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ABSTRACT 
 
Major accidents in the process industries occurred mostly as an outcome of multiple failures in 
different safety barriers and their interrelation with unsafe acts by frontline operators. This has 
become the reason why safety analyses in terms of plant technical aspects cannot be performed 
independently from analysing human response to the changing technology. Unsafe acts and 
errors by operators must be seen as a symptom of system insufficiencies and underlying 
problems, rather than as the cause of an accident. With this paradigm, the need to optimally 
configure the system and the whole working condition to understand human’s limitation and 
requirements becomes very evident. It is too naive to desire that human operators make zero 
error by asking them to change their behaviour and to perfectly adapt to the system.  
Human Factors (HF) attempts to cope with the need to understand the interrelation between 
human operators, the technology they are working with and the management system, with the 
aim to increase safety and efficiency. In achieving this goal, HF must be incorporated into the 
whole plant lifecycle, from the earliest design stage to plant operation and modifications. 
Moreover, HF analysis must comprise all kinds of operators’ activities and responsibilities in 
operating process plants, which can include manual works in field and supervisory control 
conducted remotely from a control centre/room. 
This work has developed techniques that provide systematic way to incorporate HF into process 
plant lifecycle. The new HF analysis technique, PITOPA-Design, in a combination with the classic 
PITOPA, is applicable for an implementation during design and operation of a plant. With the 
awareness that safety analysis and HF cannot be performed separately, an interconnection with 
HAZOPs is made possible by means of this new technique. Moreover, to provide a systematic 
analysis of operators’ work in control room, an additional technique, the PITOPA-CR was also 
developed. This HF technique can as well be integrated into a general HF analysis both during 
design phase and plant operation. In addition to it, results coming from PITOPA-CR will provide 
information required to optimally configure control and alarm system, as well as the whole 
alarm management system to better understand the limitation and requirements of control 
room operators. 
The structure of the development can be described as follows:  
i) Development of HAZOPA (the Hazards and Operator Actions Analysis), which provides 
the interconnection between HF analysis and HAZOPs,  
ii) Development of PITOPA-Design, a technique to incorporate HF consideration into design 
phase, which is differentiated into 3 stages to comprise the conceptual design, the basic 
engineering and the detail engineering phase,  
iii) Development of PITOPA-CR, a technique for HF analysis in control room, 
iv) Integration of PITOPA-CR into alarm management system, development of a technique 
for alarm prioritization. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Schwere Unfälle in der Prozessindustrie erfolgen meist aus einem Zusammenspiel mehrerer 
verschiedener Fehler und der gleichzeitigen Wechselwirkung mit falschem menschlichem Handeln. 
Dabei sind diese Fehlhandlungen nicht als Unfallursache anzusehen, sondern sie resultieren aus 
Fehlern, die in dem System selbst zu finden sind. Aus diesem Grund kann bei der Sicherheitsanalyse 
die technische Analyse nicht unabhängig von der Betrachtung des Human Factors (HF) 
durchgeführt werden. Um eine Reduzierung der Fehlhandlungen zu erreichen, müssen das 
Anlagendesign, die Bedienbarkeit und die Arbeitsumgebung an die menschlichen Fähigkeiten 
angepasst werden.  
 
Human Factors (HF) betrachtet die Interaktion zwischen menschlichen, technischen und 
organisatorischen Aspekten einer Anlage, mit dem Ziel die Sicherheit und Effektivität der Anlage zu 
optimieren. Dafür ist eine Einbindung von HF in den gesamten Lebenszyklus einer Anlage 
notwendig. So müssen HF- Analysen nicht nur während des Betriebs einer Anlage und bei 
Prozessmodifikationen durchgeführt werden, sondern auch während des gesamten Design- 
Prozesses, da gerade in den frühen Design-Phasen das Optimierungspotential besonders hoch ist. 
Eine solche Analysemethode muss alle Aufgaben eines Operators erfassen, so dass zwischen 
manueller Arbeit und der Arbeit in der Leitwarte unterschieden werden muss. 
 
In dieser Arbeit wurden Analysentechniken entwickelt, die einen systematischen Ansatz zur 
Berücksichtigung des HF über den gesamten Lebenszyklus einer verfahrenstechnischen Anlage 
darstellen. Mit Hilfe der neuen Analysemethode, PITOPA-Design, können  Untersuchungen sowohl 
während der Designphase als auch während des Betriebs einer Anlage durchgeführt werden. Da 
solche HF-Analyse immer in Verbindung mit einer klassischen Sicherheitsanalyse erfolgen muss, 
bindet die neue Methode die HAZOP-Analyse direkt ein. 
 
Darüber hinaus wurde ein weiterer Ansatz für die Analyse von Operatorhandlungen in einer 
Messwartenarbeit entwickelt. Diese neue Analysentechnik, PITOPA-CR, bildet die Grundlage für 
Verbesserungen im  Alarmsystem und wird in das Alarmmanagementsystem eingebunden. 
 
Die Arbeit ist wie folgt strukturiert: 
 
i)  Entwicklung von HAZOPA (the Hazards and Operator Actions Analysis). Diese Methode 
stellt  die Einbindung der HF-Analyse in HAZOP dar.  
ii)  Entwicklung von PITOPA-Design, zur HF-Analyse während des gesamten Designprozesses 
einer verfahrenstechnischen Anlage. Die Methode wurde in 3 Teile eingeteilt,  um die drei 
Designsphasen Conceptual-, Basic-, und Detail-Design zu erfassen. 
iii)  Entwicklung von PITOPA-CR, zur HF-Analyse in der Messwarte. 
iv)  Einbindung von PITOPA-CR in das Alarmmanagementsystem und Entwicklung einer 
Technik zur Alarmpriorisierung. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Over the past decades, safety control in the process industries has advanced to an 
established application. For the improvement of safety systems, diverse analysis 
techniques have been developed and are widely implemented to systematically analyze 
process installations and to identify potential hazards. However, catastrophic accidents 
with numerous fatalities, severe injuries and serious damage on facilities still happen on 
an almost daily basis (Knegtering, et al., 2009). In finding the reason why accidents still 
happen after such an enormous attention has been given to avoid and reduce the 
occurrence, it is essential to understand the common characteristics of those major 
accidents. One crucial characteristic of such accidents is that they always occur as an 
outcome of multiple failures in different safety barriers and their interrelation with 
unsafe acts by frontline operators. Major accidents were also found to be mostly caused 
by insufficient management quality and organizational as well as human factors (HF), 
since the changes that happened rapidly in the process industries in terms of new 
technology and high market competition have affected operators’ work significantly. The 
more complex process installations, process control and safeguarding equipment are 
becoming, the bigger the risk of incorrect application can be and the more distant the 
operators will be from the real process. Meanwhile, in coping with the need to increase 
productivity and reduce costs, large turnover and reduction of staffs occurs while the 
work load is growing (Knegtering, et al., 2009).     
HF has been given much less attention than it deserves in most companies’ safety 
programs. Even if practitioners are gaining more awareness about the importance and 
benefits that can be achieved through the performance of HF analyses in their plants, 
there is a considerably great number that still view HF sceptically. An internal survey 
was conducted during this work within a well established company running in process 
industry in Germany. This survey has delivered findings1 that HF is as a matter of fact 
                                                 
1
 no attempt is made for generalizing the condition 
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not an unfamiliar term for most of the managerial staffs, however, not many of them are 
aware of what HF really implies and is aimed at. The survey also presents the low level 
of acceptance to HF and its implementation in this company. This is an indication that 
there is still a lack of understanding about HF. Sceptics still see HF as ill-defined, difficult 
and expensive to apply (CCPS, 2007b). Such perceptions have convinced many people to 
wholly ignore or only partly include HF in their safety policy. 
What they often fail to realize is that operators hold the key to reaching every goal the 
company is aiming at, and only if they were guaranteed safety and comfort during work, 
those goals can become achievable. Ignoring HF means ignoring their needs and 
requirements in order to successfully perform their work, which also means risking 
operational safety. HF will receive the attention it deserves if everyone was aware that 
the costs spent for implementing HF are barely comparable to the advantages it 
provides. The avoidance of fatalities, injuries, damage to the environment and the loss to 
capital are only some of the benefits of performing HF in a process plant. Increase in the 
operators’ trusts in the company, in their working motivation, and the improvement in 
productivity and production efficiency are several others to mention. 
In order to achieve these advantages, HF needs to be included in every stage of plant 
lifecycle, especially during the design of a process plant. Considering HF in early design 
phase can avoid the need of later changes during operation so that increase in efficiency 
and safety of operation will be achievable. Moreover, the incorporation of HF must be 
able to comprehensively take into account the diverse operator tasks and 
responsibilities during process operation. HF must cope with the requirements of a 
reliable information exchange between human operators and the distant processes they 
are supervising. The design of control system as a whole must therefore include 
consideration on how operator acts and responds to the provided information. Hence, an 
introduction of a reliable HF analysis technique that comprises works in field and in 
control rooms/centres, and is applicable for both plant design and operation is 
inevitably required.   
1.2  Objectives 
The lack of adequate systematic and well-structured means to incorporate HF in design 
and operation of chemical processes has been giving a big contribution to the slow 
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penetration of HF in process industries. Hence, the objective of this work is aimed at the 
inclusion of HF in both plant design and operation, comprising the whole operators’ 
activity and responsibility both during manual work and supervisory control.  
As one of the most crucial aspects to maintain frontline operators’ reliability, alarm 
management and the design of control system must incorporate HF and the 
consideration of operator actions especially in coping with abnormal situations. For this 
reason, a technique that provides the way to incorporate HF into alarm management is 
also developed in this work. The new technique will also enable an incorporation of HF 
into the design of control and alarm system, so that it understands operators’ 
capabilities, requirements and limitations in performing supervisory control, 
particularly in dealing with process upsets. 
The objective of the work is not to set new standards for the industry, but to encourage 
companies and individuals to apply the existing standards and operational guidelines in 
revealing the main HF issues and the most underlying problems in their facility by 
providing tools for a systematic HF analysis. Human error is not the cause of an accident, 
but the symptom of various underlying problems (Mackenzie, et al., 2009). Hence, in 
achieving the objective, this work developed methods that assist diverse users (HF 
analysts, engineers, plant managerial staffs or also operators) in finding the underlying 
problems in a system and to recognize necessary improvements so that operators’ 
reliability and operation efficiency can be assured.  
1.3 Scope of Work 
The development of the HF method for plant design and the technique to incorporate HF 
into alarm management was based on the practical observation in several plants of 
Bayer CropScience AG, Germany. The case studies delivered in this work in order to 
better demonstrate the practical implementation of the developed methods are however 
hypothetical and simplified examples and do not represent any actual condition of the 
processes at that company.   
The methods developed in this work are an enhancement of works conducted previously 
(Widiputri, 2007; Widiputri, et al., 2008). However, to enable an implementation in 
design phase and to provide an analysis of control room works, the previous works had 
been massively modified. New checklists, worksheets and questionnaires were 
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developed corresponding to each of the new approaches. The development of the 
checklists and questionnaires was made based on the previous works and expert 
considerations related to this subject. Results provided by the methods should give 
direction to necessary recommendations provided by operational guidelines and 
standards.  
The technique for HF analysis in control room developed in this work is aimed at 
providing a way to include HF into general alarm management. However, the technique 
only comprises a detail incorporation of operator actions in one particular stage of alarm 
management, which is the alarm prioritization.  Prioritizing alarms is considered one of 
the most essential and effective ways to improve alarm system’s performance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Fundamentals of Human Error  
Understanding human errors and their mechanisms has been a research focus in 
different areas for decades. Several views in defining what human error is and how it 
happens were offered by different perspectives. Rasmussen views human error and 
faults in performing a task as a phenomenon that cannot be defined objectively apart 
from the systemic context. A reference of what is intended and expected as an outcome 
of the task performance is required, to be able to judge whether the action taken was an 
erroneous one (Rasmussen, 1987). This opinion was also supported by Reason in his 
book saying that any attempt made to define human error or to classify types of errors 
must be made after a consideration of different intentional behaviour (Reason, 1990). 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to recall that having an intended action successfully done 
does not always mean that the action conducted was not erroneous. Human intention 
and the outcome of the action might be correct from one’s perspective, which may vary 
from the intended and expected output of the function. 
“There is no universally agreed classification of human error, nor is there in prospect”. A 
taxonomy of errors is usually made for a specific purpose, and can consequently differ in 
a broad range depending on what the classification is based upon. Reason suggested one 
error classification based on the interaction between the basic error tendencies; which 
can include the ecological constraints, resource limitations, or various strategies; and the 
cognitive domains, which represent various stages or operation in human information 
processing (Reason, 1987). For this modelling, the mechanism of information processing 
in human mind is divided into three main stages: planning, storage and execution. 
Planning refers to the processes concerned with identifying goals and the means to 
achieve it, which will usually not immediately come to an execution, so that it is likely 
that a storage phase will intervene between those two stages. Errors that occur during 
all of the three stages can be classified into four main types of human failures: slips, 
lapses, mistakes and violations (Reason, 1990) as described in the following. 
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Slips are associated to failures in executing an action, even though the person has the 
correct intention. Due to different reasons, the action the person intended to perform is 
not conducted as planned. An example of slip is when an operator unintentionally enters 
a wrong set-point into a console by mistakenly typing the number 9 instead of 0, even 
though he knew exactly what the correct number was. Training will not prevent errors 
of this type, for even if everyone is well-trained and well-motivated, physically and 
mentally capable, they will still make occasional slips.  
Lapses, similar to slips are failures conducted where the intention was correct. 
However, this kind of errors is associated with failures of memory, where actions are 
omitted or parts of the actions sequence are repeated. Lapses happen mostly during the 
performance of routine tasks in a familiar environment. The memory in this case is 
labelled as ‘temporary’ or ‘volatile’ memory that includes the short-term memory. 
Examples of this error type include forgetting list items, losing track of previous actions, 
misreading a display, or forgetting to press a switch.  
Mistakes are the outcome of a failure in the plan to meet its objective. Errors of this type 
occur principally when someone lacks the idea of performing an action correctly. This 
can occur either because the plan or the intention was not suitable for the situation, or 
the situation was not foreseen so that no plan was available to face the situation. 
Mistakes can be further broken down into two types: the first one is failures of expertise, 
where plans are incorrectly and inappropriately conducted, and the second one is the 
lack of expertise. Misdiagnosing process parameters can be an example of this error 
type. 
Violations happen when someone knows exactly what to do but decides not to do it. The 
intention of carrying out actions that might be contrary to organization rules and 
procedures is however not to cause harm or endanger the operation. Violations can 
happen while the operators are dealing with impracticable working procedures or out-
of-date manuals. In the case where instructions are incorrect, violations can offer a 
prevention of an accident.  
Another commonly used classification of error is the Generic Error-Modelling System 
(GEMS), which is based on the information processing mechanism proposed by a model 
from Rasmussen. This model differentiates human information processing into 3 levels, 
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the skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based (SRK) tasks or behaviour. The lowest level of 
information processing is skill-based and includes mainly routine tasks where an 
automatic execution of actions is required. Skill-based behaviour relates to motor-skill in 
reacting to a current condition, without necessarily requiring conscious thinking. This 
behaviour is very commonly involved in industrial tasks, where in a familiar working 
environment, following a triggering event an operator knows spontaneously what the 
expected reaction is. The skill-based level is comparable with the ‘execution’ stage of 
human information processing.  
Rule-based behaviour on the other hand requires a definition of the link between a 
condition and an action. An input sensed by one person will be interpreted into signs 
that characterise the condition in need of an action. The correct action will be defined by 
applying the rule: if <condition> then <action>. This level is comparable with the 
‘storage’ stage in human information processing. 
The highest level of information processing in SRK-based model is knowledge-based. To 
complete tasks of this category operators are required to consciously consider what 
action needs to be executed. It is very common that knowledge-based behaviour occurs 
in facing novel situations where no fixed rules are available. This level is comparable 
with the ‘planning’ stage of Reason’s model, where an identification of the problem and 
assessment of the situation is required before able to decide the correct reaction.  
 
 
Figure 2. 1 Classification of human errors from the cognitive perspective (Reason, 1990) 
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SRK-based model differentiate errors based on the level of information processing 
where they are likely to occur. Skill-based errors are mainly described as unintended 
actions including slips and lapses. Mistakes on the other hand can be described as rule-
based and knowledge-based errors, depending on whether they were caused through 
failures of expertise or by a lack of expertise itself. Figure 2. 1 demonstrates the error 
classification based on GEMS model, which summarizes the combination between 
Reason’s classification and the SRK-based model from Rasmussen. 
The error classification from the cognitive perspective has successfully described how 
different types of errors can occur in different levels in the human information 
processing system. The model however fails to define the underlying causations of these 
errors. The interrelation between human and the factors affecting their performance is 
not explained in this model and consequently, it strengthens the belief that human being 
with their limitations is the actual problem. Hence, the study about human error cannot 
end with the identification and classification of errors alone, but must proceed with the 
search for the causations. Only by understanding why people make errors, the 
occurrence can be prevented. 
2.2 Human Factors (HF) 
The term Human Factors (HF) corresponds to the interface between the scientific 
knowledge of human, facilities and procedural or managerial system, regarding all 
activities in different stages of a process, which can lead either to a better or poorer 
system efficiency, safety and reliability (CCPS, 2007b). This similar definition of HF was 
also suggested by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP): 
„HF is the environmental, organizational and job factors, and human and 
individual characteristics which influence behavior at work in a way which can 
affect health and safety.” (HSE, 1999) 
„HF is the interaction of individuals with each other, with facilities and equipment 
and with management systems.” (OGP, 2005) 
Figure 2. 2 shows the interaction of the 3 HF domains; facility/equipment, 
human/people and management system based on the OGP model. The domain 
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human/people represents the personal characteristics and behaviour, including factors 
related to fitness, skill, stress and fatigues. The facility/equipment domain includes 
considerations on physical characteristics of the workplace and design of equipment 
that the people need to work with. Meanwhile the management system domain can be 
considered as a framework under which operator works must take place. This domain 
includes working procedures, trainings and safety culture. The model shows an 
overlapping area between the 3 domains, which represents the focus of HF analysis in 
achieving a safe workplace. HF aims to fit the tasks and the environment to the person 
rather than forcing the people to adapt to those factors in a significant manner in order 
to successfully perform their work (CCPS, 2007b). 
 
 
Figure 2. 2 HF domains based on the OGP model 
 
Different from the cognitive perspective, HF views errors as a consequence rather than a 
cause of accidents. Although there are personal characteristics that are unchangeable, 
which influence the working performance of an operator in a significant manner, there 
are many more attributes that can be improved and adjusted to human’s limitation in 
such a way that they reduce the likelihood of errors. Hence, HF always tends to search 
for the underlying causes of errors, which can be as simple as misplaced labels or a 
complex problem such as lack of trust to the company’s safety policy. 
2.3 Motivations to Consider HF in Process Safety 
Human Factors (HF) as a study has its origin in the aviation industry, started with the 
consciousness that human plays a very big role in maintaining even the most 
sophisticated automatic system to operate expectedly. The irony of this fact is, apart 
from their ability to reliable information processing and decision making, human beings 
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with so many weaknesses and limitations are left with such a huge responsibility. These 
weaknesses are often blamed to cause human errors that led to fatal accidents. With the 
expanding technology of aircraft and aviation industry, systems were becoming more 
complex and automation took over most of the responsibilities that previously were 
assigned to human. There is only one intention of performing this rapid shift in 
technology, which is to increase safety. Meanwhile, no matter to which degree the 
automation is increased, human being can never be eliminated from the system. The 
escalating system complexity leaves humans with even a bigger responsibility, and 
therefore a higher work load. Understanding this reality, many experts had dedicated 
their effort to comprehend how human beings interact with their surroundings and to 
eventually conclude that human errors are caused more by system inadequacies rather 
than their personal characteristics and limitations alone.  
After gaining attention and responses in aviation industry, other industry branches such 
as medical, nuclear power plants and transportation realized the same problems in their 
fields. Improving the technology alone cannot further reduce the number of accidents 
occurring at their sites. The same issue was also acknowledged in process industry in 
early 1980s. Human factors deficiencies have been recognized to be the main cause of 
many major accidents in process industries. This has become a motivation to understand 
more about HF, regarding how to improve and optimize a working environment to best 
support and suit the operators’ limitations so that they can deliver their maximal 
performance.  
Figure 2. 3 demonstrates statistical data that address HF as a main cause of most 
undesired events in process industry. The figure illustrates results of a study conducted 
in petroleum refining industries to indentify the recurring human factors contributions 
to accidents. It is shown that 47% or around half of all the causes of incidents occurred 
in refining industries included elements of HF (Chadwell, et al., 1999). This result shows 
that seeking for technical flaws and people ineffective behaviour separately in analysing 
an accident is not adequate. It is crucial to also observe aspects behind the routine 
activities, for instance the organisational aspects, safety culture and training programs. 
Understanding that many major accidents in process industries happened through 
inadequacies of various HF attributes helps people to realize that those accidents could 
have been avoided if the company had proactively incorporated considerations on HF 
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throughout the plant lifecycle. Hence, avoidance of accidents becomes the main 
motivation to considering HF in process industry, which is in several regions already 
regulated and enforced by applied laws. However, one of the benefits of considering HF 
that people often disbelief is the increase in revenue since productivity and efficiency 
are improved, where at the same time, unplanned outages are reduced.  
 
Figure 2. 3 Level 1 cause contribution factors of incidents in petroleum refining industries  
(Chadwell, et al., 1999) 
 
In this chapter several accidents that attributed HF issues are discussed in brief and 
several others are tabulated in Table 2. 1. An explanation about regulations on HF in 
process industries and the business advantages offered by the implementation of HF is 
delivered subsequently. 
2. 3. 1 Accidents that Address HF in Process Safety  
Learning from accidents is the best way to avoid the same accidents from happening 
again. Understanding what had happened prior to the accident can help recognizing 
whether or not the similar deficiencies are found in other plants. During the last two 
decades, it has been acknowledged that the lack of awareness concerning HF and the 
insufficient design of HF aspects were the main cause of many major accidents in 
process industries. Several to mention are the Piper Alpha disaster, BP Texas City 
accident and the explosion of Texaco Refinery in Milford Haven, UK. 
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Piper Alpha 
The Piper Alpha accident is one of the biggest events in process industry which has 
brought many insights about how important it is to incorporate the consideration of HF 
into safety concept. The disaster happened on an oil platform on July 6, 1988, where an 
explosion and resulting fire destroyed the whole platform and killed 165 people on 
board and 2 emergency response personnel, leaving only 59 survivors.  
The Platform was first constructed in 1976 as an oil platform only, which was then 
extended to include gas production. In the first construction, four modules were located 
separately by using firewalls between each module. The safety concept had successfully 
brought the most dangerous sections distant from the personnel areas. The introduction 
of the new gas conversion part forced the utilization of the available spaces between the 
modules, which was previously intended as a safety barrier. 
The disaster started with the burst of high pressure gas out of a condensate pump, which 
at the time was under maintenance. The pump was a backup pump, whose relieve valve 
(RV) was being overhauled on that day after one day extension, which still could not be 
completely finished until 6 pm. Permission to continue the service work on the next day 
was received and the tube where the RV should have been installed was sealed with a 
plate. Later long after shift change the primary condensate pump experienced a 
disturbance. A quick decision needed to be made, exactly when the shift leader found a 
permit to work (PTW) for the backup pump, without knowing that this PTW was 
prepared before the earlier shift realized that the overhaul could not be accomplished. 
No one present at that time realized the situation, that there was no RV installed at the 
backup pump and that this backup pump was still not ready for operation. The plate 
used to seal the pipe could not resist the high pressure and burst at once. The resulting 
amount of gas ignited instantly and caused an explosion. This initial explosion was the 
start of a huge fire and several other explosions, and within 22 minutes, the platform 
was totally destroyed. 
Lessons learned 
An investigation conducted by CCPS (CCPS, 2005) had delivered several key lessons that 
addressed complex HF issue, including: 
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1. Permit to work (PTW) system. 
2. Communication problem during shift turnover. 
3. Insufficient procedure to operate safety system, in this case the fire pump that had 
been switched to manual due to the presence of divers around the platform. 
4. Insufficient design of the separating wall of the new module for gas processing, 
which was fireproof but not explosion proof.  
5. Maintenance problems referring to corrosion. 
6. Insufficient emergency response training for personnel, especially for the new 
platform. 
7. Inadequate design of evacuation line and facility.  
BP Texas City Refinery 
The BP Texas incident marked the new millennium with one of the worst industrial 
disasters. The accident happened on March 23, 2005 at noon, after the lunch break. An 
investigation by U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) reported 
that the explosion and fires killed 15 people and injured 180 with total financial losses 
exceeding $1.5 billion.  
The accident was initiated during the start-up of a raffinate splitter tower that was 
earlier under maintenance. The start-up took place in early morning where the tower 
was filled with a flammable liquid hydrocarbon up to a certain level, indicated by the 
control and instrumentation system. During start-up, the operator expected the level of 
the liquid in the tower to rise slightly over the desired level during operation, after years 
of experience. Therefore, alarm indicating that an inappropriate level of liquid has been 
reached was not an emergency alert for the operator during start-up. Unfortunately, the 
instrumentation did not provide the actual level of liquid in the tower to the operator, so 
that liquid that was flowing into the tower over three hours, which was actually contrary 
to the normal operating procedure, filled up the 57-m tower and overflowed the 
overhead pipe, down through a safety relief and at last reached the blowdown drum. The 
blowdown system was not properly redesigned for safety since it was an old unit built in 
the 1950s and had never been attached to a flare system. The overfilled blowdown drum 
released volatile liquid that evaporated right away into flammable vapour creating a 
huge vapour cloud surrounding the facility. Less than 10-m away from the blowdown 
drum it was found that at the exact time a pickup truck was parked with an engine still 
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on, and was then believed as the source of ignition that backfired in an instance to the 
facility and caused a massive explosion (CSB, 2007).   
Lessons learned 
Findings of the investigation addressed that the BP Texas City Disaster was a result of 
both organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels in the corporation. BP was 
considered as not having the adequate method for analysing safety and had used wrong 
indicators to evaluate their safety performance. The misleading information had drifted 
them further away from preventing such a disastrous incident. Root causes of the 
disaster had been recognized as to involve following HF and organisational issues: 
1. The absent of safety culture and major accident prevention programs 
2. No inclusion of HF consideration in their training, staffing and work scheduling 
3. No incorporation of good practice design in the operation of the unit 
Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven 
The series of events that led to the accident at the facility of Texaco Refinery started on a 
Sunday morning, 24 July 1994 following a severe weather condition. A lightning strike 
started a fire in the facility’s crude distillation unit (CDU), which caused disturbances in 
several other units. The fire caused was however not the reason of the explosion that 
came several hours later at around midday. The explosion of the Texaco Refinery in 
Milford Haven was a result of a complex combination of deficiencies in management, 
control system and equipment, as to the investigation conducted by the U. K.  Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). 
Prior to the explosion, flammable liquid hydrocarbon was continually pumped into a 
process vessel, whose valve at the outlet was closed due to a malfunction. The operators 
in the control room were not aware of the situation since the display showed that the 
valve was opened. The display did not provide overviews concerning process data such 
as mass and energy balance so that there was no way for the control room operators to 
have acknowledged what was going on with the operation. This event led to a series of 
other disturbances and released around 20 tonnes of a flammable mixture of fluid and 
vapour hydrocarbons. The vapour reached a source of ignition and exploded 
instantaneously afterwards (HSE, 1997).  
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Table 2. 1 Several Major Accidents that Addressed HF Issues (CCPS, 2007b) 
Accident 
Human 
Consequences 
Human Factors Issues 
Communications Training Equipment Maintenance Decisions Procedures 
Human 
Machine 
Interface 
Flixborough, 
England, 1974: 
Cyclohexane 
release 
28 fatalities 
86 injured 
Drawing of change 
done on shop room 
floor only. 
The operators 
were not 
trained in 
hazard 
identification. 
 
Not supervised by 
qualified engineer. 
To bypass one 
reactor vessel 
with a 
temporary 
modification to 
allow the plant 
to continue to 
operate. 
Poor management of 
change. No time limit 
set for the temporary 
change. 
 
Seveso, Italy, 
1976: Dioxin 
release. 
No fatalities 
directly 
attributed. 
Multiple illnesses. 
Company did not 
communicate which 
chemicals had been 
released. 
 
Bursting disc blew 
on a reactor vessel – 
set point too high. 
Reactor vessels 
inadequate. 
 
Secondary 
receiver 
recommended 
by 
manufacturer to 
collect any 
vented material 
– not fitted. 
Failure to follow 
operating procedures 
– Batch not finished 
and operation not 
shut down per 
normal shutdown 
procedures because 
of weekend holiday. 
 
Three Mile 
Island, 
Harrisburg, PA, 
1979: Loss of 
control of 
nuclear 
reaction 
resulting in 
destruction of 
reactor core. 
None 
A near miss at another 
unit was not 
communicated to this 
unit. 
Training for 
operators not 
adequate – no 
feedback to 
students. 
Turbine trip. 
Subsequently, pilot-
operated relief valve 
(PORV) sticks open. 
Two block valves left in 
closed position after 
maintenance 2 days 
before. 
Operators 
reduced coolant 
water flow into 
reactor 
attempting to 
prevent 
flooding – 
caused 
meltdown. 
 
Operators misled by 
control panel – poor 
design. Over 100 
alarms – not 
prioritized. Warning 
light showing valves 
closed obscured by 
maintenance tag. 
Bhopal , India, 
1984: Release 
of Methyl 
Isocyamat 
(MIC) 
Est. 8,000 
fatalities 
300,000 injured 
No alarm ever 
properly sounded to 
warn of gas cloud. 
Failure to provide MIC 
treatment information. 
Half to two-
thirds of 
skilled 
engineers had 
left prior to 
the accident. 
Insufficient scrubber 
capacity. Flare tower 
disconnected. Vent 
gas scrubber in 
inactive mode. No 
gas masks available. 
Pressure and temperature 
sensors did not work – 
pressure gauge under 
reading by 30psig. 
Refrigeration plant shut 
down to save costs. No 
regular cleaning of pipes 
and valves. 
To store 10 
times more MIC 
than required 
on site. 
Poor evacuation 
measures. No 
temporary 
management of 
change. 
No online monitor 
for MIC tasks. No 
automatic sensors to 
warn of temperature 
increase. 
16 | C h a p t e r  2  
 
Lessons learned 
The investigation by HSE provided some key lessons from the occurrence of the 
explosion at Texaco Refinery in Milford Haven. In the following several lessons learned 
from the accident are crystallized addressing the contribution of both technical 
measures and HF as the causes: 
1. Inadequate emergency response procedure that failed to overcome with process 
upsets 
2. Inadequate control and instrumentation system 
3. Insufficient display configuration and operator interface 
4. The absent of good management of change (MoC) and overall maintenance 
5. Inadequate hazard analysis and assessment 
2. 3. 2 Regulation and Legal Requirements 
The integration of consideration about human operators in process industry has been 
addressed in many regulations in different parts of the world. Some of the regulations 
and standards have explicitly put the requirements to incorporate HF into plant lifecycle, 
whereas some others impose the assurance of occupational health and safety in order to 
reduce the number of people killed, injured, or made ill by work. In this section several 
regulation requirements in different regions are described. 
HF Regulations in the European Union (EU) 
Within the European Union (EU) the control of major accident hazards is regulated 
under the Council directive 96/82/EC issued in 1996, also often referred to as the Seveso 
II Directive. The directive is aimed at the prevention of hazards involving dangerous 
substances and at the limitation of the consequences of such accidents for man and the 
environment. The latest amendment to the SEVESO II Directive was issued on 16 
December 2003 (Directive 2003/105/EC). SEVESO II was the first regulation to introduce 
checks on human role in the chemical process safety. The directive acknowledged the 
significance of interaction between humans and the system on the overall process safety 
(European Union, 1996; Kariuki, 2007).  
In Germany, SEVESO II Directive is implemented through the “12. Verordnung zur 
Durchführung des Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes-12. BImSchV” of 26 April 2000. The 
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act put explicit requirements to take the necessary safety-relevant precautions to avoid 
false operation, to provide suitable operating and safety applications, as well as to 
conduct adequate trainings of the personnel in preventing major accidents 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2010). Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom SEVESO was 
transposed into COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) regulations, which ensure 
that businesses "take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents involving 
dangerous substances and limit the consequences to people and the environment of any 
major accidents which do occur". Three organizations are responsible for the 
enforcement of COMAH, which are the Health and Safety Executive – HSE, the 
Environment Agency – EA (for England and Wales) and the Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency – SEPA (HSE, 2010).    
HF Regulations in the United States of America (USA) and North America 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the US government in their 
capacity as the regulator require the inclusion of HF as one of the 12 core elements in 
process safety management (PSM) system. In OSHA‘s standard 29-CFR-1910.119 
inclusion of HF into the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), design of procedures, and 
training programs is emphasized (Bridges, et al., 2010). The guidelines to compliance of 
these standards are provided by the Directive CPL-02-02-045 issued and revised by 
OSHA in 1994 (OSHA, 2000). The inclusion of HF in PHAs is also required by regulations 
for risk management programs, 40 CFR 68.24 of the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) (Bridges, 1994). 
In Canada, the consideration of HF and ergonomics is regulated under the Canada 
Labour Code Part II, the R.S., 1985, c. L-2 with the purpose to prevent work-related 
accidents and diseases in companies and organizations (Department of Justice Canada, 
2010b). The codes are the formal written enactment of the Canada Occupational Health 
and Safety regulations – SOR 86-304 (Department of Justice Canada, 2010a). 
HF Regulations in Asia 
The Korean Occupational Safety and Health (KOSHA) enacted the Industrial Safety and 
Health Act (ISH Act) in 1981 with the purpose to prevent injuries and disease and to 
maintain worker’s health. ISH Act then served as the groundwork for the full 
implementation of industrial accident prevention policy (Kang, et al., 2004). In 1990 
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KOSHA issued the Presidential Decree No. 13053, latest amendment in 2010 that 
regulates the enforcement of the occupational safety and health act. In South Korea the 
specific term of HF is commonly known as human factors engineering (HFE), and has 
been taken into account as one of the important issues for safety improvement. The 
implementation is however still relatively limited and comprises mostly the nuclear 
industry. Generally, HF analysis is performed by means of HRA (Human Reliability 
Analysis), which is a quantitative technique to predict the likelihood of human error.  
Similarly in Indonesia, HF has not been massively adopted into safety promotion 
programs. Acts related to occupational health and safety have been however enacted 
since the 1970s, one of the initial ones is the Indonesian Act No.1/1970 about 
occupational safety at work. The practical implementation of this act is generally based 
on different international standards, such as the ILO Code of Practise, the ISO and OSHA 
standards. In the past decade there has been a significant move in interest for 
incorporating HF in design and operation of process plants, which is however mostly 
captured in the gas and petroleum industries. 
All of the enforced regulations and the related compliance directives emphasize 
companies to identify potential human errors and to reduce the frequency and 
consequences of such errors as part of an overall process safety management (PSM) 
program. Nevertheless, many practitioners claim that there are momentarily too many 
regulations without any reference how to practically implement HF consideration 
during plant design, operation, maintenance and construction. Several guidelines, such 
as the OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accidents Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response and different CCPS guidelines provide the golden rules in achieving a safer 
workplace and avoiding accidents. However, not all recommendations suggested by the 
available guidelines are suitable for every situation, and therefore, a careful 
consideration in selecting the most appropriate ones is necessary. Moreover, many of 
the regulations and directive address HF only in term of how to design a safer working 
environment and do not focus on the search for error causations and the underlying 
problems.  
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2. 3. 3 Business Value 
The performance of HF in a plant or a facility will deliver many benefits in addition to 
the improvement of process safety. The impacts of better safety quality will result in not 
only the reduction in near-misses and human errors potential, but also in an increase in 
working performance, which will improve productivity and production efficiencies. 
Ultimately, a reduction in lifetime costs associated with maintaining and re-engineering 
the facility and equipment will be achievable (CCPS, 2007b). The cost need to be 
expended in performing HF is considerably insignificant if compared to the significant 
performance improvement and to the fact that fatalities are potentially avoided.   
Some useful proofs of how HF can substantially bring benefits to business values are 
provided by several case histories. BP Grangemouth took actions to improve the quality 
of human factors at their site after recognizing numerous incidents attributable to 
human errors. After a 3-years period a 10% improvement in plant reliability and a 25% 
reduction in costs were achieved. A human factors improvement conducted in the Air 
Products and Chemical, Inc. within 2 years-period has resulted in a 60% reduction in the 
number of controllable outages. ExxonMobil, Inc. as another example has also 
successfully reduced their outages by 80% within 5 years after the implementation of 
human factors improvement had been initiated. These success stories should motivate 
the implementation of HF properly and proactively throughout plant lifecycle as a cost 
effective way to improve process safety (CCPS, 2007b). 
2.4  Work of Operators in Complex Systems 
The definition of system complexity described in this work is based on the level of 
responsibility and mental workload that one operator holds during operation. How to 
judge the degree of both attributes is very questionable and includes subjective opinions 
from people that might claim to know the system at its best. However, a complex system 
has become a frequently used expression to describe a system where a large number of 
components are involved; whose changes in status and parameter might occur 
frequently, and to certain extent could happen unpredictably and very rapidly (Cochran, 
1997).  
The technology modernisation in process industry has resulted in computerization and 
automation of process functions. The need to computerize and automate appeared as 
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markets are being enhanced, productivity must be increased and processes have to be 
therefore extended. From the awareness that human operators have their limitations in 
supervising and monitoring systems, that can each consist of several complex processes, 
automation has become an absolute requirement. The aim of automation is basically to 
eliminate work of operators at points where operator’s interference is not feasible for 
any reason. Automation aims therefore at the assurance of process and personnel safety, 
as well as production efficiency and product quality.  
However, the introduction of computerization and automation had brought other, much 
bigger issues for process safety. In this chapter, some most common problems with 
automation are discussed after the description of operator’s role and responsibility in 
complex systems. 
2. 4. 1 Role of Operators in Complex Systems 
Operators, no matter what their limitations are, can never be eliminated from a system 
and indeed, still hold the most important role among all elements in the system. A 
minimum number of personnel is required in maintaining the operation to run. An 
increasing degree of automation can only reduce the number of operators down to a 
certain point, where no further reduction will be possible. In fact, if the degree of 
automation is heightened even further, it would be possible that the required number of 
operator will increase again due to i.e. maintenance activities, as shown in Figure 2. 4 
(Ivergard, et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2. 4 Number of personnel with the increasing degree of automation 
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Operators working in a complex system must stay and work as a team. The system is too 
large and too complicated for one single person to comprehend and handle. In their 
relationship with the system, human operators have the role to manage the operation to 
run smoothly, at the desired condition and status. The activities are nowadays facilitated 
by distributed control systems (DCS) that provide the operators with information from 
every measuring point all over the process on a single visual display unit (VDU). All parts 
of the process are brought together and control is possible to be conducted from one 
centralized control room. DCS appeared in place of conventional control system while 
VDUs replaced the old control panels. The changes imply directly to operator load, since 
they influence the information exchange between operators and the process.  
Traditionally, operators in operating and controlling a process have a direct contact to 
other system elements such as the machineries. The procedure is quite simple; the 
operators give input to control equipment like valves, wheels or levers, usually 
decentralized and spread all over the plant, which will directly affect the process. 
Process will deliver a feed-back to an analogue instrument in form of panel mounted 
displays, either decentralized or brought together in a control room (remote operation). 
With the introduction of computerisation and automation, there was a shift in this 
relationship between operator and the process. Nowadays, operators do not always 
have a direct contact with the process, since control is basically automated. Whenever 
intervention is necessary, operators have the possibility to interfere through computers, 
based on the information provided by displays. Operator’s responsibility becomes one of 
checking standards and monitoring the automatically controlled process, rather than to 
conduct manual tasks outside the control room (Ivergard, et al., 2009).  
Nevertheless, there are only a few numbers of processes that completely assign its 
control functions to computer. In many processes, a direct intervention of operators to 
the system is still required, if not in routine operation (for non-automated functions), 
then during process upsets and maintenance.  Figure 2. 5 demonstrates such a process, 
where process intervention through analogue control systems is still required. The 
dashed line shown in the figure represents the operator’s authority in some cases, to 
intervene with the automated functions through computers. Even if most of the 
functions in one process are fully automated, operator involvement can never be 
completely eliminated.  
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Figure 2. 5 Model of human operator’s role in semi-automated complex system,  
adapted from (Ivergard, et al., 2009) 
 
Process automation can only be increased to a certain degree, without entirely removing 
human beings from the operation. A discussion about the degree of automation is 
delivered later in this chapter. In process industries, processes that run semi-
automatically still outnumber the full-automated ones. In semi-automated complex 
systems, operators must conduct on-site work in addition to the monitoring tasks they 
ought to complete in control rooms. A brief description of operator responsibilities 
during on-site work and work in control room is delivered in the followings: 
Work in field (manual/on-site work). Operator responsibilities that can be classified 
into field work or manual/on-site work are for example:  
1. Process start-up/shut-down 
2. Sampling and sample proofing 
3. Level checking 
4. Acknowledging process state at analogue devices in field 
5. Manual feeding/charging 
6. Cleaning work 
7. Loading/unloading 
8. Inspection and maintenance 
Work in control room (supervisory task) requires operators to conduct several 
typical tasks, which include the followings (Stubler, et al., 1996): 
1. Process monitoring or supervisory control 
2. Fault detection 
3. Fault diagnosis and cause identification 
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4. Decision-making to select desired response 
5. Execution of the accurate corrective actions 
Work of operators both in field and in control room is aimed to maintain the operation 
to run its normal state, and to overcome with upsets or abnormal situations whenever 
disturbances occur. The sequence of operators’ responsibilities during both process 
conditions is illustrated in Figure 2. 6. The x-axis of the diagram describes the time 
sequence, irrelevant to the real duration of each action, whereas the y-axis shows the 
different process status, from normal to abnormal condition.  
During a normal operation, process monitoring is the main task to be performed both in 
field and in control room. Due to one or another disturbance, the operation can move 
away from its normal state, approaching abnormal condition. The system needs a certain 
time to be able to detect that a deviation is occurring, before alarm will be activated. 
Alarms following a process deviation will notify the operators of the abnormal situation, 
which will require certain corrective action to be performed. It is crucial for the 
operators to understand the cause of alarm activation, in order to select and decide the 
most proper solutions. Following the implementation of a corrective action, the system 
will require some time to react, before moving back approaching the normal operation 
line.  
 
Figure 2. 6 Flow of an operation and operator responsibilities (Rothenberg, 2009) 
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Even though operator tasks during a normal operating state are not trouble free, it is 
very obvious that in abnormal situation/upsets operator load will be heightened. 
Unfortunately, during this stressful phase operators are required to give their best 
performance, since their decision and how they implement the solution holds the key for 
the avoidance of undesired events from happening. Any mistaken action taken during 
this phase can result to an unwanted consequence that can trigger a disaster. This is the 
reason why in various discussions about work in control rooms, experts tend to stress 
on the importance of managing abnormal situations. In order to understand human 
information processing during abnormal operation, a model was developed by Cochran 
as illustrated in Figure 2. 7.  
 
Figure 2. 7 Model of operators’ information processing in abnormal situation (Cochran, 1997) 
 
2. 4. 2 Problems with Computerisation and Automation 
As mentioned previously, the introduction of computerisation in process industry has 
led to the implementation of distributed control systems (DCS). Computerisation was a 
solution to many industrial problems, starting with economic profitability, improvement 
of both process and personnel safety, and to the fulfilment of community requirements 
to conserve nature. As a result of computerisation, automation becomes an inevitable 
way in achieving these goals. Nevertheless, computerisation and automation has 
brought many cons apart from the pros it offers.  
Table 2. 2 lists some benefits and problems caused by the shift from conventional 
control system to remote operations due to the introduction of computerisation in 
process industries (HSE, 2002).  
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Table 2. 2 Issues arising through the change to remote operation,  
adapted from (HSE, 2002) 
 
Change Potential Benefits Potential Problems 
Reduced manning 
levels 
Cost reduction 
Increase in work load, stress, 
difficulty in covering for absence 
Digital control 
systems 
Cheaper maintenance, reliability 
increase 
Technical problems, e.g. during 
power failure 
Computer interface 
to control system 
Early detection of problems 
through reliable readily available 
data 
Information overload for operator, 
additional skill required, reduction 
of  awareness of the real process 
status 
Higher degree of 
automation 
Consistency improvement, 
workload reduction 
Over-reliance to the system, 
vigilance reduction, boredom 
Distant control 
room from plant 
Increase in personnel safety 
Problem in communication, 
reduction in term of know-how 
concerning the process physically 
Use of 
communication 
devices, e.g. radios 
Communication improvement 
Technical problems, e.g. during 
power failure 
 
Since it has become very clear that computerisation and automation can contribute in 
causing extra load to the operators, deciding what to automate and to what degree the 
operation needs to be automated cannot be done without a thorough consideration. In 
the next section, allocation of functions between human operator and machines is 
discussed closer, as well as the influence of the degree of automation on operator’s work 
load. 
2. 4. 3 Allocation of Functions and Levels of Automation 
Automating functions that are dangerous for people or are impossible for human 
operators to complete is most of the time unavoidable. However, due to many problems 
that might arise as a consequence of system changes, a threshold must be met. In order 
to maintain the complexity of the system at a certain tolerable and acceptable degree, it 
is sometimes desirable to keep several functions conducted manually. Therefore, 
functions have to be carefully analysed and closely observed, in assuring the correct and 
most proper allocation between human operators and machines.  
One of the oldest techniques for the allocation of functions in the history of ergonomics 
and HF study is the so-called MABA-MABA (“men are better at, machines are better at”), 
which was later changed into HABA-MABA, with “human” replacing “men” for ethical 
reason. This technique utilizes comparative lists between human abilities or limitations 
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and those of machines, which were referred to as Fitts Lists (Fitts, 1951; Hancock, et al., 
1998). Basically, there are several general considerations in allocating functions to 
human or machines; these are summarized after (Woodson, 1992) and some of which 
are discussed in the following: 
1. Environmental Constraints. Several constraints that are not supported by human 
physiology are for instance extreme atmospheric pressure, temperature, noise, 
vibration, radiation and risks arising from explosion, fires or chemical contamination.  
2. Speed and accuracy. Human response cannot compete with the capacity of a 
machine in terms of speed and accuracy. Thus allocation to human must be made 
based on their capacity. 
3. Overload. Humans tend to accumulate load either physiologically or psychologically. 
Under stress and pressure, effectiveness and accuracy after a long period of work can 
become very uncertain. 
4. Physical strength and fatigue. Humans are extremely limited compared with 
machines in terms of how much force they can apply, and for how long.  
5. Storage capacity. Even though human has a great capability to store large amount of 
information for a relative long period, their ability to retrieve this information is 
somewhat limited. Machines capability in storing or retrieving information may not 
always be better than human, since is wholly subject to its design.  
6. Interpretation of and response to unexpected events. While machines can 
completely quit in facing unexpected events, especially ones they were not designed 
to cope with, human have the unique capability to re-evaluate every situation. They 
may come to a less-than-perfect solution, but can result in the rescue of the operation. 
7. Learning. Learning new things require certain period of time for human operators, 
while machines operate right away after being programmed and operated.  
8. Cost. As long as humans are used properly, they often are the least expensive 
component of a system. 
Allocating functions between human and machine based only on the differences 
between their capabilities and limitations is nowadays not considered as adequate 
anymore. Since human and machine need to work together in a good synchronization, it 
is crucial to emphasize the interaction and co-operation between the two (Noyes, et al., 
2001). There is a gray area that must not be forgotten between manual and automated 
system, the semi-automated one, which is the most common type of chemical industry 
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these days. In such system, human and automation must support each other to give their 
best performance. In Figure 2. 8 different levels of possible combination between the 
proportion of human responsibility to machines are listed (Sheridan, 1987). 
 
Figure 2. 8 Sheridan’s scale of human-machine functions in complex systems 
 
2.5 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs)  
In performing their work human operators can never stay in isolation; there is always an 
environment where an interrelation between them, the machines or equipment they 
work with, and the workplace characteristics occurs. The situation has been very clearly 
described in the previous section about work of operators in a complex system. One 
important point to be noted is that regardless of their capabilities, human beings can be 
very easily influenced by their surroundings. Hence, understanding the underlying cause 
of any incorrect action possibly performed by human operators requires an analysis of 
the total man-machine systems, in order to identify factors that affect operator’s 
performance during work (Widiputri, 2007).  
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Factors, which in combination with basic error tendencies can enhance or degrade 
human performance, are referred to as the performance influencing factors (PIFs) or in 
most human reliability analyses (HRA) are often labelled as performance shaping factors 
(PSF).  These factors are however not automatically associated with human error. They 
will vary continuously from the most influencing to the most irrelevant ones. There are 
factors which are generic and will influence performance in most industries, but the 
most are more likely to be important only in specific industries. For that reason, it is 
difficult to produce a list of PIFs that could be used as an audit in any given situation 
(Embrey, 2000).  
PIFs can generally be divided into two areas, the external and internal PIFs. The external 
factors are basically those, which influence the human from its surrounding. This 
consists of especially technical equipment design and managerial conditions such as 
working procedures and instructions. The internal factors on the opposite are the 
factors that represent the personal characteristics of the individual, including their 
mental capabilities, motivations and skills. Table 2. 3 shows an example of PIFs grouping 
(Dalijono, et al., 2006).  
Table 2. 3 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) 
 
Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) 
External PIFs Internal PIFs 
Technical Condition 
Managerial 
Condition 
e.g.: 
• Skills 
• Communication 
• Stress Level 
• Motivation 
e.g.: 
• Time span to 
complete the task 
• Temperature 
• Vibration 
• Noise 
e.g.: 
• Frequency of task 
• Instructions 
(form, procedure) 
 
In addition to these main groups, Swain and Guttmann added another group of PIFs that 
represent the condition resulted from system’s non-conformance to human operator 
capabilities and limitations. The latest factors are grouped into stressors PIFs, which 
include psychological and physiological stressors. Some examples of psychological 
stressors are high and jeopardizing risk and work that is monotonous or meaningless. 
Physiological stressors on the other hand relate with fatigue and the feel of hunger or 
thirst (Swain, et al., 1983).     
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Regardless of the grouping into internal, external or stressor factors, PIFs can differ 
broadly depending on the kind of activities performed by the operators, e.g. in nuclear, 
aerospace and chemical industries. Therefore, in analysing a man-machine system all 
PIFs relevant to the work must be identified and defined at the first place. Based on 
previous works, the PIFs classification used in this work had been identified for typical 
operator tasks in process industries, mainly in less-automated plants where a 
considerable amount of manual and field work still exists besides the works conducted 
in control room. These PIFs are described later in Chapter 5.      
2.6 Distributed Control System (DCS) and Alarm Systems 
Distributed control systems (DCSs) were introduced in process industry around more 
than 3 decades ago, replacing the centralized one. DCS normally utilizes VDU-based 
consoles in place of panel mounted consoles. This shift in technology has brought a 
direct impact on control room instrumentation, and therefore influenced also operators’ 
responsibility and workload. That the rapid introduction of DCS in process industries 
has resulted in not only many positive system improvements but also in many additional 
safety problems, was not instantly recognized by system designers. After many years of 
practical experiences, it became evident that designing DCS requires more than just 
technical knowledge concerning the process and control system.  
The design of DCS includes many aspects that directly and/or indirectly affect operator 
performance. These can include the system architecture, selection and design of 
hardware and software, security design, process input/output design, communication 
facilities, as well as operator and engineering interfaces (Lukas, 1986). Since the 
dominant issue in designing process control is to minimize the potential of human error 
both during normal operation and upsets, an understanding about the way operators 
perform their tasks and how they interact with the DCS is very crucial to have (Zwaga, et 
al., 1994). Hence, designing DCS must include HF considerations to help operators 
avoiding upsets, diagnosing and ultimately responding to those upsets that do occur 
(CCPS, 2007b).  
As one of the main key aspects of DCS-design that have the responsibility to maintain a 
reliable information exchange between the operators and the process, design of alarm 
systems becomes an essential issue in assuring that the process runs within the safe 
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operation zone. Further discussion concerning alarms and alarm system is delivered in 
the following section. 
2. 6. 1 Alarm, Alarm System and Alarm Management 
Alarm may be a familiar word to people working in process industries, especially those 
in charge in operating process control. However, in the application, there is often a 
misdefinition between alarms and warnings or other annunciations/signals. Due to this 
issue, alarms, which are supposed to provide assistance for operators in maintaining the 
operation flow, often become the source of load and troubles in gaining situational 
awareness. Several basic definitions of alarms are summarized from several sources 
should help in defining an alarm:  
“Alarms are signals which are annunciated to the operator typically by an 
audible sound, some form of visual indication, usually flashing, and by the 
presentation of a message or some other identifier. An alarm will indicate 
a problem requiring operator attention, and is generally initiated by a 
process measurement passing a defined alarm setting as it approaches an 
undesirable or potentially unsafe value”, (EEMUA, 1999).  
“It is generally considered that the role of alarm is to give warning of 
impending danger, albeit in varying degrees of severity. An alarm can be 
an unexpected change in system state, a means of signalling state 
changes, a means of attracting attention, a means to arousing someone, or 
a change in the operator’s mental state”, (Stanton, 1994). 
From the above definitions, the first rule in designing alarms can be extracted as; alarms 
must indicate that the system is facing a problem or an undesired change of process 
status, which requires operator’s attention to quickly respond to it. Consequently, other 
annunciation such as warnings, information about parameter changes in a tolerable 
range, or reminder to maintenance cannot necessarily be defined as alarms and must be 
treated separately.  
There is a recommendation of several characteristics that a good alarm and alarm 
system must meet according to (EEMUA, 1999). A good alarm must be:  
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a) relevant: not spurious or of low operational value;  
b) unique: not duplication of another alarm;  
c) timely: not long before any response is needed or too late to do anything;  
d) prioritised: indicating the importance that the operator deals with the problem;  
e) understandable: having a message which is clear and easy to understand;  
f) diagnostic: identifying the problem that has occurred;  
g) advisory: indicative of the action to be taken; and  
h) focusing: drawing attention to the most important issues.  
If each alarm is designed to meet these desired characteristics, then a good alarm system 
will be achievable.  
An alarm system as a broader term than alarm is defined in ISA-SP 18 as the collection of 
hardware and software that states an alarm, transmits the message to be displayed to 
the operator, records the message, and generates alarm metric reports, which must also 
be capable of filtering plant status information to be presented to operators. Sometimes 
it is desirable to discard some information rather than to present everything and 
overload the operators with information (Bransby, et al., 1998). A good alarm system 
must successfully provide helps to the operators to: 
1. maintain the plant within a safe operating envelope. A good alarm system helps the 
operator to correct potentially dangerous situation before the ESD (Emergency 
Shutdown Systems) is forced to intervene,  
2. recognise and act to avoid hazardous situations,  
3. identify deviations that could lead to financial loss, e.g. off-specification, 
4. better understand complex process conditions. Alarms should be an important 
diagnostic tool that provides assistance for operators during an upset. 
Alarm management on the other hand includes the processes and practices for 
determining, documenting, designing, monitoring, and maintaining alarm messages from 
process automation and safety systems. It is in essence the design and implementation 
process for the entire redesign (rationalization) of alarm systems. The implementation 
and role of this process is demonstrated in a life-cycle model illustrated in Figure 2. 9 
(Dunn, et al., 2005).  
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Figure 2. 9 Alarm management lifecycle (Dunn, et al., 2005) 
Many guidelines, although none of which is up to the date this work was written is 
standardized nor regulated, have been regionally developed and are available to help the 
design and management of alarm systems in diverse industrial branches. These 
guidelines are de facto the industrial best-practises, which are obtainable in (EEMUA, 
1999; HSE, 2002; NAMUR, 2003; Dunn, et al., 2005). 
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2. 6. 2 Most Common Alarm Problems 
The installation of an alarm system has a significant contribution in adding problems to 
the operators, if not performed properly. This sub-chapter will list the mostly recognized 
problems with alarm systems experienced in process industries. The numbering in the 
list does not show the relative significance of each problem. 
1. Over-alarming or alarm flood. Alarm flood can be considered as the most complex 
problem. Due to over-alarming, during upset conditions operators are very likely to 
receive too many signals from the alarm systems in too short time frame (Koene, 
2000). This can lead to overloading operators’ capacity in processing the incoming 
information that it will be extremely difficult for them to understand the real status 
of the process.  
2. Lack of clarity of real alarm. The lack of clarity of real alarms is also caused due to 
over-alarming. Being too cautious of every parameter change during operation often 
leads system designers and engineers to install alarms into the system more than 
necessary. This is sometime resulted from safety analyses such as HAZOPs (Hazard 
and Operability study). A lot of the introduced alarms are basically not an alarm, 
since they only inform operators about tolerable changes. 
3. Stale or standing alarm. Stale or standing alarms are those that remain activated 
for extended time period, since they require no clear respond from operators and 
keep standing even after an action has been taken (Dunn, et al., 2005). The term 
standing alarms is used for shorter term activation whereas stale refers to alarms 
that remain active almost all the time. 
4. Chattering alarms. Chattering alarms are those alarms that are activated and 
cleared again and again in a very short time frame. This kind of alarms is symptom of 
improperly designed alarm systems, or parts of the process whose parameters vary 
extremely (Rothenberg, 2009). 
5. Nuisance and perpetual alarm. These alarms are caused by mainly poor chosen set 
points, poor maintenance of the equipment or when the alarm logic does not show 
the status of the equipment for instance alarms that are still active on idle 
equipments (Atwood, et al., 2007). Moreover, if such alarms went off, no exact 
response needs to be conducted instantly. These types of alarms distract operators 
from the real alarms and train them to intentionally ignore incoming alarms.   
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6. Hidden alarms are actually a consequence of the implementation of DCSs, since 
displays only provide a small window for operators to monitor the change of process 
status. Sometimes the system successfully alerts the operators of an active alarm, 
however for inexperienced operators it could be a problem to locate where the exact 
problem is (Shaw, 1993). 
2. 6. 3 Improving Alarm Performance through Prioritization 
Even though improving alarm performance requires more than subtraction alone, 
reducing the number of configured alarms or removing unnecessary alarms can attend 
to a significant increase in efficiency. This will address to solving two major alarm 
problems; flooding and nuisance alarms. However, removing alarms from the system 
requires a systematic assessment of the current system performance. Such systematic is 
known as alarm rationalization, which includes which points to alarm, determining point 
of activations and other alarm response information such as potential causes, 
appropriate operator responses as well as the consequences of error, which is normally 
followed by the setting of priority (Rothenberg, 2009). 
Another suggested means to improve alarm system performance is the alarm 
prioritization. With a proper priorities distribution, operators are acknowledged with 
the actual most critical situation during an information flood. This way, operators can 
filter the information they are receiving, thus can build a better situational awareness. 
Alarm prioritization should also be linked with an operator response procedure to assist 
the selection of necessary response, especially to alarms with high priority. Several 
common techniques to prioritize alarms are discussed below, followed by a brief 
discussion about some extension of those techniques.  
I. Alarm prioritization matrix 
The EEMUA publication no. 191 suggests a prioritization of alarms according to two 
attributes; the severity of consequences and the available time to respond to alarms. 
Priorities are defined in 3 levels, high, medium and low priorities, which are to be 
differentiated from emergency alarms leading to automatic emergency shutdown. An 
example of alarm matrix to assist the analysis is recommended by NAMUR NA – 102 
(Figure 2. 10).  
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Figure 2. 10 Example of a prioritization matrix (NAMUR, 2003) 
 
The matrix shows the relation between the seriousness of the consequences caused 
if operators ignore or omit an alarm and the approximate available time to respond 
to the corresponding alarm. The consequence can be classified into three levels of 
severity, for instance process shutdown, product off specification and a production 
delay with decreasing severity respectively. The alarm priority reduces as the 
consequence severity decreases and as more time is available for operator to 
conduct corrective actions. 
II. Alarm prioritization using scoring table and urgency values 
Based on the classic technique to prioritize alarms as discussed above, many experts 
attempted to put more logic and systematic behind the relationship between 
consequence severity and available time to respond. An extension of this technique is 
described by Rothenberg in his book which recommends the use of a scoring table 
and urgency mapping in assessing priorities. The technique adds additional 
subjective numerical weight on the severity of each consequence and elicits the 
urgency values from the available time. Priorities of alarms can then be calculated by 
multiplying the consequence-severity values and the multipliers obtained from the 
urgency values. Following is a short example to describe how this technique works 
(Rothenberg, 2009). 
Let an alarm given a priority based on the consequences related to 3 attributes; 
safety, environmental damage and financial loss. The severity of these consequences 
is levelled into low, medium and high, complementary a ‘none’ to describe no 
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possibility of a certain consequence to happen can as well be applied. Weight will 
then be subjectively added to each severity for every consequence. As example in the 
above table (Table 2. 4), a high severity of safety impact is weighted with ‘150’ (the 
weight is arbitrary and can be set in any ranges). Afterwards, relative to the first 
settled weight, weights are to be added for other severity levels (low and medium) 
for the same attribute ‘safety impact’. Finished with one attribute, the weighting 
continues with the next one. For this purpose, the first attribute that was completely 
assigned with subjective weights is taken as a baseline for the next weighting 
process. In this example, the baseline would be safety impact. By taking ‘high’ safety 
impact as a comparison, ‘high’ environmental damage will be next evaluated. 
Supposedly, the company sees that environmental damage in the same severity level 
with safety will cause bigger impact, than the weight for high severity environmental 
damage must be assigned with a bigger number, i.e. 200. Afterwards, the same 
procedure is applied until all attributes and their associated severity levels are 
weighted. An alarm will be evaluated by selecting the scores (severity number) from 
the table that best represent how the alarm might impact all 3 attributes.  
Table 2. 4 Example of alarm priority scoring table (Rothenberg, 2009)  
 
As some alarms are to be attended more quickly than other, or in other words, have 
bigger urgency than others, the severity values obtained in Table 2. 4 must be 
adjusted to reflect the urgency of an alarm in avoiding a particular incident. For this 
purpose, multipliers are determined to represent the urgency level. These 
multipliers will adjust the severity number, which will later be mapped to a priority 
table to assign a proper priority. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show an example of 
multipliers table and table of alarm priority break points respectively. 
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Table 2. 5 Example of urgency values and   Table 2. 6 Example of alarm priority         
the corresponding multipliers                                               mapping table 
                  
Time available Multiplier 
≤ 3 min 1.5 
> 3 but ≤ 10 min 1.2 
> 10 but ≤ 20 min 1.0 
> 20 min 0.8 
 
 
III. Function-based alarm prioritization 
Alarm prioritization can also be done by prioritizing functions identified in the 
process. The function-based alarm prioritization approach (Basso, et al., 1998) 
suggests a prioritization based on 3 steps: 
Step 1. Identification and organization of plant functions, specifically those functions 
involved with annunciation, 
Step 2. Prioritization of plant functions, by operational importance, for each plant 
operational issues, and  
Step 3. Assignment of individual alarm priorities based on their association with a 
specific plant function. 
The implementation of the approach aims to reduce the inconsistency in assigning 
the prioritization to each single alarm, since this activity can be very labour-intensive 
and prone to human error.  From the functional perspective, prioritization of alarms 
should be done not only for normal operation state, but especially should focus to 
abnormal states of the process. Since in abnormal situation, maintaining the 
awareness of relative importance between incoming alarms is the most difficult thing 
to achieve. Thus, a priority should be assigned to all alarms relevant to one process 
function. Following are the major considerations of using this approach: 
1. Consistency in alarm grouping and prioritization. Alarms will be prioritized based 
on the common importance with a single set of priority assignments applicable to 
the group. 
2. Alarm grouping will be done through an operationally relevant way, since staffs 
are to monitor and observe the system from a functional perspective, relevant to 
plant operating goals and states. 
Priority Breakpoint value 
High From 350 and above 
Medium From 250 to 349 
Low From 100 to 249 
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3. An organization of plant functions by importance, with respect to each operating 
state, would provide a basis for grouping alarms for prioritization purposes. 
Priorities for individual alarms would be assigned with respect to the base 
function priority. 
4. The approach provides way to compare priority among alarms and function 
groups to reveal inconsistencies.  
5. Compatible to be converted into widely implemented computer operating 
systems such as Microsoft and Oracle environments.  
Although most industrial plants use three levels of prioritization for their alarms, there 
are also several plants that implement four levels prioritization; critical, high, medium 
and low priority. However, there is a danger in using too many priorities since a clear 
distinction between each priority can be missing. The use of the fourth priority can be on 
the other hand very useful if implemented consistently for very few situations only, such 
as cases where life, serious plant damage or major financial and environmental impacts 
are jeopardized (Rothenberg, 2009).  
Table 2. 7 Recommended alarm priority distribution 
Priority level Distribution 
High 5% 
Medium 15% 
Low 80% 
 
Moreover, an effective priority distribution of alarms is very crucial to help the 
operators during upsets. Since a large number of alarms can be active during this 
abnormal situation, there should be only a relative small and manageable portion which 
accounts to high priority alarms that will direct operators to acknowledge the most 
significant disturbances (NPD, 2001). The distribution of priorities recommended by 
EEMUA is as shown in Table 2. 7 above (EEMUA, 1999). 
2.7 Safety Analysis Methods 
Safety analysis holds a critical role in the development of complex process plants, which 
can generally involve two main activities; hazard identification and risk analysis. The 
first activity aims at the recognition of possible hazards with significant consequences 
such as loss of life or serious damage to facilities and the surrounding environment, as 
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well as the possible causes of such hazards. Identifying possible occurrences of critical 
hazards will provide assistance in avoiding them from happening, and hence to prevent 
their undesirable consequences. In safety analysis, hazard identification is often 
followed by a risk analysis, where a quantification of potential risk associated with each 
identified hazard takes place. Risk assessment will deliver consideration in judging the 
tolerability of potential risks in the facility.   
In order to perform a safety analysis, both qualitative and quantitative methods are 
available, which enable the performance of both hazard identification and risk 
assessment. The most common and widely-used methods for safety analysis in the 
process industry are discussed in brief in the following (CCPS, 2000; Crowl, et al., 2001). 
2.7.1 Qualitative Safety Analysis 
Several qualitative safety analysis methods that are commonly implemented during 
development of process plants are the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), the Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP) study, the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), What-if 
Analysis and Checklists. Among these methods, HAZOP and FMEA provide an adequate 
systematic structure for the identification and analysis of potential hazards, as well as 
the causes thereof. Hence, more detailed explanation concerning both methods will be 
delivered here. 
2.7.1.1 The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study 
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a qualitative means in identifying possible 
hazards and problems during operation in a process plant (NSW Government, 2008; 
Crowl, et al., 2001), which was first developed by ICI in the 1960s and started to be 
widely implemented in chemical process industries after the Flixborough disaster. The 
examination is carried out by applying guidewords on each process parameter to 
discover how deviations from design intent can occur, and whether those deviations can 
cause hazards. The guidewords provide a way to brainstorm every possible cause of an 
incident, yet some of the causes may be very unlikely and can be disregarded form the 
analysis. For every recognized hazard, necessary safeguards or modifications on existing 
safeguards will be proposed. The typical practical implementation of HAZOP can be seen 
in Figure 2. 11 whereas the basic guidewords used for the analysis are tabulated in Table 
2. 8 (Rausand, et al., 2004). 
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Figure 2. 11 HAZOP procedure illustration, adapted from (NSW Government, 2008) 
 
 
Table 2. 8 The standard HAZOP guidewords (Rausand, et al., 2004) 
Guideword Meaning Example 
No 
None of the design intent is 
achieved 
No flow when production is 
expected 
More 
Quantitative increase in a 
parameter 
Higher temperature than 
intended 
Less 
Quantitative decrease in a 
parameter 
Lower pressure than normal 
As well as An additional activity occurs 
Different valves close at the same 
time 
Part of 
Only some of the design intention 
are achieved 
Only part of the system is shut 
down 
Reverse 
Logical opposite of design 
intention occurs 
Flowing in opposite direction 
Other than Completely substitution Liquid in the gas piping 
 
The performance of HAZOP studies in the process industries requires a contribution of 
experts from different backgrounds to assure its comprehensiveness. The team for such 
analysis must be at the least consisted of: 
a. Project engineer 
b. Commissioning manager 
c. Operation manager 
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d. Instrument/electrical engineer 
e. Safety engineer 
and depending on the necessity can be enhanced to also include the operator team 
leader, maintenance engineer, supplier representative as other appropriate specialists 
(Rausand, et al., 2004).   
The results delivered by a HAZOP analysis are summarized in a report, and can be 
utilized to improve the system configuration and operation. An advantage of HAZOP in 
addition to its systematic examination is the multidisciplinary study required during its 
performance. This enables the inclusion of operational experiences of different parties 
involved in the team that can address among others the lessons learnt from past 
incidents.  
To overcome with various needs in discovering hazard potentials, HAZOP has been 
modified or adapted into several other analyses techniques, also referred to as the non-
traditional HAZOPs. Some examples are the Control/Computer HAZOP – CHAZOP (Kletz, 
et al., 1995), the Safety Culture HAZOP – SCHAZOP (Kennedy, et al., 1996) and Human 
(Error) HAZOP (Stanton, et al., 2005). The basic difference during the implementation of 
these non-traditional HAZOPs lies on the selected guidewords used for the identification 
of possible deviations.  
2.7.1.2 The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
The FMEA was one of the first systematic techniques for failure analysis and is widely 
used in the initial stages of system development. The performance of FMEA has the 
purpose to assure that all potential failure modes and their effects have been considered 
and the proper condition to prevent those failures has been made available. Nowadays, 
FMEA is also known as FMECA with an additional “C” that expresses the “criticality” of 
various failure effects. The distinction between the two terms is no longer obvious, since 
consideration on criticality has become a common part of an FMEA and is always 
included in such an analysis (Rausand, et al., 2004).  
The performance of FMEA/FMECA basically follows the 4 main steps: system structure 
analysis, failure analysis, risk ranking and team review, and the identification of 
corrective actions. System structure analysis will break down the system into 
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manageable units, typically functional elements, depending on the scope of the analysis. 
Corresponding to the identified hierarchy of the system, a worksheet will then be 
prepared to assist the analysis of potential failures in each function. An example of an 
FMEA worksheet covering the most relevant columns is provided in Figure 2. 12. 
 
Figure 2. 12 Example of FMEA worksheet (Rausand & H∅yland, 2004) 
In the first 3 columns of the worksheet, a description of the unit is listed, including the 
definition of functions and the various operational modes for each element (e.g., idle, 
standby, running). In the next 3 columns (columns 4, 5, and 6) potential failures are 
listed, together with their causes and the possibilities for detection of those failures. In 
columns 7 and 8 both the local and global effects of identified potential failures are 
listed. The failure rates are listed in column 9, representing how likely a failure would 
occur. In the next column of the worksheet (column 10) the severity of the failure effects 
is ranked and listed. Afterwards, necessary risk reducing measures need to be identified 
and listed as well in the worksheet.  
In the third step of FMEA/FMECA performance, which is the risk ranking and team 
review, a calculation of the so-called Risk Priority Number (RPN) is normally carried out. 
For this calculation, several variables that were analysed in the previous stage (during 
failures analysis) need to be classified and expressed in ranks to enable a simple 
quantification of the risk. These variables are the possiblility for failure detection (D) 
listed in column 6 in the worksheet, the likelihood of failure occurence or failure rate (P) 
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listed in column 9, and the severity of failure effects (S) listed in column 10 in the 
worksheet. For the calculation in this analysis, these variables are classified and 
assigned with different ranks. An example of the classifications of variables D, S and P is 
provided in Table 2. 9 (Pillay, et al., 2003). 
Table 2. 9 Example of the ranking of variables in FMEA 
Rank Detection (D) 
Failure 
Probability (P) 
Effect Severity (S) 
1 
Failure would almost 
certainly be detected  
Very unlikely  No noticeable effect 
2 – 3 
Failure remains undetected 
until the next inspection 
Remote 
Failure that causes low level of 
annoyance to the operator but does 
not result in system deterioration 
4 – 6 
Failure remains undetected 
until system performance is 
affected 
Occasional  
Failure that causes high level of 
annoyance to personnel or results in 
noticeable but slight deterioration of 
the system 
7 – 8 
Failure remains undetected 
until system performance is 
severely reduced 
Probable 
Failure results in significant 
degradation of system performance 
or minor injuries to personnel 
9 – 10 
Failure remains undetected 
until system performance 
degrades to an extent that 
function fails 
Frequent 
Failure results in serious damage to 
the facility or causes major injuries to 
personnel or fatality 
 
The RPN is accordingly defined as 
                                                          =  ×  × 
                                             Equation 1                            
Corresponding to the values of each rank defined in Table 2. 9 above, a greater value of 
RPN will express a more severe condition and hence a bigger risk potential. 
Correspondingly, the design team or the engineers will be provided with the insights 
concerning the most critical process elements in the whole system and can accordingly 
conduct effort to preventing the undesirable failure effects. 
2.7.2 Quantitative Safety Analysis 
Besides the qualitative performance of a safety analysis, quantification is in many cases 
required for the risk assessment. A quantitative analysis needs therefore to be carried 
out after an analysis of system structure and plant condition, in order to enable an 
analysis concerning the probability and frequency of possible hazards, and also the risk 
level. For this purpose, several quantitative safety analysis methods were developed, 
and some of the most well-known and commonly implemented ones are the Fault Tree 
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Analysis (FTA) and the Event Tree Analysis (ETA). A detailed description of both methods 
is delivered in (CCPS, 2000). 
2.8 Mathematical Algorithms 
In analysing different criteria in order to make decisions subjected to various HF 
problems, working with numerical values is sensed to be a more comfortable and 
convenient way. Even during an analysis that takes place qualitatively, the interpretation 
of human logical thinking in linguistic language into numerical values can provide a 
more comprehensible description concerning HF issues in the plant and to 
correspondingly settle the most proper solutions to the identified problems. Several 
common calculation techniques can be applied to support the decision-making process 
in problems associated with multiple attributes (goals/criteria) and the classification of 
those problems in finding the most suitable solutions. In this section, a brief description 
about techniques for multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) and classification 
techniques is delivered.   
2.8.1 Techniques for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
Many decisions that people need to make in the real life involve multiple objectives, 
either it is a decision in private life for example in choosing a holiday destination, or in 
professional life such as strategic decision making in a company. Due to the limitation of 
capacity, human mind cannot always cope with complex calculations, so that in dealing 
with complex decision analysis people tend to use approximate methods, as often 
referred to as ‘rules-of-thumb’ or also ‘heuristics’ (Goodwin, et al., 2003). These 
heuristics can lead to quick decisions and are often well adapted to particular situations.  
However, if the information to be handled simultaneously becomes too large and too 
complex, heuristics cannot lead to an optimal decision. In dealing with complex 
problems, decision makers need to consider and explore trade-offs between multiple 
attributes, so that quick decisions are not suitable anymore. In coping with problems 
associated with multiple objectives, techniques for decision analysis are available, which 
are classified under the multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) techniques. The main 
idea of such techniques is to break the complex problem down into smaller parts, so that 
the decision maker can acquire better understanding of the problem. MCDM techniques 
are widely diverse; each has its own characteristics. There are many ways to further 
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classify MCDM techniques, for example based on the type of data available for the 
analysis process. An example of taxonomy of MCDM techniques is provided in 
(Triantaphyllou, 2000). 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process 
One of the most widely applied MCDM techniques is the analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) proposed by Saaty in 1980 (Saaty, 1980). The basic idea of the method is to 
translate the subjective assessment of relative importance to a set of overall scores or 
weights (Fülöp, 2005). AHP is applied for making judgments about the priorities 
between alternatives of solutions, if examined with respect to different decision criteria 
in achieving the main goal. Figure 2. 13 below demonstrates how a problem is set into a 
decision hierarchy for decision analysis purposes using AHP.   
 
 
Figure 2. 13 A typical decision hierarchy for decision analysis with AHP 
 
 
The methodology of AHP is based on pair-wise comparisons between decision criteria Cj                       
(j = 1,..., n) in terms of their relative importance if compared one with another. For the 
relative comparison purpose, Saaty suggested a nine-point scale expressing the 
preference intensity for one criterion against another (Table 2. 10). The pair-wise 
comparison can be arranged in an n x n reciprocal matrix C. By using the eigenvector of 
this comparison matrix C the weights of each criterion can be elicited. Let wj denote the 
weights of all n criteria where ∑  = 1=1 . 
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Table 2. 10 Fundamental scores for importance comparison (Saaty, 2008) 
Intensity of 
importance 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance 
Two activities contribute equally to the 
objective 
3 Moderate importance 
Experience and judgement slightly favour 
one activity over another 
5 Strong importance 
Experience and judgement strongly favour 
one activity over another 
7 
Very strong or demonstrated 
importance 
An activity is favoured very strongly over 
another; its dominance is demonstrated in 
practice 
9 Extreme importance 
The evidence favouring one activity over 
another is of the highest possible order of 
affirmation 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed 
Reciprocals 
of the above 
If activity i has one of the above 
nonzero numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, then 
j has the reciprocal value when 
compared with i 
A logical assumption 
 
Similar to the elicitation of weights for the criteria, AHP uses pair-wise comparisons to 
determine the relative performance of the alternatives subjective to each decision 
criterion. Let Ai (i = 1, ..., m) describes m types of possible alternatives. The scores in the 
nine-point scale will be once again used to express the relative importance of the 
performance of one alternative in comparison with another relating to each criterion Cj. 
The relative performance value of alternative Ai when it is considered in terms of 
criterion Cj is denoted with aij and the sum ∑ =1  is as well equal to 1. In taking the final 
decision, the judgement of which alternative is taken as the best solution to the problem 
(in the maximation case) will follow the relationship below: 
                                =  ∑  !       for i = 1, 2, ..., m                Equation 2 
 
Since people’s feeling and preferences remain inconsistent, and since this inconsistency 
increases with the increase of the size of the pair-wise matrix, a method to check the 
consistency of the judgement has to be done before accepting the calculation results. 
Saaty suggested a way to check the consistency by calculating the Consistency Ratio 
(CR), which is the ratio of the Consistency Index (CI) to Random Consistency Index (RI). 
 
                                                          
RI
CICR =                                                     Equation 3 
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To obtain CR, CI is calculated from the comparison matrix following: 
                                                       CI = ( )( )1
max
−
−
n
nλ
                                                   Equation 4 
 
where λmax denotes the biggest eigenvalue of the pair-wise comparison matrix and n is 
the number of elements to be compared. 
The Random Consistency Index (RI) was obtained from large number simulation runs, 
using a sample size of 500 to 1000, and is dependent on the order of the matrix. These 
values are tabulated in Figure 2. 14 above. The matrix is considered to be consistent and 
acceptable when the value of its CR is lower or equal to 0.1 (CR ≤ 0.1). If the value of CR 
exceeds 0.1, a revision should be carried out to the pair-wise judgement. 
 
 
Figure 2. 14 Random consistency index (RI) (Saaty, 2008) 
2.8.2 Classification Methods 
In the decision making process, it is sometimes very necessary to classify problems in 
order to have a better focus in searching for the most proper solutions. From 
experiences, a relation between a problem and the possible solutions to it can become a 
common know-how in a particular field. This relationship can be interpreted as a data 
set that classifies common problems and pairs them with the most typical solutions. 
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Hence, by classifying one problem into a certain class or type, solutions to the problem 
can be searched within a narrower area. In this section, one of the simplest and most 
widely used algorithms applicable for classification purposes is delivered briefly.  
The k-Nearest-Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm  
The idea of k-Nearest-Neighbor (kNN) was first introduced by Cover and Hart in 1967 
(Song, et al., 2007; Cover, et al., 1967). kNN is one example of many instance-based 
learning methods, which assumes that instances can be represented as points in a 
Euclidean space. The basic principle of kNN is the classification of a query instance q, by 
comparing it to a stored database of training examples (Mitchell, 1997). Every time a 
new query instance encounters and needs to be classified, its relationship with the 
previously stored data or training examples is examined in order to set target value for 
this new query instance. Instances in this matter are assumed to be consisted of several 
attributes ar so that for a particular instance x, the attributes can be expressed as  
〈#$%&', )%&', … , +%&'〉# 
where ar%x' denotes the value of the rth attribute of instance x. If instance xi is assumed 
to be the training examples stored in the database, then the distance to be examined 
between a query instance xq and xi is defined to be d%xi,xq' where 
                                         FGH, HIJ ≡ K∑ LM%H' − MGHIJNM=! O                                 Equation 5 
Each training example is assigned with a certain target value so that the database stores 
the examples of the form 〈&, P%&'〉, and the value of f(xq) returned by the algorithm as an 
estimation of the target value for the query xq is simply the most common value of f  
among a number of training examples (the amount is expressed with k) nearest to the 
query xq. k for this purpose can be arbitrarily determined, depends on the requisites and 
problem definitions.  
As an example, in Figure 2. 15 a set of training examples is plotted on a two-dimensional 
space, where the target functions are valued as positive and negative and represented 
with  “+” and “-“ respectively on the diagram. A query point is shown as the blue point 
labelled with q. It is now desired to examine the distance between q and the training 
examples within the dataset, in order to classify q to either positive or negative class. In 
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this example k is determined as 5, so that f(q) is defined by the most common f value of 
the nearest 5 training examples to the query point q. From this example it can be noted 
that the 5-Nearest-Neighbor classifies q as negative, since 4 among the five nearest 
neighbouring points are assigned with “-“. 
 
Figure 2. 15 Example for a classification with k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) 
 
The kNN algorithm is one of the most widely-used approaches for classification and has 
been enhanced to comply with more complex problems and to improve its robustness 
and reliability. Several variants of this approach are available for example by weighting 
the k neighbours according to their distance to the query point or by weighting the 
significance or relevance of the attributes of each instance, which are taken into account 
in the classification process. This way, instances will be examined relevant to the most 
contributing attributes.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HF STUDIES 
 
With the escalating awareness that as a crucial element of a system, human operators 
deserve the opportunity to be given an adequate working condition and safety 
assurance, techniques to analyse HF in process industry have become a very essential 
need. Approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, have been developed over time 
with the aim to find the way to providing the operators with better working 
environment. In this chapter, several techniques to incorporate HF consideration are 
described, and a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages will be pointed out 
subsequently.      
3. 1 Methods for HF analysis 
Methods for HF analysis in process industries are aiming to the recognition of possible 
errors by human operators during the performance of their work. Recognizing and 
understanding human limitations and the underlying problems that can force humans to 
conduct errors is considered to be the key in avoiding them from happening. 
Unfortunately, revealing these problems is not as trivial as it seems. A systematic way is 
necessary to adequately analyse the interaction between operators and their working 
environment. In the following sub-chapters, several common techniques to analyse HF 
are briefly discussed, beginning with the most commonly implemented HF method, the 
Task Analysis. 
A. Task Analysis 
Task analysis is the fundamental approach to identify and analyse every operator task. 
To initiate the analysis, preliminary plant investigations and observations must be 
performed, and technical information (P&IDs, flow-charts), operating manuals, 
documents of the local conditions (plant lay-out, map of location) and personnel 
information (training, personnel qualification) should be at assistance. There are a 
variety of different techniques in performing task analysis, several to mention are the 
well-known hierarchical task analysis (HTA), the operator action event tree (OAET) or 
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the cognitive based ones such as the critical action and decision evaluation techniques 
(CADET) and the influence modelling and assessment systems (IMAS).  
Despite the advantages that each technique may offer, there are essential disadvantages 
of those techniques in general that must be underlined. Varying between those well-
known techniques, the disadvantages may include one or more of the following aspects 
(CCPS, 1994): 
• Some are not focusing on the observable aspects of operator behaviour 
• Some provide no analysis on the mental process underlying operator behaviour 
• Some provide no description of temporal characteristics of the tasks, e.g. during 
abnormal condition 
• Some provide no description of interaction between operators and control 
system 
• Some are not emphasizing on the required communication among team members 
• Some provide no classification of tasks into different categories 
• Some provide no qualitative description of the technical system being operated 
Although task analysis aims at the prediction and prevention of possible errors, this 
method is to be differentiated from the so-called human error analysis. TA is the 
fundamental technique, whereas human error analysis (HEA) is a domain where TA can 
be implemented.  
B. Techniques for Operators Actions Analysis 
Several techniques that investigate and observe operator actions during plant operation 
were developed to prevail over a deficiency of TA or HEA, which is the absent of the 
search for the causes of human errors. By understanding what people must do during 
performance of their work, the causes why errors are executed can be recognized. 
Examples of such methods are; Identification in the P&I-Diagram, Disturbance 
Compensation Graph and the Bar-Graph Method (Dalijono, et al., 2004) 
The above mentioned methods are not widely-recognized and commonly implemented 
for several drawbacks that must be emphasized, such as; they do not provide 
information about the distance between different equipment to be operated 
simultaneously, some of the methods do not give prediction of consequences of an error 
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and they do not investigate operator actions during both normal and abnormal 
conditions concurrently. The points which are not delivered by those existing methods 
are the most essential information in understanding why operators conduct incorrect 
actions, especially during abnormal situation. This called for a development of a new 
method for analysing operator actions in process industry (Dalijono, et al., 2005). 
3. 2 Human Reliability Analyses (HRA) 
The basic incorporation of consideration on human error is brought into safety analyses 
through the derivation of numerical human error probabilities for a use in fault trees. 
Nevertheless, experts have believed that the quantification is often misplaced and will 
lead to a totally incorrect analysis result. Thus, there have been numerous attempts to 
optimize human reliability analysis (HRA) from time to time, by taking more qualitative 
parts of such analyses into account. Practitioners emphasize the importance of this 
qualitative insight to understand comprehensively how errors could occur and how to 
avoid them (CCPS, 1994). One of the well-known HRA methods is the Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). 
The performance of THERP is basically identical to the event tree in the chemical 
process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA). The basic step is the identification of 
elementary tasks; followed by a definition of an error occurrence scenario structured 
top down to the bottom level, whose human error probability (HEP) is contained in the 
THERP-Handbook. Lastly, a total quantification of the error probability can be 
calculated, which will then be applicable for a use in fault tree analysis. If the overall 
error probability calculated through THERP shows an unacceptable value, consideration 
on PIFs modification will be taken, in order to avoid the error to happen. The typical 
representation of this analysis suggested by Swain and Guttman takes a form of a tree, 
where the probability of failures or the HEPs is represented by its branches together 
with the likelihood of success in performing each step (Swain, et al., 1983).     
Although considered as a powerful tool to predict and prevent human error, THERP has 
also its weaknesses that must be highlighted. The main limitation of this method is the 
analysis of contributing factors of human errors is not done structurally. This can lead to 
an identification of only a part of all possible errors relating to only certain numbers of 
performance influencing factors. Moreover, THERP emphasizes the errors that are 
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usually found during operations in nuclear power plants, which indicates that the use of 
HEPs listed in the handbook for an analysis in process industries cannot be transferred 
one to one. Thus, an attempt had been made to improve the derivation of HEPs for 
THERP analysis in the process industries (Kariuki, 2007).  Additionally, even though 
THERP proposes an implementation of HF analysis during plant design, the analysis 
result does not specifically point out the HF relevant design parameters that must be 
taken into consideration in preventing human errors from occurring during operation.  
3. 3 Consideration of Human Error in HAZOP 
The conventional HAZOP has been used in many domains and has gained wide 
acceptance. During the examination, issues concerning human error are nonetheless not 
systematically involved and scrutinized. It is undeniable that HAZOP can recognize 
human contribution in causing process deviation, yet merely arbitrarily. Human (Error) 
HAZOP was developed as an attempt to comprise human error issues that can arise 
hazards in a process plant (Kirwan, et al., 2001). Human HAZOP is initiated by using the 
result of hierarchical task analysis (HTA), which provides exhaustive descriptions of 
tasks within the process hierarchically. Guidewords are to be applied on the bottom 
level tasks from HTA. The next procedures are similar to classic HAZOP, using the 
following guidewords: ‘less than’, ‘more than’, ‘as well as’, ‘other than’, ‘repeated’, 
‘sooner than’, ‘later than’, ‘mis-ordered’, and ‘part of’ (Stanton, et al., 2005).    
Although Human HAZOP has included human error issues into safety analysis, this 
method still has drawbacks to be highlighted, especially in finding a systematic attempt 
to avoid human error and the incidents caused by it. These drawbacks are for instance: 
- HAZOP and Human HAZOP focus only either on technical parts of the system or 
on human relevant tasks, and not on the entire system as a whole. 
- Both HAZOP and Human HAZOP do not systematically consider the corrective 
action to be conducted if a hazard takes place. This can require operators to 
perform further actions where errors can still occur. 
- Human HAZOP can identify possible human errors and their corresponding 
causes, but cannot comprehensively reveal the underlying causes why operators 
make errors. 
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- Without recognizing the real underlying causes, finding the optimal 
modifications or proposing the most necessary safeguards is very unlikely to be 
realizable. 
- HAZOP and Human HAZOP cannot directly recognize if a disturbance was caused 
as an implication of incorrect operator action in other parts of the plant.  
3. 4 HF in Process Plant Design 
Performing HF analysis must be initiated as early as possible to be able to seize the 
system potential as a whole in preventing all possible errors and to avoid the needs of 
later changes. Consideration on HF must become one point of interest during plant 
design, since this is where the actual attempts to avoid human error must take place.  
However, since performing HF analysis is momentarily not one of the main interests in 
process industries due to some reasoning; many people still see the incorporation of HF 
in process design sceptically. The sceptics look at the necessity to include HF during 
process design as extra burdens to the design team, since they believe that the 
performance of extra analyses in addition to the whole design activities can be 
unbearably laborious. Even without a HF analysis, a process design might never meet an 
optimal end, due to so many considerations that must be taken into account. 
Practitioners are convinced that many safety analyses have already comprised issues 
concerning human errors, and that performing these analyses during design will give 
more than adequate support to the design team. This way of thinking has directed 
practitioners to abandon the real intention of taking HF into account during process 
design, and to ignore the fact that not all of the commonly used safety analysis methods 
are applicable throughout the whole design phase.  
Figure 3. 1 shows the applicability of several safety analysis methods (as mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 2.7) in different stages of process design, which in this example is 
described as the conceptual design, detailed engineering and construction/start-up. The 
figure shows, that only a few methods can be used in every design stage including the 
construction/start-up, among them are the checklist and what-if analysis (Heikkilä, 
1999). However, although these methods are applicable for design phase, the 
implementation of a single method individually cannot adequately deliver necessary 
information required to optimally avoid human error. They need to be performed in 
55 | C h a p t e r  3  
 
association with other methods to provide more comprehensive insights concerning HF 
issues in the design. The danger of it is that an analyst being unable to find the proper 
structure of the analysis and unsystematically implements those different techniques. 
The result obtained from such an analysis will only lead to false or irrelevant findings. 
 
Figure 3. 1 Application of safety analysis methods on process design (Heikkilä, 1999) 
 
 
3. 5 HF in Alarm Management and DCS-Design 
HF in the context of alarm management and design of DCS is commonly interpreted as 
the design of human-system interface (HSI), which includes design of displays, different 
control elements and the general control room configuration. Since human information 
processing capacity plays an enormous role in the performance of supervisory tasks, the 
design of HSI must be able to ensure operator’s situational awareness (SA), vigilance and 
workload to help them achieving a reliable decision making. Situation awareness (SA) is 
defined by Endsley as the operator’s perception of what is happening within a certain 
time and place, their comprehension of the meaning, and in projecting its status in the 
near future. Vigilance on the other hand can be interpreted as “the capacity for sustained 
effective attention when monitoring a situation or display for critical signals, conditions 
or events, to which the observer must respond” and often referred to as alertness 
(Sandom, 2001). 
There are several methods developed to assess and optimize operator SA and to assist 
decision-making process. Most of the methods consider human’s perception processes, 
general cognitive ability and personality as the sources of SA. Other techniques provide a 
prediction about the level of operator SA in complex and dynamic systems, focusing 
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more on the interaction between human and technical facility as an important source of 
SA. An example of such methods is the Situation Awareness Process Analysis Technique 
– SAPAT, which suggests the application of existing SA models to analyse interactive 
control system in order to identify the sources of SA and to analyse the hazardous 
interactions in the system (Sandom, 2001). This technique provides a way to deal with 
the design trade-off between usability and safety by suggesting design solutions from a 
system safety perspective based on HAZOP results (Noyes, et al., 2001).  
In the area of human-system interface (HSI) design, many guidelines provide 
recommendations in optimizing the interaction between process and operating 
personnel, (O'Hara, et al., 2002). However, since the success in working with computers 
lies also on the user’s knowledge concerning the system they are working with, 
designing HSI needs to include an analysis of the tasks from knowledge requirements 
perspective. Several methods to analyse knowledge intensive tasks in HSI were 
developed (Diaper, 1989), i.e. the Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection Rules (GOMS) 
– approach (John, et al., 1996). Those techniques provide a structured decomposition of 
tasks and can help the system designers to systemize the information provided to 
operators in such a way that facilitates their decision-making process. 
Despite the availability of such methods, in process industry designing DCS is normally 
conducted after practical experiences and expert considerations. HF is normally 
included at the line end of the DCS design, where the design of HSI takes place. This late 
inclusion of HF considerations cannot optimally improve system safety, since incidents 
in computer controlled plants can be caused through many reasons other than 
inadequate design of HSI. Equipment failures or software faults, insufficient operator 
knowledge about the process, and system design failure due to the ignorance or 
misunderstanding reaction to the displayed information are the common problems that 
had caused disasters to happen (Kletz, et al., 1995). This indicates how each aspect of 
DCS design can address deficiencies of HF issues. Therefore, HF must be taken into 
consideration during early design of DCS, as early as the identification of alarms is taking 
place.   
 
 
57 | C h a p t e r  3  
 
3. 6 The Need for Further Development of HF Methods 
Despite the availability of different methods and techniques to analyse human errors, 
there is still a need for a systematic and clear-structured way to considering HF in the 
process industries. The HF methods discussed in this chapter, whether the qualitative or 
the quantitative ones have essential drawbacks that can fatally lead to a faulty result in 
understanding system weaknesses to comply with human limitations. Moreover, the 
available techniques in general have limited coverage in terms of their application. One 
technique can be implemented during a certain stage of plant design or operation, while 
another one applies only to other stages. None of the techniques provides a clear way to 
analyse and implement HF during the entire life of a plant. An approach that is 
applicable for design, construction, and plant operation as well as maintenance 
activities, which assists the analysis of both field and control room work and complies 
with both technical deficiencies as well as human limitations, must be available for an 
implementation in the process industries.   
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CHAPTER 4 
MOTIVATION OF THE WORK 
 
A computer-based method for HF analysis, PITOPA (the Process Industry Tool for 
Operator Action Analysis) was developed during a previous work for an analysis in 
existing process plants (Widiputri, 2007; Widiputri, et al., 2008). During this work, 
PITOPA had been optimised and validated several times in different types of process 
plants. After successful implementations of PITOPA, it came to the awareness that 
analysing HF only during process operation cannot optimally increase the quality of 
operator performance and plant safety, since the findings delivered through such an 
analysis often require major modifications on the plant, which is not always a feasible 
case. For this reason, PITOPA must be enhanced to such an extent to include HF 
considerations in the earliest phase of process plant design. 
Due to the need to consider many issues during design of a process plant, many 
practitioners are convinced that adding HF into the design process will only result in a 
much bigger load without significant results. Nonetheless, since every goal a company is 
aiming can be obtained only if the operators are guaranteed their safety in work and 
understood in their limitations, there is no further option other than to design every 
aspect of the plant based on their requirements. If an adequate HF method that can link 
HF analysis with other important design issues is available, the sceptic looks on HF can 
be eliminated and providing the operators with an optimal working environment will 
become more achievable.  
This work develops an approach for a systematic and comprehensive HF analysis of 
process plants that is applicable in both process design and plant operation. Since it 
obliges much more than only a modification of different available methods to 
incorporate HF analysis into a design process; a careful consideration to structure the 
development of such approach is required. In the context of bridging HF consideration in 
every activity during design process, an integration of HF into general safety analysis is 
an essential matter. The attempt to achieve a safer operation must include the 
consideration that technical aspects affect human beings in a great manner, and also the 
59 | C h a p t e r  4  
 
other way around, that errors executed by operators can lead to later technical 
problems. For this reason, integration between HF analysis and the general safety 
analysis, such as HAZOP studies must be enabled.  
To comprehensively design a system that ensures the conformance to different 
operators’ requirements, HF analysis must be able to comprise the whole operators’ 
activities during process operation, either the works to be conducted on-site (field 
works) or works to be conducted in control rooms/centres (monitoring and supervisory 
control). In terms of providing support for control room operators, HF must be 
incorporated into alarm management and into the design of DCS. Often, the design of 
control and alarm system is taken as pure engineering matters. The inclusion of HF 
always starts at latest design stages, during the design of HSI, which is already too late. 
HF should have been considered as early as alarms are being identified and configured, 
and not later than the rationalization stage. Therefore, the HF method developed here 
must be able to specifically address the inclusion of HF into alarm management and into 
DCS design.  
 
Figure 4. 1 Structure of the development of the new HF approach 
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The new approach developed in this work will provide a structured and systematic 
means to perform HF analysis concurrently with other different analyses and design 
activities, and will be additionally applicable for an analysis during process operation. 
Analysis of operator actions and their requirements in performing both manual/field 
works and control room works are comprised in the new developed approach. The 
development is illustrated in Figure 4. 1 and takes into account of the following main 
points: 
1. the inclusion of HF consideration into plant design,  
2. an integration between HF analysis and a widely implemented general safety 
analysis during design of process plants to provide a way to meeting regulation 
requirements in designing process plants,  
3. an enhancement of the existing HF analysis methods to provide a systematic way in 
analysing control room work/supervisory control, and 
4. since designing DCS and alarm system influences the work of operator in a 
significant manner, especially in highly automated systems, a technique to 
incorporate HF into alarm management and into the design of DCS must be 
additionally provided. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROCESS INDUSTRY TOOL FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS ANALYSIS 
(PITOPA) 
 
Performing a HF analysis in process industry without a systematic means can become 
very lengthy and laborious. For this reason, a new approach, the Process Industry Tool 
for Operator Actions Analysis (PITOPA) was developed (Löwe, et al., 2007). The 
development of PITOPA as demonstrated in Figure 5. 1, involved the implementation of 
three HF techniques; a task analysis (TA), the Operator Actions Analysis (OAA) 
technique and an evaluation of performance influencing factors (PIFs). In order to ease 
the application of the new method and to facilitate the documentation of the huge 
amount of information collected during analysis, PITOPA was computerized and linked 
with a database system.  
 
Figure 5. 1 Development of PITOPA 
Figure 5. 2 demonstrates the systematic structure in implementing the new method 
PITOPA. By making use of the available process information and documentation such as 
the process flow diagrams, P&IDs, plans of plant layout, safety and near-misses reports, 
operating manuals and instructions, as well as the working procedures, a task analysis 
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must take place as an initial step of the whole analysis process. The aim of TA is to 
collect as much as possible understandings about the process under analysis, and to 
identify the required human operator’s contribution during operation. At the beginning 
of the analysis, the system is broken down into smaller parts and functions. Operator 
tasks are then analysed in their relation to each part of the process in achieving the 
function’s intended purpose.  
 
Figure 5. 2 Performance of PITOPA 
The analysis of operator tasks is aimed at the early recognition of requirements on 
operators and particular constraints caused by extreme working and environmental 
conditions. If during the performance of certain tasks, harms to the operators might 
arise, these tasks are to be considered as safety relevant or critical. The harms to be 
considered can be a direct contact with chemicals, exposure to heated equipments, or 
awkward positioning that can with time cause permanent injuries to the operators. 
Besides the dangerousness, identifying safety relevant and critical tasks requires 
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considerations about task complexity and difficulty, as well as the physical load caused 
through the performance of those tasks. The determination of safety relevant tasks is 
facilitated by a checklist (Figure 5. 3). If at least two of the three options: 
complex/difficult, physically hard and dangerous were chosen to characterise a certain 
task, than this task will be considered as safety relevant. 
On all of the identified safety relevant/critical tasks, further analyses are required, since 
during the performance of these particular tasks, error occurrence must be strictly 
avoided. PITOPA provides two techniques to analyse these tasks further, which are the 
Operator Actions Analysis (OAA) and the PIFs evaluation techniques. In the following 
section, both techniques are described in more detail.  
 
 
Figure 5. 3 Check list for task analysis to determine the safety relevant tasks 
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5.1 The New Technique for Operator Actions Analysis (OAA) 
The new operator actions analysis (OAA) provides a way to evaluate the consequences 
of incorrect or omitted actions during task performance in both normal and abnormal 
operation. For this purpose, distance between components in the system which have to 
be operated simultaneously must be evaluated, since distance can help determining load 
on operator during task performance. Identified tasks are decomposed into subtasks or 
steps to understand their sequence. Analysis of every step includes the identification of 
location and time span of the performance, possible errors, error causes and 
consequences as well as the necessary corrective actions by operators. Figure 5. 4 
demonstrates the OAA diagram for a normal operation as one result of OAA. Each step in 
the task sequence is represented using a numbered rectangle in the diagram. The x-axis 
of the diagram represents time span, while the y-axis shows the distance between 
equipment that need to be operated simultaneously. The horizontal lines parallel to x-
axis indicate the grade levels, on which each step has to be performed (Dalijono, et al., 
2005). Whenever due to inadequacy of plant layout, accessibility, or time available, an 
overlapping of tasks or other kinds of work overloading is recognized, incorrect actions 
are becoming more likely, which can subsequently cause disturbances leading to 
abnormal situations. 
 
Figure 5. 4 Operator Action Analysis Diagram for Normal Operation 
 
An abnormal operation that follows an error will require some corrective actions as the 
attempt to bring the process back to its normal operating state. During such abnormal 
situation, an operator has to respond to a disturbance while at the same time has to keep 
performing the normal tasks. This can significantly affect their performance and can 
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once again result in errors. Figure 5. 5 demonstrates an abnormal OAA diagram 
(Dalijono, et al., 2005). The structure of the diagram is similar to the one for normal 
operations; but underneath the x-axis, the disturbances, their consequences and the 
necessary corrective actions are illustrated.  
 
Figure 5. 5 Operator Action Analysis Diagram for Abnormal Operation 
Performing OAA on each of the identified safety relevant tasks in both normal and 
abnormal operation enables: 
- Identification of every step to successfully complete one task. 
- Recognition of inadequacy in plant layout and job design. 
- Identification of possible errors during the performance of each step, and the 
consequences thereof. 
- Identification of necessary corrective actions following each error. 
5.2 Technique for Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) Evaluation 
Working environment must be configured in such a way that best suits human beings 
during their work. Due to the complex interaction between various factors within a man-
machine system, it becomes very complicated to settle on the factors that can contribute 
in improving the whole system. The technique for PIFs evaluation enables the 
determination of the most influencing factors on operators during a certain task 
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performance. By means of this technique, improvement potentials to optimize process 
safety can be systematically revealed. 
Table 5. 1 PIFs classification and relative weights 
HF Group PIF Attribute Global weight  
Technical 
Facilities 
Equipment 
Technical equipment 0.0183 
Process safety 
condition 0.0061 
System Interface 
Display 0.0400 
Communication 
system 0.0447 
Feedback and alarm 0.0141 
Environment 
Lighting 0.0209 
Temperature 0.0233 
Vibration & noise 0.0185 
Air quality 0.0281 
Workplace Design 
Layout 0.0580 
Accessibility 0.0613 
Human 
Skill & Knowledge 
Type of task 0.0451 
Qualification & 
experience 0.0977 
Manual & Physical 
Handling 
Physical load  0.0754 
Additional tools 
0.0675 
Stress Level 
Concentration demand 0.0191 
Monotony 0.0109 
Health hazards 0.0176 
Management 
System 
Job Design 
Task frequency 0.0172 
Job description 0.0861 
Line Management 
& Instruction 
Line of responsibilities 0.0446 
Procedures 0.0409 
Supervision 0.0446 
Information 
Labels & signs 0.0192 
Communication 0.0532 
Documentation 0.0276 
 
 
For this evaluation, PIFs are classified into three HF groups as discussed in Chapter 2 
(technical facilities, management system and human/people). For the evaluation 
purpose, the factors within each group are decomposed into smaller attributes. The 
influence of one HF group on operator during a certain task is determined through the 
contribution of each PIF within it. Likewise, the influence of each PIF is determined by 
each attribute contributing to it. The contribution of PIFs and/or attributes in affecting 
operator performance can be referred to as the importance level, and will be determined 
by eliciting weights (Table 5. 1) using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980). 
The weights represent the importance of one factor in giving influence on operator’s 
work and performance, compared to other factors in the same weighting system 
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(Widiputri, et al., 2008). The elicitation of weights for this evaluation involved a 
European-wide industrial survey (PRISM, 2004). 
However, although the weights represent the potential and importance of every factor 
and attribute in influencing human performance, the actual level of influence depends 
strongly on the situations and specific characteristics of every task. Hence, the quality of 
each PIF in affecting human at the time the analysis takes place must be evaluated by 
using scores/rating (Figure 5. 6) that will characterise demands on operators during 
performance of safety critical tasks.  A questionnaire is available to assist the scoring 
process (Widiputri, 2007).  
 
Figure 5. 6 Determination of most influencing factors 
 
In this rating, the score ‘1’ is used to represent an extremely good adequacy of a PIF in 
supporting human and in reverse, ‘10’ will represent an extremely poor quality. In other 
perspective, score 1 is given to those PIFs that are either providing adequate support to 
operators or totally irrelevant for the task performance, so that no improvement must 
be made to the corresponding PIF (Löwe, et al., 2007). Ultimately, the influence level 
comparison is made based upon both the weight and the score assigned to each PIF 
during the performance of a certain task (Figure 5. 6). 
5.3 Validation of PITOPA in the Process Industry 
The performance of HF analyses by means of the new PITOPA at BayerCropscience AG in 
Germany has delivered numerous benefits (Löwe, et al., 2008). The company and the 
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management received many insights concerning the plant condition from operators’ 
perspective. Although it can be ensured that plant managers and engineers understand 
every little detail concerning the process, operators are still the ones who know exactly 
the plant’s strengths and weaknesses regarding to how various aspects are affecting 
them during their work.  
The validation of PITOPA at this company revealed that there are a lot of discrepancies 
between the opinions of operators and the managerial staffs and engineers in viewing 
the importance of different PIFs in supporting operators work. Several typical problems 
that reflect the misapprehension between these two groups are for instance: 
- Working procedures that are not anymore up-to date. Due to many changes and 
plant modifications, working space might be reduced, or equipments are dislocated. 
After one minor modification it might be too exhausting to make changes on the 
working procedures, so people tend to ignore it. But after several minor 
modifications, it becomes very likely that the working procedure no longer suits the 
actual plant conditions. Operators are often left with a single option that is to adapt 
with the new plant condition and to creatively modify the way they work to adjust to 
the situation. Although most of the times such phenomenon is harmless and even 
desired, there is a huge danger behind it that can act as a latent condition and can lead 
to a disaster.  
- Proper documentation and journals are for the operators, especially those who 
work on shifts, a very essential matter. Such journals provide the operators with 
necessary information before they start working and help maintaining their 
situational awareness concerning process condition. The managements views this 
matter also as an important thing, but not as important as a good supervision and 
good line management.   
- Extreme environmental condition might be the most typical aspect that receives 
different level of appreciation from operators and management, especially in those 
less automated plants where a great deal of manual handlings needs to be conducted. 
With the assumption that operators have a vast capability to adjust with their 
surroundings, many engineers and managerial staffs do not see the urge to provide 
operators with more comfort during their work.  
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- Additional supporting tools are sometimes introduced as an apology for an 
inappropriate working condition or working environment. This is quite typical in 
cases where operators must conduct tasks that require extra physical strengths or 
other tasks, during which contacts to dangerous substances might arise. The use of 
additional tools can often lead to even more extra load, if their availability is not 
properly arranged to give the exact support the operators require. 
- Signage and labelling. These two issues might seem to be very trivial and many 
believe that signage and labelling must have been provided in a good and adequate 
manner. However in the reality, problems with signs and labels can be often found in 
existing plants, especially if the plant had been operating for many years and has 
experienced numerous modifications during the years. Signs placed in reverse or 
labels that are not readable anymore can contribute as a latent condition that can 
force operators to execute incorrect action. 
Therefore, the performance of HF analysis must include operators’ opinion concerning 
how they feel affected through different aspects within the system. With this 
understanding, it will be possible to correspondingly recognize the necessary 
improvement to be introduced upon the existing plants, in order to better support 
operators in their work so that errors can be prevented. The new computer-based 
PITOPA in this context provides the company with a systematic means to 
comprehensively understand the state of plant conditions from HF perspectives, the 
underlying problems that might result in operator errors, the possible errors that can 
occur and their consequences, to anticipate the necessary corrective measures in 
overcoming with the error consequences, to comprehend the operators requirements 
and eventually to reveal the most necessary improvements to be made on the whole 
system. An example of the PIFs’ importance level comparison as one of the outcomes of 
PITOPA is shown in Figure 5. 7. Another extra benefit delivered by the performance of 
HF analysis is the general improvement in operators’ motivation, since they become 
aware; that their needs and requirements are being taken into account in the company’s 
safety policy. This will as a result lead to an integrally healthier working atmosphere.  
The validation of PITOPA in process plants has on the other hand recognized the 
necessity to enhance the technique into an approach that comprises a broader spectrum 
of analysis. PITOPA was found to be suitable for HF analysis in chemical plants with 
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relative big portion of manual/field work, or in other words is implementable for 
analysing HF quality of less-automated plants. The analysis of work in control room by 
means of PITOPA will not deliver comprehensive solutions in overcoming with problems 
in control system and control room configuration in general.  Moreover, due to the 
amount of required information during the analysis, PITOPA is mostly applicable to 
analyse work in existing plants, or in processes that are already running in operation. 
PITOPA is for this reason not necessarily suitable to be implemented during early design 
phase of chemical process plants. 
 
Figure 5. 7 Example of PIFs comparison delivered by PITOPA 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXTENDING HAZOP TO INTEGRATE HF INTO  
GENERAL SAFETY ANALYSIS 
 
The performance of qualitative safety analysis in process industry has become a 
regulated requirement in some countries, which these days is mainly facilitated by 
HAZOP. HAZOP enables the identification of all design intentions of every part of the 
system, and by means of using guide-words, also indicate the possible deviations of 
process parameters and consequences that might arise (Crowl, et al., 2001). HAZOP also 
attempts to find the causes why deviations are possible, so that as a result, safeguards 
to avoid such events from occurring can be proposed (see also chapter 3.3).  
 
Figure 6. 1 The new Hazard, Operability and Operator Actions Analysis (HAZOPA) 
By integrating PITOPA into HAZOP, it will be possible to systematically observe both 
technical failures and human errors that could occur during operation. PITOPA enables 
the identification of task sequences and the most influencing factors that can possibly 
add workload on operators during task performance. By recognizing these issues, 
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possible errors can be predicted and the consequences of these errors can be 
anticipated. Hence, with PITOPA any possible error that can likely lead to parameter 
deviations will be recognizable. This information will extend the results coming from 
HAZOP to systematically identify all deviations including those that are caused by 
operators. Reversely, if HAZOP already indicates that some deviations could have been 
occurred through operator involvement, PITOPA will analyse further the reason why 
operator conducts this particular incorrect action. At the end of the analysis, every 
source of failure will be revealed; either it is pure technical or HF relevant. This way, the 
most underlying causes of parameters deviations can be determined, so that 
discovering extra safeguards to avoiding them from happening will be achievable. 
6.1 Development of HAZOPA (The Hazard, Operability and Operator Actions 
Analysis) 
The integration between general safety and HF analyses into one systematic means is 
realized through the development of HAZOPA (The Hazard, Operability and Operator 
Actions Analysis). HAZOPA combines the powerful method for qualitative safety 
analysis, HAZOP studies and the new systematic HF analysis method, PITOPA (Widiputri, 
et al., 2009). By utilizing the available process documentation such as process 
description, P&IDs, process flow diagrams, operating manuals and procedures, as well as 
safety reports, the new HAZOPA will enable the identification of:  
1. both possible process deviations and human errors 
2. the causes and consequences thereof 
3. the interrelation between errors and parameters deviations 
4.  required corrective actions both following parameter deviations and incorrect 
actions 
5. the necessary safeguards and countermeasures, and 
6. the necessary modifications of the existing system. 
The structure of HAZOPA (Figure 6. 2) is similar to PITOPA. This new approach is an 
extension of PITOPA with a specific benefit that it takes into account not only the HF 
aspects but also the technical ones, based on the results coming from HAZOPs. A proper 
and ideal implementation of this new means HAZOPA will eliminate the need to perform 
HF and safety analyses separately and repetitively. Moreover, the results will provide 
73 | C h a p t e r  6  
 
more comprehensive understandings concerning the interrelation between the technical 
systems and human operators.  
The implementation of HAZOPA (Figure 6. 3) starts with a process description and 
identification of parts within it, followed by the identification of process nodes. The next 
step of the analysis will be differentiated in two dimensions, the HAZOP part and the 
task analysis part. Both analyses will run simultaneously for each process node. In the 
HAZOP part, the intervention of human operators in causing parameter deviations needs 
to be identified. In addition to it, for every parameter deviation, either if it was caused by 
incorrect operator action or not, the necessity of any corrective action by operators must 
be identified. 
 
Figure 6. 2 Structure of HAZOPA 
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Figure 6. 3 Steps to perform HAZOPA 
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In the task analysis part, all operator tasks in relation to every process node are 
identified. Following this step, all possible errors, the causes as well as the consequences 
will be identified as well. In addition to a classic task analysis, the possible process 
deviations caused by operator incorrect action must be specifically identified. 
Afterwards, through a careful consideration on the task characteristics, the safety 
relevant tasks are identified. A worksheet for this purpose is available in Figure 6. 4 
below. 
After the most important part of the analysis had taken place, on each identified safety 
relevant/critical task and crucial process deviations, operator actions analysis and PIFs 
evaluation are conducted. Through the implementation of both task analysis and HAZOP 
at the same time for a certain process node, it will be possible to recognize the 
susceptible interface between the technical system and operators where incorrect 
actions can lead to further disturbances. Moreover, it will also be possible to determine 
whether error in one process part can relate to disturbances in other parts of the plant.  
By gaining awareness of these areas, a comprehensive solution to avoid errors and 
disturbances to happen will be achievable. 
 
 Figure 6. 4 HAZOPA worksheet 
 
6.2 Case Study 
In order to better understand the implementation of HAZOPA, in this subchapter a 
hypothetical case-study will be analysed as an example.  
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I. Process description 
In this case study a simple mixing process is taken to be analysed with HAZOPA. The 
mixing process involves no chemical reaction and runs in batch. The whole process 
plant was designed for production of different types of chemicals, depending on 
market demands and production plans. However, since during mixing there is no 
reaction taking place, the analysis in this case study will ignore the type of chemical 
being produced at the time of the analysis. This mixing process requires both manual 
and automatic charging of both liquid and solid materials. The process diagram of the 
mixing process is shown in a simplified form in Figure 6. 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 5 Simplified process diagram of the mixing process 
 
 
II. Division of the process into smaller parts and into nodes 
The process demonstrated in Figure 6. 5 is to be broken down into smaller process 
parts, and furthermore into process nodes to provide a better analysis on the 
process. In this example, the process can be divided into 5 main parts as listed in 
Table 6. 1 together with their associated nodes. 
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Table 6. 1 Identification of process parts and nodes of the mixing process 
Process Parts Process Nodes 
P1 
Charging of solid 
materials 
N 1.1 
Solid materials charging 
chamber – suction duct 
P2 Charging of liquids N 2.1 Liquid charging duct 
P3 
Pre-treatment of 
additives & solvents 
N 3.1 Heating cabinet 
N 3.2 Solvent feed-tank (buffer tank) 
P4 Mixing N 4.1 Stir tank 
P5 Suspension grinding N 5.1 Grinder 
 
III. The simultaneous and iterative performance of HAZOP and task analysis 
To demonstrate the performance of both HAZOP and task analysis, 2 process nodes 
are taken as examples. The first node to be analysed is the P1.N1.1, which is the 
charging of solid materials that takes account of the operation of the suction chamber 
and suction duct. The next process node to be analysed is the P4.N4.1, the stir tank 
where the mixing process is taking place. The worksheets in Table 6. 2 and Table 6. 3 
show the analysis of both process nodes.  
P1.N1.1: Manual charging of solid materials 
In this mixing process several types of solid materials must be added into the tank 
manually, through a suction chamber. The amount of these solids and in which size 
the bags are delivered by suppliers varies significantly.  
P4.N4.1: Mixing process in a stir tank 
The mixing process is conducted in batch, after the required amount of solids and 
liquid materials have been completely charged into the tank. To begin and during the 
process, several process parameters must be monitored and checked upon. 
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Table 6. 2 Analysis of P1.N1.1: manual charging of solid materials into charging chamber and 
suction duct 
 
Table 6. 2 and Table 6. 3 demonstrate the performance of HAZOP together with task 
analysis simultaneously on the  two process nodes described earlier. At the beginning of 
the analysis, it is very likely that not all information can be thought of or recognized, 
since the nodes are interconnected one with another, so that to have a comprehensive 
analysis, this step must be done iteratively. As an example, the tasks to be conducted at 
the node P1.N1.1 (Table 6. 2) are not identified as to be able to cause process deviation 
at the beginning. However, as the analysis proceeds to the node P4.N4.1 (Table 6. 3), by 
taking a closer look at 2 of the causes of process deviations 4.1.3 (incorrect product 
composition), which are: 
Cause 1 : feeding a wrong amount of materials into the tank 
Cause 2 : selecting and charging the wrong kinds of solid materials 
it is found that these causes are interrelated with errors by operators in other parts of 
the process plant. Both of the causes of deviation on product composition listed above 
resulted from the errors executed during the performance of manual charging of solid 
materials (node P1.N1.1, during both task 1.1.T1 and task 1.1.T2). Therefore, at this 
point, the initial analysis of node P1.N1.1 can now be completed by putting more 
information concerning the possible process deviations caused through error 
occurrence (Table 6. 4). 
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Table 6. 3 Analysis of P4.N4.1: mixing process in the stir tank 
Process 
Node Parameter
Possible 
Deviation
Cause
Human 
Involvement
Consequence Corrective 
Actions
Safeguards Remarks
P4
N4.1
Mixing process 
in 
stir tank
1. Pressure Too high
Jam in the 
circulation 
pipeline to/
from the 
grinder
Not identified
Material release 
due to pipelines 
break-down
Yes
Identified 
Tasks
Location Possible 
Error
Consequence
Can lead to 
process deviation?
Safety 
Relevant?
Remarks
Flow control
2. Temperature Too high
Excessive 
energy input 
through 
stirrer
Not identified
Product thermal 
decomposition
Temperature 
control in the 
stir tank
3. 
Product 
composition
Incorrect
1. 
Wrong 
amount of 
materials 
fed
Yes
Development of 
flammable 
atmosphere
Yes
Take-over 
accordance to 
check-lists
Corrective 
actions under 
supervision
2. 
Wrong solid 
materials 
selected 
and 
charged
Yes Quality failure Yes
Updated 
working 
manuals
Corrective 
actions under 
supervision
3. 
Wrong 
composition 
of liquid 
additives 
prepared
Yes Quality failure Yes
Updated 
working 
manuals
Corrective 
actions under 
supervision
4. 
Tank level Too high
Level 
measure-
ment defect
Yes Tank overflow Yes
Redundancy,
Cross-check 
by field 
operator
T1. 
Monitoring tank 
temperature and 
pressure
Control 
room
Not 
conducted
Tank overflow
Yes
Conducted by 
control room 
operator
T2.
Monitoring fluid 
level 
3
rd
level
Yes 
(if not acknowledged 
by control room 
operator)
Double checking 
through level 
indicator 
monitored in 
control room 
Incorrectly 
conducted
Inhalation of or 
contact with 
hazardous 
chemicals
Yes
Monitoring 
through sight 
glass is often 
hindered. 
Operators often 
open manhole to 
ensure materials 
flow and tank level
T3.
Ensuring 
materials flow 
into the tank 
3
rd
level
Not 
conducted
Incorrectly 
conducted
Inhalation of or 
contact with 
hazardous 
chemicals
Yes 
(if not acknowledged 
by control room 
operator)
Yes
Monitoring 
through sight 
glass is often 
hindered. 
Operators often 
open manhole to 
ensure materials 
flow and tank level
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Table 6. 4 Complete Analysis of P1.N1.1 
 
IV. Determination of critical tasks and identification of necessary corrective action 
After every identified node is iteratively analyzed through the combination of HAZOP 
and task analysis, the next step will be to summarize all the recognized critical tasks. 
Critical tasks in this context are defined as all tasks, which can cause process 
deviations if not conducted as intended, and tasks that are considered as safety 
relevant. The determination of these critical tasks will serve as a filter before 
continuing to further analyses. Only tasks with perceived criticality are to be 
analyzed in-depth through the operator actions analysis and PIFs evaluation. For the 
case-study discussed in this chapter, the identified critical tasks at node P1.N1.1 and 
P4.N4.1 are tabulated in Table 6. 5. 
Besides the determination of different critical tasks during plant operation, the 
necessary operator contribution in coping with unexpected disturbances can also be 
delivered through the iterative analysis. Table 6. 6 lists all points where operator 
corrective actions are required following a parameter deviation or an operator error. 
This recognition of necessary operator’s involvement to remedy process 
disturbances is very crucial. The necessary corrective actions will then be as well 
analyzed further through the operator actions analysis, together with the identified 
critical tasks. 
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Table 6. 5 List of tasks with perceived criticality at node P1.N1.1 and P4.N4.1 
 
Task Nr. Task Description 
Process Deviation 
Caused 
Safety 
Relevant 
1.1.T1 
Transporting materials from 
the warehouse 
Deviation 4.1.3 
(cause 2) 
 
1.1.T2 
Charging solid materials in 
bags into suction 
chamber/duct manually 
Deviation 4.1.3 
(cause 1) 
√ 
4.1.T2 
Monitoring fluid level in the 
stir tank 
Deviation 4.1.4 √ 
4.1.T3 
Ensuring flow of materials 
into the stir tank 
 √ 
 
Table 6. 6 Identification of deviations in need of operator corrective actions 
Process Part Process Node 
Deviation and Causes Requiring Operator 
Corrective Actions 
P1 
Charging of 
solid materials 
N1.1 
Solid charging 
chamber – 
suction duct 
1.1.1 
Temperature too high, caused by 
plugging in the roller crusher 
P4 
Mixing 
process 
N4.1 Stir tank 
4.1.1 
Pressure too high, caused by a jam 
in the recirculation pipeline  
4.1.3 
(cause 1) 
Failure on product composition, 
caused by mistake in controlling 
the amount of materials fed  
4.1.3. 
(cause 2) 
Failure on product composition, 
mistake in preparing solid 
materials 
4.1.3 
(cause 3) 
Failure on product composition, 
mistake in preparing additives 
 
V. The Operator Actions Analysis step 
For all identified critical tasks (all tasks listed in Table 6. 5), OAA is to be conducted. 
In addition to it, the necessary corrective actions following process disturbances 
(Table 6. 6) are to be defined and analyzed by means of the same technique. The 
similar steps as in the classic operator actions analysis (chapter 5.1) are performed 
to identify further the characteristics of work to be completed by operators. Through 
this operator actions analysis, it will be possible to see in more detail the possible 
incorrect actions that operators might conduct under inadequate working condition, 
and what impact these errors have on the operation.  
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For further analysis of the case study, one critical task will be discussed here. Taken 
as example is the task 1.1.T2, which is the manual charging of solid materials in bags 
into the charging chamber. To complete this task, 4 subtasks or steps must be done 
in a certain sequence. The analysis of the completion of this task in a normal 
operation is demonstrated in Table 6. 7 and Figure 6. 6.  
Table 6. 7 Operator actions analysis on task 1.1.T2: “Charging solid materials into charging 
chamber manually” 
 
Nr. Location Step 
Possible 
Error 
Conse-
quence 
Time 
Required 
(min) 
Remarks 
1. 
 
1st level 
Switching on the 
suction pump, 
roller-crusher, 
and exhaust 
Not done 
Process 
delay 
2 min  
2. 1st level 
Placing the solid 
materials in bags  
approaching the 
chamber 
Incorrectly 
done 
Process 
delay, 
injury 
6 min 
Inadequate space 
for maneuvering  
3. 1st level 
Placing bag on 
the sieve (grid), 
opening it by 
using a knife, 
and pouring the 
content down 
the chamber 
Incorrectly 
done 
Material 
release, 
dust 
formation 
and 
explosion,  
injury 
40 – 60 min 
Physically hard 
work, weight of 
each bag can reach 
25 kg, by delivery 
are often piled up 
to 2 m high, 
Under extreme 
working condition,                                     
the use of the 
additional tool 
(knife) can lead to 
injury  
Operators often 
refuse to wear full 
protective clothing 
4. 1st level Cleaning work 
Incorrectly 
done 
Inhalation 
of toxic 
materials 
2 min  
 
Based on the result of operator actions analysis tabulated in Table 6. 7, OAA-
diagrams for normal operation can be developed to demonstrate the task sequence, 
possible errors and the necessary corrective actions. In this example, one step is 
considered as extremely important, since failures conducted during the performance 
of this step can cause significant impacts on both process and operator safety. This is 
the 3rd step of the task sequence, where one operator has to charge the solid 
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materials in bags into the chamber by first lifting each bag from the palette onto the 
grid of the chamber, opening the bag using a knife, and pouring the content of each 
bag into the chamber through a sieve. Several failures are possible to happen during 
the performance of this task, due to the considerably high physical load. One batch 
will require around 25 to 40 bags of solid to be charged into the stir tank, each of 
which weighs between 12.5 to 25 kg. The working condition can be extremely hard 
for the operator, and under such extreme working condition, it is very likely that an 
operator refuses to wear full protective clothes or a full-face mask, since it will 
hinder his work pace. This is of course very dangerous, since without a full-face 
mask, fine solids can easily enter the respiratory system and can cause harm to 
health. During the completion of this step, it is also possible that due to a reduction in 
concentration the operator drops one or more bags that can cause dust formation 
and can eventually result in an explosion. Another danger can also happen under 
such high working load, that the use of a knife to open the bags leads to an injury.  
 
Figure 6. 6 Operator Actions Analysis (OAA)-Diagram for task 1.1.T2 in normal operation 
 
After understanding several consequences that can be caused by errors conducted 
during the completion of task 1.1.T2, specifically during the 3rd step of the sequence, 
an evaluation of PIFs must be conducted to reveal the most influencing factors on 
operator performance, so that the most underlying problems and the necessary 
improvements to be made on the system can be recognized.       
VI. The PIFs evaluation 
The evaluation of PIFs is conducted to have a more comprehensive understanding of 
diverse factors that affect operators during the completion of certain tasks. For the 
task discussed in this case study, the evaluation of PIFs delivers a comparison of how 
strong the factors can influence the work of operators. By recognizing the most 
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influencing factors, it will be possible to correspondingly understand the most 
necessary improvement to be conducted, to support the operators better during 
their work. Figure 6. 7 shows the result of PIFs evaluation for the task 1.1.T2. From 
the result, the most influencing factors in the performance of this task are physical 
load, additional tools, qualifications and experience, accessibility between plant 
sections, and plant layout.    
 
The case study clearly demonstrates how the new HAZOPA systematically leads the way 
to find the most underlying problems that have been burdening the operators with 
unnecessary load. The factors recommended by HAZOPA to be improved are revealed 
through a systematic analysis of the interrelation between the plant’s technical aspects 
and the human operators. By means of this new method, the legal requirement to 
conduct both safety and HF analysis can be fulfilled simultaneously, since the integration 
of plant personnel into safety concept is guaranteed.  
 
 
Figure 6. 7 Result of PIFs evaluation for task 1.1.T2 
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CHAPTER 7 
APPROACH TO INCORPORATING HF CONSIDERATION  
INTO PLANT DESIGN 
 
The previously developed computer-base method PITOPA (Chapter 5), although was 
proven capable in finding most necessary improvement potentials within a system to 
improve operation safety, is unfortunately less applicable for an implementation during 
design phase, where many information required to perform the means is not attainable 
yet. Nonetheless, considerations on HF are inevitable to be taken into account during 
design, since this is the exact time where actual attempts to avoid human error must 
take place. An enhancement of PITOPA is therefore required and conducted in this 
work, with the intention to develop a new approach that comprises both design and 
operation of a process plant. 
7.1 Development of an Approach for HF Analysis in Design – The PITOPA-Design 
 A typical process design can be basically differentiated into three main phases; the 
conceptual, basic and detail engineering design phase. Subsequently, a commissioning 
stage will take place before the plant is taken into operation (Löwe et al., 2004). It is 
often very difficult to define the change-over between two different phases, and some 
activities conducted in a particular stage can lead to a need of modification on decisions 
taken in the previous stage. Figure 7. 1 shows the activities during the entire process 
design, where it can be seen that issues concerning human requirements are not 
directly focused upon. 
Concurrent to the activities conducted during process design, HF consideration must 
also be taken into account. Unfortunately, the incorporation of HF into design phase is 
more complex than during process operation, since only little amount of information 
concerning the process is available at these early stages. Several methods attempt to 
implement HF during design, which unfortunately cannot comprise the whole design 
phase (McCafferty, 1995). This calls for a new approach that systematically assists the 
utilization of the limited amount of information during the whole design phase, to 
optimally minimize the potential problems related to HF issues later during operation. 
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Figure 7. 1 Process design phases and the corresponding design activities of a process plant 
The new method developed in this work, the PITOPA-Design, attempts to include 
different HF activities into each of the design stages shown in Figure 7.1. Some basic HF 
activities that are necessary to be conducted during those stages are (Widiputri, et al., 
2009): 
- Definition of all functions that require human contribution 
- Identification and analysis of any kind of operator contribution and 
responsibility 
- Designing all aspects relevant to HF to provide adequate support for operators 
- Iterative HF design evaluation by taking into account operators’ opinion 
- Frequent performance of HF reviews and audits during operation to maintain 
plant’s HF quality   
The above activities are comprised in the 2 major components of PITOPA-Design, which 
are the HFAD (HF Analysis in Design Phase) and the evaluation of HF design parameters. 
The incorporation of these activities into the general engineering design is shown in 
Figure 7. 2. 
Figure 7. 2 illustrates that HF activities by means of PITOPA-Design must be performed 
in relation to the ongoing engineering design. Some results gained from this HF analysis 
can call for modifications not only on the system’s technical design, but also on the 
organisational structure of the work as well as the management system. Decisions made 
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during a particular stage can require changes on the design of certain aspects conducted 
in previous stages.  Therefore, HF analysis during design must take place continuously 
and must assure that the interconnection between different stages of design process is 
maintained accessible. 
 
Figure 7. 2 HF design activities concurrent to engineering design by means of PITOPA-Design 
 
The first component of PITOPA-Design, the HFAD (HF Analysis in Design) technique is 
developed to cover HF analyses in all 3 design stages. HFAD combines the 
implementation of different HF methods for design purpose, i.e. functional analysis, 
allocation of functions and task analyses, completed with the generation of HF-Design 
(HFD)-catalogues for every stage. The HFD-catalogues summarize results delivered by 
HFAD, pointing out the most necessary design considerations related to every HF-
relevant aspect. The generation of HFD-catalogues employs questionnaires, which are 
developed in form of a systematic tree-structure to address the identification of 
potential HF issues and correspondingly suggest the necessary requirements on HF 
design parameters, in order to maintain process and personnel safety (Cramar, 2009). 
The suggestions provided by the catalogues, although not exhaustive, address the basic 
operators’ requirements to be met by plant design. This way, the design team will 
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receive more focused direction in finding most relevant design suggestions as 
recommended by the available practical guidelines and standards. 
In order to comprise an implementation of HF analysis during the whole phase of a 
process plant design, HFAD is differentiated into three levels correspondingly, which are 
the HFAD-Conceptual, the HFAD-Basic and the HFAD-Detail with increasing 
particularities in every stage. If during conceptual design, considerations can only be 
made related to the plant’s geographical conditions, in basic and detail engineering the 
analysis of human contribution can be performed in a deeper scrutiny. Figure 7. 3 
illustrates the interrelation of all three design stages, in each of which the design of HF 
aspects becomes more and more specific. 
Simultaneous with the performance of HFAD, the second component of PITOPA-Design, 
which is an iterative evaluation of HF design parameters must be conducted throughout 
the whole design and also during the commissioning. This evaluation has the aim to 
ensure that the engineering design meets HF requirements and also the other way 
around, that the design of various HF aspects still meets process’s intentions and goals. 
Later on, a regular HF audits and reviews by means of PITOPA are necessary to maintain 
and improve the HF quality in the facility. A closer discussion about the HFAD and the 
technique for HF design evaluation is delivered in the following sections.  
7.1.1 HF Analysis in Conceptual Design Phase (HFAD–Conceptual)  
In early design phase or conceptual engineering, there is still a large opportunity and 
potential to optimally design the facility to meet production and safety requirements. 
This potential diminishes however with the increasing level of the design state, until at 
one point only minor changes can still be performed without causing significant cost 
implication. Hence, even with the least process information available in conceptual 
design, attempts to include HF consideration must already be made. In the early design 
phase or in conceptual engineering, considering HF can be facilitated through the 
performance of HFAD-Conceptual, where functional analysis and the allocation of 
functions take place as an initial step, as shown in Figure 7. 4. The aim of this analysis is 
to identify all functions that need to be fulfilled in achieving process’s goals, and to 
recognize the necessary operators’ involvement in each function.   
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Figure 7. 3 Area of the HF analysis in each design stage
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Figure 7. 4 HFAD in conceptual design (HFAD-Conceptual)  
The consideration of HF can begin as early as the process has been defined. For the 
performance of functional analysis, the process is divided into smaller parts or units. 
Afterwards, the intended functions of every process part must be identified and 
analysed in term of the consideration about the required operator involvement to 
achieve intended purposes. Functions are afterwards allocated to machines only 
(automatic functions), to human operators only (manual functions) or to both machines 
and human (semi-automatic functions) (McCafferty, 1995). The functions which are 
decided to be operated semi-automatically and manually will be the focus of the next 
analysis. 
Besides to identify functions and the requirement for operator’s interference in 
achieving the purpose of those functions, early information about the process in terms of 
the selected plant location and in form of basic block diagrams can be utilised to 
recognize potential HF issues later during operation, so that necessary attempts to 
prevent them can be correspondingly taken. Considerations related to those potential 
HF issues will be summarized in the Preliminary-HFD-Catalogue, which will point out the 
most relevant and necessary design parameters in need of particular attention to avoid 
later problems. To generate this catalogue, an analysis by means of a tree-structured 
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catalogue provided in Figure 7. 5 below must be conducted, which concerns these 
following aspects: i) climate and geographical conditions, ii) extreme climate and 
weather condition, iii) significant instability in political situations, iv) regional laws and 
regulations on safety and health, v) public holidays and festive days, vi) difference in 
cultural backgrounds and understanding on symbols and process units, and vii) manning 
availability and qualifications. 
Table 7. 1 Five basic types of operator tasks 
 
Preparation 
and operation 
Process start-up 
/ shut-down 
Process 
monitoring and 
controlling 
Maintenance 
and cleaning 
work 
Testing, sampling 
and inspection 
T
a
sk
 d
e
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 
• Handling of 
materials 
• Storage 
• Starting-up the 
whole process, 
one part of a 
process, a 
process unit, or 
beginning a 
batch 
• Shutting-down 
the whole 
process, one 
part of a 
process, a 
process unit, or 
ending a batch 
• Monitoring of 
operation at 
control room 
displays 
• Field monitoring 
• Decision making 
during 
deviations 
• Execution of 
solutions to 
problems 
• Documentation 
• Maintenance 
activities both 
by own 
operators or 
third party 
workers 
• Cleaning of 
process 
equipment 
• General 
cleaning work 
• Any sampling 
activity 
• Laboratory testing 
• On-site testing 
• Trouble shooting 
• Inspection of 
apparatus and 
equipment 
R
e
le
v
a
n
t 
d
e
si
g
n
 a
sp
e
ct
s 
• Material 
properties 
• Storage 
• Working 
environment 
• Accessibility to 
process 
equipment 
• Additional 
tools 
• Safety 
equipment 
• Console and 
control panels 
• Displays and 
human-
computer 
interface 
• Working 
procedures 
• Console and 
control panels 
• Displays and 
Human-
computer 
interface  
• Design of DCS 
• Working 
environment 
• Control 
elements 
• Working 
procedures 
• Material 
properties 
• Working 
environment 
• Additional 
tools 
• Safety 
equipment 
• Working 
procedures 
• Material properties 
• Working 
environment 
• Accessibility to 
laboratories 
• Additional tools 
• Safety equipment 
• Working 
procedures 
 
Still in the scope of HFAD-Conceptual, by making use of the results from functional 
analysis and functions allocation, as well as the suggestions delivered by the 
Preliminary-HFD-Catalogue, an analysis of all operator contribution must take place 
subsequently. This is a very critical step during design process, where information 
concerning all tasks, operators’ actions and requirements are collected and analysed 
(Kirwan, et al., 2001). In early design stage, the first attempt to analyse tasks can be done 
through the classification of operator’s contribution into 5 basic task types, as listed in 
Table 7. 1 above.  
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Figure 7. 5 Analysis of HF aspects relevant to geographical location of the plant 
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7.1.2 HF Analysis in Basic Engineering (HFAD – Basic) 
After all functions in need of operator’s contribution have been identified in conceptual 
engineering, and after the first identification of possible types of operator tasks, a more 
specific analysis on these tasks must be conducted in basic engineering. At this stage, HF 
has many opportunities to influence the design of both the process and the plant 
construction. As the design plan enters a more specific and concrete dimension, 
analysing HF can be done in a more real and exact way. Some necessary documentation 
in enabling the identification of operator tasks during basic engineering are i.e. the 
available process flow diagrams, preliminary P&IDs, conception of building design and 
plant layout, and also the Preliminary-HFD-Catalogue provided by HFAD-Conceptual. 
The analysis of HF in basic engineering is provided by the HFAD-Basic, whose 
implementation is presented in Figure 7. 6. 
 
Figure 7. 6 HFAD in basic engineering (HFAD-Basic) 
The HFAD-Basic is a combination between a task analysis and an analysis of relevant 
PIFs. For every identified function, the sequence of operator tasks is to be defined. In 
order to do so, experience from similar plants and expert opinions can be a very good 
source of information. After the identification of operator tasks, the characteristic of the 
tasks are to be analysed, and in addition to it, the relevant PIFs are to be identified. For 
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this purpose, another set of tree-structured questionnaires was developed. The 
questionnaires comprise all HF aspects that must be considered before entering detail 
engineering, and will point out a list of the most necessary design parameters that hold 
the key to an inherently safe process and plant design.  
HFAD-Basic provides a way to recognize unrealistic demands on operators, through an 
understanding about the possible inadequate working condition and dangerous 
characteristics of the tasks. The analysis will provide design considerations related to 
the following aspects, for each of which a questionnaire is available: 
1. Material properties 
2. Storage of raw materials and products 
3. Manual handling of materials and products 
4. Working environment  
5. Accessibility to plant sections and process equipment 
6. Human-machine interface 
7. Additional supporting tools 
8. Control and monitoring system 
In analysing the characteristics of a task, some of the above factors are interrelated one 
with another. As an example, if one task deals with dangerous materials, then manual 
handlings of those materials, the required additional supporting tools and human-
machine interface must be correspondingly designed. For this reason, in several cases, 
the completion of one questionnaire related to a certain aspect can refer to a further 
analysis of other aspects using other questionnaires. At the end of the analysis by means 
of HFAD-Basic, the HFD-catalogue-Basic will be provided, which summarizes all 
necessary HF design considerations to be incorporated during basic engineering and 
points out the most necessary HF design parameters for this purpose. 
Following is a closer discussion about each of the aspects listed above together with the 
presentation of the associated tree-structured questionnaires for analysis purpose. 
1. Material properties 
A crucial basic aspect to be analysed in terms of operator safety is the material 
properties involved in the whole processing. The properties of materials to be 
utilized, the intermediate and finished products affect the operators directly, 
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especially in plants where manual handlings are to be conducted. Material properties 
of chemicals being treated in the process are among the most important concerns in 
determining the level of automation. The consideration comprises the followings: 
- The hazard potentials of the utilized chemicals and products that may cause 
safety and environmental problems 
- The hazards to workers through exposure with the chemicals 
The above points are systematically structured in the questionnaire shown in Figure 
7. 7. Several considerations provided from this analysis are focused to achieve an 
inherently safer design (ISD) through the four principles; minimisation, substitution, 
moderation and simplification. In addition to it, the catalogue will suggest the design 
team to take considerations concerning the necessary safety equipment, adequate 
job design, working procedure, labelling and signage corresponding to any possible 
hazardous property of materials.  
2. Storage of raw materials and products 
From the first sight it may seem that design of storage does not relate directly to HF 
and is more a responsibility of engineering design to handle. But, one cannot 
eliminate the fact that, there are operators who must spend almost all of their 
working time in warehouses. In other cases, some operators may have to travel a 
significant distance between warehouses and their actual work location, 
transporting dangerous materials with them. Related to the first aspect of the 
analysis in HFAD-Basic, which is material properties, the design of warehouse should 
meet several basic operators’ requirements, such as: 
- Proper ventilation to keep good air quality 
- Systematic inventory system to avoid mix-up 
- Location with a proper distance from any relevant part of process plant 
- Availability of necessary tools in handling with materials in storage, in any form 
and size of packaging.  
The questionnaire related with warehouse and storage of materials is shown in 
Figure 7. 8. 
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Figure 7. 7 HF design related to material properties 
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Figure 7. 8 HF design related to storage and warehouses 
 
3. Manual handling of materials and products 
After allocating the functions into automatic, manual and semi-automatic, HF 
consideration must be focused upon the manual parts of all functions, including 
those that are required for semi-automatic ones. The responsibility to conduct tasks 
manually will impact the operators directly both mentally and physically. Hence at 
this step, an analysis to re-check the allocation of functions is conducted. In the 
associated questionnaire (Figure 7. 9), some questions will ensure whether or not 
the related task should necessarily include operator’s contribution. Although the 
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allocation of functions was conducted previously in conceptual design, as more 
specific information about the process is available, the involvement of human 
operators in certain tasks must be further evaluated.  
4. Working environment  
Operator performance is very easily influenced by the condition of working 
environment surrounding them. Besides the reduction in working performance, 
extreme working conditions can also cause permanent health problems. Several 
aspects related to working environment that must be taken into account during 
design are temperature, noise, vibration, and time of task completion; either at day 
or night time (Figure 7. 10). Again, a consideration to automate certain functions or 
tasks will be made at this point, since the recognition of possibility that an operator 
has to work under an extreme condition must address the need of automation.  
5. Accessibility to plant sections and process equipment 
As the design proceeds with the development of preliminary plant lay-out, an 
analysis of accessibility in and between plant sections must be thoroughly conducted. 
Problems with insufficient access are often realized far too late during operation, 
where it will not be possible anymore to make any changes on the plant without 
causing excessive additional costs. The aspect ‘accessibility’ in this term is related 
with the required operator’s effort to reach certain plant section or process 
equipment in completing the sequence of their job. The questionnaire for an analysis 
of this HF aspect is provided in Figure 7. 11, which includes the followings: 
- Distance between plant sections or process equipment that must be reached or 
operated by operators during the completion of tasks. 
- Availability of adequate path ways between plant sections and process 
equipment, including the clarity of path allocation to avoid confusion. 
- Exclusion of any possible awkward positioning while operators conducting their 
job. 
- Elimination of any contact with process equipment, chemicals or also additional 
tool that might cause harm to the operators. 
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Figure 7. 9 HF design related to manual handlings
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Figure 7. 10 HF design related to working environment 
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II.5.
Accessibility
II.5.2
Work space 
arrangement
II.5.3
Need of particular 
clothing
II.5.4
Work under high 
temperature 
condition
II.5.5
Any possibility of 
explosion, fire or 
material release 
II.5.6
Work includes 
dealing with 
materials manual 
handling
II.5.7
Maintenance, 
repair and service
Consider available guidelines and 
regulation
Equipment and furnishing size is 
allocated between 5 – 95 percentile  
Adequate space for task completion
Emergency exit and evacuation way
No
Yes
Consideration on equipment 
arrangement under the use of extra 
clothing and additional tools/
equipment
Possible direct 
contacts with 
equipment or 
materials?
Yes
No
Stop
Safety equipment and clothing
Yes
Stop
No Avoid direct contact with heated 
equipment
Labeling and signage
Yes
Stop
No
Intercommunication system, 
emergency alarm.
Emergency exit and evacuation way
Yes
II.5.1
No
Adequate space for movement and 
maneuvers 
Extra space to temporarily place 
materials, intermediate or final 
products
For sampling: 
Accessible sampling location and 
necessary equipment, shortest 
pathway to laboratory or examination 
location
Consideration on the requirement for 
adequate work space under limitation 
of anthropometric data
II.5.1
Work requires 
movement 
between different 
parts/plants/
buildings?
Yes
Stop
No
Shortest and safe pathway between 
locations
Means for movement (by foot, 
vehicles, other transport devices) 
Use of vehicles: adequate width of 
path way, adequate signage, working 
procedure
 
 
Figure 7. 11 HF design related to accessibility 
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6. Human-machine interface and consoles  
Consideration about human-machine interface (HMI) and design of consoles is 
normally made during detail engineering, which is actually already too late since at 
that stage, there is only minimal space left for the design team to make significant 
changes. On the other side, HMI is one of the main focuses of HF which will impact 
operators work directly, and is the only way for operators to communicate with the 
process. Therefore, HF consideration to analyse the design of HMI must be initialized 
as early as in basic engineering, although not every design parameter can be 
considered yet.  
The HF consideration concerning HMI in basic engineering will assist the recognition 
of possible interactions between operators and the system, in terms of to which 
extent operators’ contribution is required in ensuring the operation to run 
expectedly. Points of analysis by means of the questionnaire in Figure 7. 12 are: 
- Recognizing the possibility of hazards and dangers arising during start-up and 
operation, and whether operators need to be present in field during these 
activities.   
- Ensuring the availability of necessary data and process logs for the operators. 
This will later relate with the adequacy of control and alarm log system, as well as 
working procedures. 
- Recognizing the possibility of any awkward positioning during work. In later 
design stages, the space for improving building and plant layout is extremely 
reduced.  
Many of design specifications of HMI i.e. displays configuration or data input devices 
can only be made based on market offers and availability. Standards and guidelines 
are available that suggest the appropriate HMI design based on best practices, and 
these guidelines can assist the design team in comparing technical specification and 
quality offered by different vendors. This activity will be optimal when conducted in 
detail engineering, as most of the required design specifications are already 
determined. Moreover, if the analysis of this aspect addresses the need to optimally 
adjust the design of control system (DCS) to operators’ limitation, the catalogue will 
refer to a separate analysis of HF in DCS design, without giving more specific 
considerations concerning this subject.  
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7. Additional working tools and operating elements  
Availability of additional working tools must also be considered in early design stage. 
Additional tools can affect both the design of operator work as well as the process 
itself. If the use of a certain additional tool was related to the absent of one or more 
process equipment, either due to financial reasons, space availability or other 
reasoning, then the impact of using this tool on operator performance cannot be 
ignored. Often, additional tools that are intended to reduce operator load are in fact 
the source of problems during task completion. Such implication must be avoided 
through a better process and job design. 
Besides additional tools, the design of all operating elements must also take place at 
this point. Although it may seem small, design of operating elements must not be 
done later than in basic engineering, since in the next stage, in detail engineering, 
working procedures and manuals are to be arranged based on, among others, the 
design of operating elements. The associated questionnaire for this analysis is 
provided in Figure 7. 13. 
8. Control and monitoring system 
Human-system interface might be a very important aspect that affects operator 
performance. However, since the actual aim of the design is to provide a good 
communication between the operators and the process, which means to enable a 
reliable process controlling and monitoring, the logic behind this interface becomes a 
very crucial aspect. In HFAD-Basic, the analysis on control and monitoring system 
design is done only at the superficial level. This includes the consideration of 
whether a field monitoring is required and the identification of the need to 
particularly perform decision-making during monitoring, which requires the 
operator to first notify and analyse the changing of process parameters. The 
questionnaire for this analysis is provided in Figure 7. 14. 
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Figure 7. 12 HF design related to operating interface and human-machine interface 
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Figure 7. 13 HF design related to operating elements 
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Figure 7. 14 HF design related to process monitoring
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7.1.3 HF Analysis in Detail Engineering (HFAD-Detail)  
Going further into detail engineering, the design team would already have been 
acknowledged with most of the requirements on engineering and technical design 
specifications that must be provided for the operation. The whole element of process 
design will be finalized by the end of this stage. Although the space for making changes 
and modifications on the ongoing design is considerably smaller than in previous stages, 
there are still potentials that must be thoroughly examined to optimize the system 
design, so that a higher efficiency and safer operation can be achieved.  
For an analysis of HF in detail engineering, steps of the classic PITOPA (Chapter 5) need 
to be only slightly modified, since, as the design moves closer to reaching the final aimed 
configuration, the analysis of HF becomes more similar to an analysis of an existing 
facility. In terms of operator safety, HF considerations at this point must cover the 
design of all identified performance influencing factors (PIFs) relevant with operators’ 
work within the system. In order to be able to locate the points in need of extra 
awareness, one must understand how the various PIFs can contribute in affecting human 
beings during their work.  
The HFAD-Detail continues the analysis of tasks and HF aspects started in the previous 
stage. In basic engineering, task analysis has provided the identification of all tasks to be 
conducted by operators, together with the particular characteristics of the tasks as well 
as the possible load caused during performance of the work. HFAD-Basic also provides 
the design team with an HFD-catalogue-Basic, which suggest necessary HF design 
considerations for ensuring the system’s HF quality. In detail engineering, the design of 
these aspects will be finalized, and therefore, further analysis of the identified tasks will 
be made. The analysis will identify the possible errors during performance, the cause or 
source of these errors, as well as the consequences brought by the error execution, 
which can either lead to an exposure to operators, causing an environmental damage, or 
process deviations in other parts of the process. A deeper understanding about how 
human operators interrelate with the process is therefore required. For this reason, the 
HFAD-Detail will implement the new HAZOPA (see the development in Chapter 6) to 
provide a wider scope of HF and safety analysis by combining their implementation 
during design of a process plant. The structure of HFAD-Detail is illustrated in Figure 7. 
15. 
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As explained in chapter 6, the implementation of HAZOPA takes place using the available 
worksheet (Figure 6. 4) to identify the points where operator errors will have impact on 
process state, to identify necessary operators’ contribution or interference following a 
process disturbance. As a result, operator actions analysis (OAA)-diagrams are provided. 
Through such an analysis, a comprehensive understanding on the interaction between 
operators and the system will be achievable. Moreover, the susceptible points where 
human errors can lead to a serious problem will be recognized. This information is 
crucial in correspondingly designing every HF aspect in the system, in order to provide 
adequate support for the operators, to improve their performance and to consequently 
heighten operation safety.  
 
Figure 7. 15 Structure of HFAD in detail engineering (HFAD-Detail) 
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Subsequent to the implementation of HAZOPA, another HFD-catalogue will be generated 
for detail engineering. The development of this catalogue will cover more detail aspects 
than in both previous stages. A PIFs evaluation similar to which conducted during 
PITOPA needs to be performed for this purpose; however, the questionnaire used for the 
evaluation has been modified to suit an evaluation in detail engineering. The complete 
version of the questionnaire that assists the generation of HFD-catalogue-Detail is shown 
in Appendix A. 
For the PIFs evaluation, similar to PITOPA, the factors are broken down into smaller 
attributes to provide a more detailed analysis, and each is assigned with relative weight 
(Table 5. 1). The result of this analysis will point out the HF aspects in need of design 
modification before coming into construction stage, or will address necessary 
information concerning each aspect to be taken into account during construction. At last, 
in addition to the suggestions for design optimization, the HFD-catalogue-Detail will also 
summarize the result of HAZOPA concerning the critical tasks and necessary corrective 
actions by operators following possible process deviations. This invaluable information 
must be maintained available for start-up and operation, and will serve as the basis for 
frequent HF analyses and audits during operation, in order to maintain or even to 
improve the system’s HF quality from time to time.  
7.2 Technique for HF-Design Parameters Evaluation 
In making sure that the developed design meets the intended purpose, an evaluation 
must be carried out in each design stage, which will ensure that the ongoing design has 
taken into account the suggestions proposed by HFD-catalogues in the corresponding 
stage. Evaluation in every design stage must be done iteratively until the design team is 
convinced that the aspects to be designed in the corresponding stage have properly and 
adequately met operators’ requirements in their work. Only afterwards, the design 
process can proceed to the next design stage. On the other hand, unsatisfactory 
evaluation results can require some modifications to be conducted related to decisions 
taken previously. 
To facilitate the design evaluation of various aspects in each design stage, a new 
technique is developed. This new technique provides a way to cross-check the inclusion 
of all suggested considerations offered by HFD-catalogues, and therefore is principally a 
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reverse of the analysis itself. Through the analysis by means of HFADs, the design team 
was made aware of various HF issues that might arise during operation, and has been 
given insights about how to correspondingly design different aspects in term of those HF 
issues. In the evaluation, the design team has to re-check whether the suggested design 
considerations have been undertaken (Voβ, 2009).  
For the evaluation purpose, an evaluation form for conceptual design stage is available 
in Figure 7. 16, for basic engineering in Figure 7. 17, whereas the evaluation of HF 
aspects in detail engineering is made integrally during the generation of HFD-catalogue-
Detail by means of the questionnaire in Appendix A. In making use of the evaluation 
forms, scores are used to represent the status of a HF design consideration (various 
design parameters relevant with HF) in their relation with the design 
requirement/objectives provided in HFD-catalogues. The scores that must be used to 
evaluate the level of enforcement of the suggested HF design considerations are listed in 
Table 7. 2 below. 
Table 7. 2 Scores for HF design evaluation 
Score Description 
0 
Not relevant for specified location / 
specified task 
1 
Taken as design consideration & 
completed 
2 
Taken as design consideration, no 
completion yet 
3 Not taken as design consideration yet 
 
As an example, in conceptual design, the Preliminary HFD-catalogue suggests that the 
labels and signs (HF design consideration no. S14 in Figure 7. 16) must be designed in 
such a way that will cope with several aspects: differences in cultural backgrounds 
among workforce (design requirements no. 17 to 21) and in certain cases also the 
difference in qualifications background (design requirements no. 22 and 23). During the 
evaluation, the design team is required to check upon the settlement of the design 
consideration in fulfilling the required characteristics. Even though the final design of 
labels and signs can first be made later in basic or even in detail engineering, it is at this 
point important to be aware of the basic constraints in designing those labels and signs 
related to the varying cultural backgrounds among the personnel. 
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Figure 7. 16 Form for design evaluation in conceptual design
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The HF design considerations listed on the evaluation form are to be assigned with a 
number between 0 and 3 to describe its status in the ongoing plant design, whether they 
have been taken into consideration and completed in meeting certain design objectives. 
However, there are spaces on the evaluation forms, which must be left blank (presented 
as the gray area on the evaluation forms), since several design considerations cannot be 
evaluated in term of certain HF aspects. Only the white boxes on the evaluation forms 
need to be filled-in with a score for the evaluation purpose.  
The score 0 in this case represents an irrelevant requirements on the design of certain 
HF aspect. This may apply for instance in a specific case where the available workforce 
comes from a unique cultural background and a culture difference will not be an issue at 
the location where the plant is to be constructed, then for the HF design consideration 
no. S14 (in conceptual design stage), the design requirements no. 17 to 21 will not be 
relevant anymore and their relation with S14 must be assigned with the score 0.   
The scores 1, 2 and 3 represent a decreasing level of inclusion and completion of the 
considerations; either they have been completely incorporated into design process, have 
been taken into consideration but not realized yet, or have not been taken into 
consideration at all, respectively. The items that are assigned with either score 2 or 3 are 
to be highlighted and marked with other colours (yellow to represent score 2 and red to 
represent score 3) to remind the design team that those items are still in need of further 
action. If no more attempts can be performed in the current design stage to change the 
status, yet it is still marked with yellow or red, then this HF design consideration must 
be taken into account in the next stage. The same rule applies for the evaluation of HF 
design in basic engineering. To better demonstrate the implementation, this new 
evaluation technique is applied to the case-study together with the implementation of 
PITOPA-Design as delivered in Chapter 8.  
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Evaluation Form
HFAD in BASIC Design
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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No.
Analysis of HF aspects design related to operators’ 
contribution and responsibility
Amount reduction of dangerous materials
Substitution of dangerous materials
Effect moderation
Emergency alarms & fire services
Cooling system
Drying/dehumidification process
Pull under position instead of put up
Lifting height
Lifting frequence
Comfortable positioning to maneuver 
Avoidance of glare, blinding and reflection
Design & configuration of control room
HF Design Considerations
Design simplification
Accessibility (point II.5); reachablility, pathway
Avoidance of contact with hazardous materials
Degree of automation
Contact time minimization
Emergency safety equipment: Eye-wash, 
shower, staging area, evacuation way, etc. 
Feed stroke & route of transport
Monitoring of temperature change
Corrosion avoidance
Identification of possible reactions between 
materials
Warehouse location
Full protection clothing, full face mask
Ventilation
Leakage identification system
Waterproof protection clothing
Operator supporting system in field
Operator supporting system in control room
Consideration on design parameters based 
on guidelines for ergonomics
Avoidance of awkward positioning
Packaging dimensioning
Adequate lighting
Use of ear protection
Noise dampening, sound absorption
Time span reduction at location
Blocking of access to source of noise
Air conditioning
Reduction of excessive energy usage
Re-allocation of work to other shifts
Vibration reduction
Dimensioning of equipment and furnitures
Equipment arrangement, workspace 
adequacy
Access to intercommunication system
Sampling location and equipment
Information readability
Placement of operating elements, reachability
Grouping of elements with similar functions
Illumination of labels and signs displaying 
extra important information
Consistency of information display
Avoidance of confusion and mix-up
Control room location
Control room dimensioning
DCS Design
Data availability for inputting set-points
Display configuration
Control room lighting
Correct selection of operating elements
Dimensioning of operating elements
Positioning & placement of operating elements
Feed-back availability
Covering & containment of process 
equipment
Design of sight-glass
S20
S21
S22
S23
S24
S25
S26
S27
S28
S29
S30
S31
S32
S33
S34
S35
S36
S37
S38
S39
S40
S41
S42
S43
S44
S45
S46
S47
S48
S49
S50
S51
S52
S53
S54
S55
S56
S57
S58
S59
S60
S61
S62
S63
S64
S65
S66
S67
S68
S69
S70
S71
S72
S73
S74
S75
S76
S77
S78
S79
S80
S81
S82
S83
Related to tasks:
No. Task Description
Design of warehouse and storage
Adjustment of building construction (to 
cope with geographical condition)
Design of plant layout
(1.2.1) Transport of materials and products
(1.2.1) Protective clothing and equipment
(1.2.3) Water supply sufficiency
(1.2.3) Temperature control system
Emergency exit & evacuation way
Design consideration based on applied 
regulations and law
Shifting plans
Production plans
Work scheduling and assignment of works
Use of the same units on the whole design
Design of labels and signs
Marking, coloring and coding of labels, 
signs, information display 
Use of a unique language
Team formation
Trainings and courses
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
S16
S17
S19
Consideration to outsourceS18
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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Figure 7. 17 Form for design evaluation in basic engineering 
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7.3 Intermediate Summary 
The performance of the new PITOPA-Design enables the utilization of available 
information in every ongoing design stage for HF analysis purposes by means of HFAD, 
the development of HF Design (HFD)-Catalogue and through design evaluation during 
each of the three design stages. Resulting from PITOPA-Design is an optimal design of 
process plants that meets both HF and technical/engineering requirements and a 
promotion of general process and operation safety in the new (or modified) plants. The 
implementation of PITOPA-Design is once again summarized in a simplified form in 
Figure 7. 18. 
 
 
Figure 7. 18 Implementation of PITOPA-Design
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW PITOPA-DESIGN:  
A CASE-STUDY 
 
In order to exemplify the implementation of the new HF approach during process 
design, the hypothetical case-study discussed previously in Chapter 6 (the development 
of HAZOPA), will be taken in further discussion. In the previous case-study, a simple 
mixing process was taken under analysis by means of HAZOPA, where the results 
addressed several system weaknesses that can directly or indirectly contribute to cause 
operator errors, leading to a disaster. In an existing facility, such system weaknesses 
must be eliminated through different process improvements, which mostly hindered by 
either space unavailability, difficulties to make changes due to the complexity of the 
plant, or most importantly by the lack of financial source for process changes. Those 
weaknesses nonetheless, could have been avoided if during process design the engineers 
had been acknowledged with issues concerning HF. Designing the process must have 
addressed human limitations, so that later, the system will meet operator needs and can 
endure their tendency to err.  
In this chapter, the mixing process discussed earlier will be taken back into the design 
phase. Without much information about how the plant will later be operating and about 
what the exact responsibility the operators will have during operation and monitoring, 
HF considerations will be included into the design of this mixing process. This case-
study will demonstrate the capability of the inclusion of HF considerations in design to 
avoid later changes and unplanned costs during operation. 
8.1 Conceptual Design 
At the beginning of the design, the design team is only provided with limited amount of 
information concerning the process and consequently, in HFAD-Conceptual only 
considerations related to plant location and its geographical conditions can be made, in a 
combination with the performance of functional analysis and the allocation of functions. 
Afterwards, the possible operators’ involvement identified in each function will be 
classified into 5 different task types listed in Table 7. 1.  
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In this case-study, the selected location for the new process plant is the western part of 
Germany. The new plant will produce several types of chemicals, depending on 
production scheduling. The plant will be located in a new building, separated from other 
processes since product contamination is to be completely excluded. Several HF design 
considerations related to its geographical location are summarized in the “Preliminary 
HFD-catalogue” in Table 8. 1. The catalogue is an outcome of the questionnaire for 
conceptual design in Figure 7. 5, which was answered after the following discussions: 
1. Climate and geographical conditions. Concerning climate and geographical condition 
of the selected plant location, which is Germany, no relevance should be taken into 
account in relation to potentials of earthquakes, landslide, volcanic activity or 
flooding.  
2. Extreme weather and environmental constraints. There are 3 main conditions to be 
concerned of in relation to weather condition and environmental constraints, which 
are: tendency of extreme temperatures, high air humidity and irregular dry seasons 
that can cause water shortage. For Germany, the last condition is considered to be 
irrelevant, since water supply is always sustainable. Extreme temperature is generally 
not an issue, however, in the latest five years there has been a shift in temperature 
range that leads to some anomalies, and extreme low (below -20 ᵒC) or high 
temperature (up to 38 ᵒC) is possible to occur. The high temperature during a long 
summer will affect also the relative air humidity. Therefore several considerations 
concerning the storage of raw materials and products, and building constructions in 
general to cope with a wide temperature range must be made. In addition to it, 
operators clothing including protective equipment must as well be correspondingly 
considered.  
3. Threat through instability in political situation. Germany is considered as a country 
with a relative high stability in political condition. This point of concern is taken to be 
irrelevant for the analysis.  
4. Regulations and laws in construction projects, safety, health and environment. All 
aspects in regulations and laws applied in European Union, in Germany and in the 
federal state of Hessen concerning construction projects of chemical plants must be 
thoroughly learned and performed.  
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5. Official public holidays and festive days. Since in Germany there are no particular 
holidays, on which production must be stopped, this point will be irrelevant for the 
analysis. 
6. Differences in cultural backgrounds, symbols and applied measurement units. There is a 
relative wide range of difference in cultural backgrounds among the society living in 
Germany. Consequently, there is a high probability that the workforce available to be 
recruited by the company have different cultures. Not only the difference in tradition 
that should be concerned in recruiting workers with different cultural backgrounds, 
but also their custom in understanding symbols and units used in plant operation. 
Hence, the use of symbols, colours, marks and codes based on EU standards must be 
ensured, and the operators must be acknowledged about this concern. Other 
important issue is the use of German as the only official language during work, even if 
they are working with other people who speak the same mother language.  
7. Workforce/manning availability. In the industrial complex where the new plant is 
located, it is assumed that reliable workforce can be obtained from an educational 
institution owned by the complex. The students are educated with relevant 
backgrounds required by various industries in the complex, while they are also 
obligated to conduct practical work in the corresponding industry during their study. 
However, more senior workers with more experience and better qualifications are 
required in the operation. Since the company also has many other plants at the same 
location and some of those plants have basic similarities with the new plant being 
designed, the availability of experienced and qualified workers is not a concern.  
 
The next step of HFAD-Conceptual after developing the “Preliminary HFD-catalogue” is 
the performance of functional analysis and the allocation of functions. For the purpose of 
this case-study, only the “Mixing Process” will be taken under analysis, which will be 
responsible to prepare the raw materials before going further into the reaction and 
purification stage later on. The mixing process involves 5 smaller parts: charging of solid 
materials, charging of liquids, pre-treatment of additives and solvents, mixing in a stir 
tank, and suspension grinding (Table 6. 1), while the basic block diagram of the process 
is shown in Figure 8. 1.  
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Figure 8. 1 Basic block diagram of the “Mixing Process” 
 
 
Table 8. 1 Example of a Preliminary HFD-Catalogue 
Relevant conditional aspects HF design considerations 
I.1 
Climate and 
geographical 
conditions 
Not relevant 
I.2 
Extreme weather 
and environmental 
constraints 
Due to possible extreme temperatures (in winter and in summer) 
and high air humidity in summer: 
1. Design of storage and warehouse (especially for solid materials 
and gasses). For solids delivered in big-bags or sacks: avoid mix-
up through sufficient procedural and inventory systems 
2. Delivery scheduling and quantity (sizing of packaging) 
3. Design of working and protective clothing for seasons with both 
extreme high and low temperatures 
4. Safety equipment correspondingly (if the use of  protective 
clothing was unlikely due to extreme weather) 
I.3 
Threat through 
instability in 
political situation 
Not relevant 
I.4 
Regulation and laws 
on safety, health and 
environment 
Consider all applied laws and regulations concerning constructions 
project of the exact type of industry and safety requirements within: 
1. The European Union 
2. Germany 
3. Federal state of Hessen 
I.5 
Official public 
holidays and festive 
days 
Not relevant to operating hours and production activity 
I.6 
Differences in 
cultural 
backgrounds, 
symbols and applied 
units 
Use of the international standards of measurement units (ºC, kg, m, 
bar, etc.), and inform the workers from diverse regions about this 
issue  
Use of the EU standards to design labels and signs, including 
marking, coding and colouring of different operating elements 
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Concerning a big range of cultural backgrounds: 
1. Assure the use of German as the only official language within site 
and during work 
2. Infrastructures availability to facilitate different needs (e.g. 
religion background)  
Considerations on team formation based on possible social conflicts 
and frictions among workforce with different cultural backgrounds 
I.7 
Workforce/manning 
availability and 
qualifications 
Recruitment of workforce graduated from education institution 
supported by the industrial complex where the plant is located 
Besides academic background and working experience, German 
language proficiency must be set as a primary requirement 
 
Functional analysis will identify the intention that must be achieved by each process 
part, so that afterwards, careful consideration can be made in allocating the functions, 
either completely to machine (automated), to human operator (manual) or to both 
(semi-automatic).  For this case-study, the information concerning all functions is 
provided in Table 8. 2. The first identification of operator involvement to fulfil manual 
and semi-automatic functions is conducted subsequently, based on the classification of 
task types. The identification of task types can use information coming from the 
“Preliminary HFD-catalogue”. 
For instance, the process part “charging of solid materials”: after considerations 
proposed in the catalogue (Table 8. 1), due to possibility of high air humidity at plant 
location, it is very unlikely to store hygroscopic solids in a bulk without extra technical 
equipment that can guarantee the flow of materials to the process. Since the design is 
still too premature to decide the exact feasible technology to apply, several options must 
be thought of. As far as applicable, solids can be dissolved in certain solvent, or one less 
problematic option from technical point of view will be to have the solids delivered in 
sacks or big bags with the capacity suitable for every batch, and to have the operators 
charge those solids manually through a chamber. Both options have its pros and cons, 
depending on the design prerequisites. However, recognizing the options will help to 
allocate the functions and to correspondingly identify the possible operator contribution 
to achieve the intention.  
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Table 8. 2 Functional analysis and allocation of functions for every process part of the “Mixing 
Process” 
 
Process part Functions Allocation Type of tasks Remarks 
P1 
Charging of 
solid 
materials 
Feeding the exact 
types and amount of 
solid materials 
required for mixing 
process into stir tank 
Semi-
automatic or 
manual 
Preparation and 
operation 
Avoid confusion 
and mix-up of 
(big) bags 
P2 
Charging of 
liquids 
(including 
additives & 
solvents) 
Feeding the exact 
types and amount of 
liquids required for 
mixing process into 
stir tank 
Semi-
automatic or 
manual 
Preparation and 
operation 
 
P3 
Pre-treatment 
of additives & 
solvents 
Pre-heating or 
preparation of certain 
additives & solvent 
and intermediate 
storage in a buffer 
tanks 
Semi-
automatic 
Process start-
up/ shut-down In some cases 
can involve 
mixing of 
additives with 
the solvents 
Monitoring & 
controlling 
Testing, 
sampling & 
inspection 
P4 
Mixing in a 
stir tank 
Producing 
suspensions that meet 
desired specifications 
Semi- 
automatic 
Process start-
up/ shut-down 
 
Monitoring & 
controlling 
 
Testing, 
sampling & 
inspection 
 
P5 
Suspension 
grinding 
Reducing particle size 
in suspension down to 
certain tolerable range 
Semi- 
automatic 
Process start-
up/ shut-down 
 
Monitoring & 
controlling 
 
Testing, 
sampling & 
inspection 
 
 
The results delivered by the “Preliminary HFD-catalogue” (Table 8. 1) and through 
functional analysis (Table 8. 2) are provided for the design team for the next 
development, so that the design achieved will not only meet technical requirements but 
address also the HF concerns. 
HF-Design Evaluation in Conceptual Design 
HF evaluation of the current state of the design must be iteratively performed, in order 
to make sure that none of the design requirements from HF perspective was unfulfilled. 
For this purpose, the evaluation form provided in Figure 7. 16 assists the recognition of 
necessary changes on the ongoing design up to the recent time. After the evaluation 
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yields satisfactory results, the design team can recommend the process to proceed into 
basic engineering.  
For the case study, the evaluation is demonstrated in Figure 8. 2. The design of various 
HF relevant aspects is evaluated in terms of their status in meeting different design 
requirements. Those unrelated design requirements are blocked on the evaluation form, 
and are not necessary to be rated. Only the blank fields must be filled-in with a score 
between 0 and 3 as defined in Table 7. 2. 
The one-time evaluation for this case-study (Figure 8. 2) shows that there is still a need 
to several design aspects (marked with either colour yellow or red). One example of 
design consideration marked with yellow is the transport of materials and products, 
which is rated with ‘2’ in its relation with ‘to handle extreme high/low temperature’. 
This expresses that the design team had taken the possible extreme temperature into 
account in planning the means for transportation between warehouse and the plant, and 
had considered that an operator might have to contribute in this activity, but at the time 
the evaluation was taking place, they have not yet decided how the transport of 
materials will run under extreme temperature. The yellow mark will remind the design 
team that there are still several considerations to be paid attention to.  
‘Safety clothing and equipment’ in this example is marked with the colour red, which 
means that the design of this aspect still has a score “3” representing its status in 
meeting various design requirement. In this case, there is a bigger urge for the design 
team to look back to what has not been taken into account in the design concepts and 
has not been realized yet. The evaluation must be iteratively conducted until there is no 
design consideration is marked with red. If some of the considerations were still marked 
with yellow, and to a certain extent the design team believed that no further effort can 
be done at the time being, then the design can proceed only with a reminder that the 
unfinished HF activities still need to be completed during the next stage. 
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Figure 8. 2 HF-Design Evaluation in Conceptual Engineering
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8.2 Basic Engineering  
As the design proceeds further into basic engineering phase, more decisions should have 
been taken by the design team concerning the basic process requirements. With the 
inputs coming from design team, in basic engineering an analysis of operator tasks will 
be performed by means of HFAD-Basic. In this case-study, two process parts are going to 
be analysed closer, these are the “P1: Charging of solid materials” and the “P4: Mixing in 
a stir tank”. In Table 8. 3, a more detailed analysis of tasks to be conducted by operators 
is exemplified, which includes tasks identification, description concerning the 
characteristics of each task, and the possible workload that can be arisen during the 
performance of those tasks. 
Table 8. 3 Task analysis by means of HFAD-basic 
 
Process part 
Type of 
tasks 
Operator 
tasks 
Task 
characteristics 
Relevant aspects Remarks 
P1 
Charging 
of solid 
materials 
Preparation 
and 
operation 
Transporting 
materials in 
bags from 
warehouse 
and arrange 
them on 
charging 
location 
Can lead to 
confusion, 
wrong 
materials are 
taken 
 
II.1 
 
II.2 
 
II.4 
 
II.5 
 
Material 
properties 
Warehouse 
& storage 
Working 
environment 
Accessibility 
Distant 
location of 
warehouse 
can 
accumulate 
workload 
Insufficient 
procedural 
system can 
cause 
confusion 
and mix-up 
Charging the 
solid 
materials in 
bags into the 
chamber 
manually 
Can be very 
physically 
hard, can 
require the 
use of 
additional 
working tools 
 
II.1 
 
II.2 
 
II.3 
 
 
II.4 
II.5 
II.7 
 
Material 
properties 
Warehouse 
& storage 
Manual 
handlings 
Working 
environment 
Accessibility 
Additional 
tools 
High 
physical 
load and 
potential 
to cause 
hazard to 
health 
P4 
Mixing in 
a stir 
tank 
Process 
start-up/ 
shut-down 
Starting and 
ending the 
batch  
In control 
room 
II.6 
Operating 
interface 
 
Monitoring 
& 
controlling 
Monitoring 
of process 
parameters 
In control 
room 
II.6 
Operating 
interface 
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Cross-
checking in 
field 
In field 
II.4 
 
II.5 
II.6 
Working 
environment 
Accessibility 
Operating 
interface 
 
Testing, 
sampling & 
inspection 
Density 
control 
In control 
room 
II.6 
Operating 
interface 
 
Sampling 
Can lead to 
material 
release,. 
Can lead to 
exposure, 
hazards and 
injuries to 
operators 
 
II.1 
 
II.3 
 
II.4 
 
II.5 
II.6 
 
Material 
properties 
Manual 
handlings 
Working 
environment 
Accessibility 
Control and 
monitoring 
system 
Distant 
location of 
laboratory 
and absent 
of 
sampling 
tools can 
accumulate 
physical 
load and 
stress 
 
In this design stage, there are 8 HF aspects relevant to operators’ contribution and 
responsibility during process operation, as listed previously in Figure 7. 3. These aspects 
can have influence on operators’ performance during work, yet not all might have an 
effect on every task performance. For instance, during the charging of solid materials in 
bags into stir tank (P1, task number 2), only 6 of all aspects are considered to be relevant 
in giving influence on the operators. These are the aspects to be designed with additional 
considerations concerning HF, to ensure that the system design eliminates unrealistic 
demands on human operators through the availability of sufficient support they require 
in completing the work. The questionnaires in Figure 7. 5, as well as Figure 7. 7 to Figure 
7. 14 will assist the analysis of all relevant HF aspects to each task performance, whose 
results will be summarized in the “HFD-catalogue-Basic”.  
 
Table 8. 4 HFD-catalogue in basic engineering (applied only to P1 and P4) 
 
Relevant aspects Tasks HF design considerations 
II.1 
Material 
properties 
Transporting 
materials in 
bags from 
warehouse and 
arrange them 
on charging 
location 
Consideration to improve inherent safety through 
minimization, substitution, moderation or simplification 
Dealing with hazardous/dangerous materials: avoid direct 
contact (automation), adequate protective clothing, 
reachability of  first aid and emergency safety equipment, 
labelling and signage, working procedure and manuals 
Adequate design of work place and plant layout  
Charging the 
solid materials 
in bags into the 
chamber 
See above 
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manually 
Sampling See above 
II.2 
Storage of 
raw 
materials 
and 
products 
Transporting 
materials in 
bags from 
warehouse and 
arrange them 
on charging 
location 
If up to this point no separated area for dangerous materials is 
available: modification on building construction to avoid 
dangerous potentials required 
In relation to extreme weather condition (see point I.2): Extra 
attention to sudden temperature change during operation, 
building construction to avoid over-/underheating of stored 
materials 
Possible reaction / contamination between materials to be 
transported: to be transported separately 
Charging the 
solid materials 
in bags into the 
chamber 
manually 
See above 
For temporary storing at work location: adequate space 
availability, avoid reversed charging order if necessary, 
working procedure, work design (scheduling to transporting 
materials from warehouse) to minimize humidification effect.  
II.3 
Manual 
handlings of 
materials, 
product and 
equipment 
Charging the 
solid materials 
in bags into the 
chamber 
manually 
Partial automation with sufficient operator supporting system 
Full protective clothing, full-face mask, adequate ventilation 
Task with potential physical load, involves pulling, pushing, 
lifting: 
1. Consider guidelines and the recommended weight limit 
(RWL) 
2. Pulling under instead of putting up heavy objects 
3. Reduction of lifting height (use of lifting device/table, 
limited height of piles of bags on palette, etc.) 
4. Reduction of lifting frequency (adjusted work design) 
5. Avoidance of awkward positioning (equipment 
arrangement, reachability of necessary tools and 
operating elements) 
6. Space availability for work in comfort and safe 
maneuvering  
Sampling 
Not necessarily to be automated for liquid and solid. 
Sampling of gas must be automated. 
Protective clothing, breathing mask, gloves, adequate 
ventilation 
1. Procedures (form, checklist) 
2. Reachability of necessary tools and sampling materials 
3. Reachability of operating elements (valves, buttons, etc.), 
avoid awkward positioning 
4. Labelling and signage 
5. Space availability 
II.4 
Working 
environment 
Transporting 
materials in 
bags from 
warehouse to 
charging 
location 
Task is to be performed in the beginning of every batch (on day 
and night shift): 
1. Adequate lighting for night shift between plant and 
warehouse, on-site, and in the warehouse 
2. Avoid glare, blinding and reflection. Adequate light 
distribution between indoor and outdoor 
Under low intensity noise: ear protection only if required 
Consideration on the limit of heat exposure and comfort health 
index. 
Since warehouse is located separated from plant building: 
consider necessary vehicles or other transport devices and 
possible workload through the use of those devices 
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Not to be done under vibration 
Charging the 
solid materials 
in bags into the 
chamber 
manually 
Task is to be performed in the beginning of every batch (on day 
and night shift): 
1. Adequate lighting for night  
2. Avoid glare, blinding and reflection. Adequate light 
distribution between indoor and outdoor 
 Noise: 
1. Dampening of noise at the source (i.e. roller crusher or 
neighbouring equipment) 
2. Compulsory use of ear protection 
3. Reduction of time span at location (i.e. split/rotate the 
work with another operator, work design)  
Temperature:  
1. Consider heat exposure from related and neighbouring 
equipment.  
2. The work itself can be physically hard, can affect body 
temperature. 
3. Reduction of time span at location (i.e. split/rotate the 
work with another operator, work design) 
Vibration: 
1. Reduction through compatible technology 
2. Reduction of time span at location (i.e. split/rotate the 
work with another operator, work design) 
II.5 Accessibility 
Transporting 
materials in 
bags from 
warehouse to 
charging 
location 
Work space arrangement:  
consider guidelines and regulations, equipment sizing between 
5 – 95 percentile, adequate spacing for task completion, 
accessible emergency exit and evacuation way 
Consideration on the requirement for adequate work space 
under limitation of anthropometric data, equipment 
arrangement under consideration that operators use extra 
clothing and additional tools 
Labelling and signage 
Intercommunication system, emergency alarm, emergency exit, 
and evacuation way both in warehouse and at charging location  
Charging the 
solid materials 
in bags into the 
chamber 
manually 
See above 
Avoidance of direct contact with heated equipment  
Sampling 
See above 
Accessible sampling location and necessary equipment, 
shortest pathway to laboratory or examination location 
II.6 
Operating 
interface/ 
Man-
machine 
interface 
All monitoring 
and controlling 
tasks in control 
room 
(separated 
analysed) 
The analysis of control room tasks and the corresponding 
control room as well as its control system configuration 
requires other systematic methodology  
II.7 
Additional 
supporting 
tools 
Charging the 
solid materials 
in bags into the 
chamber 
Selection of operating elements for task with high physical  
load, lifting devices/table 
Positioning of process elements/equipment to be 
lifted/removed manually : optimal height and distance 
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manually Weight of the supporting tools, user friendliness, not indicating 
potential harms to operators (such as the use of a knife or 
unstable heavy devices) 
Labelling and signage, availability of feedback 
II.8 
Control and 
monitoring 
Flowing 
solvents and 
additives into 
stir tank 
Operator is required to open and look into the tank to ensure 
the flow: Use sight-glass with adequate lighting 
Equipment placement and layout, adequate access for 
maneuvering  
Observation of process parameters at location (cross-checking 
with control room operators): accessible/reachable/readable 
parameter display, assure the use of the correct measurement 
unit, adequate lighting 
Labelling 
Sampling See above 
 
HF-Design Evaluation in Basic Engineering 
The design considerations tabulated in HFD-catalogue-Basic shown in Table 8. 4 will as 
well be provided for the design team to ensure that the process design will not be taken 
farther into detail engineering, without realizing the crucial requirements to cope with 
HF issues that might arise during operation. Changes in detail engineering of these 
aspects will cost more time and effort; with much less space for improvement left and 
only minor changes may still be possible to be made upon. Hence, a careful evaluation 
must be made in order to make certain whether the system design has satisfactorily 
addressed HF in every aspect before going to the next stage.  
For this case-study, a one-time evaluation was performed using the evaluation form 
provided in Figure 7. 17, and the result to this evaluation is presented in Figure 8. 3. At 
the time the evaluation was conducted, there is still a number of design considerations 
marked with colour red and yellow. The design team must look back to each of those HF 
design considerations and the associated design requirements to at the least eliminate 
all the red marked ones, before proceeding to detail engineering.  
8.3 Detail Engineering 
In detail engineering phase, the process design is to be finalized from all angles, 
including technical, organisational as well as from human factors perspective. By making 
use of the result coming from the HFAD-Basic, the design team has been provided with 
design suggestions concerning every HF relevant aspect and the necessary HF issues 
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that might arise during operation. With more process information available in this stage, 
HF design analysis can be performed in more detail. 
As the project enters detail engineering, safety reports must have been made available to 
meet regulations requirement. In Germany, safety analyses of process and plant design 
is required to be performed qualitatively, mostly conducted by means of HAZOP 
analysis. During the performance of HAZOP, HF considerations cannot be taken aside, 
since some possible deviations identified in HAZOP might have been caused through 
operator incorrect actions, or might need operator corrective actions to bring the 
process to its normal operating state. The tasks where errors with significant effects are 
possible to happen or can cause process deviations, tasks where harm to operators is 
possible to arise, and tasks with particular characteristics that can overload the 
operators are to be considered as ‘critical’ with a need of further analysis. Therefore, the 
first step of HFAD-Detail will be the performance of a HAZOPA, which is afterwards 
followed by a development of an “HFD-catalogue-Detail” to address the most necessary 
improvements that still need to be made upon the design. 
In this case study, the task P1.2 “Charging the solid materials in bags into the chamber 
manually” (see Table 8. 3) is analysed further by means of HFAD-Detail. After the 
decision to not automate the task due to some technical and financial reasons, the 
charging of solid materials is to be done manually by operators, as it is normally 
conducted in a similar process plant owned by the company. Learning from experience 
in the existing similar plant, the engineers are aware that in the new plant, design 
improvements must be conducted, since the work is too dangerous and injurious for the 
operator who performs it. This experience can give better insights when used 
systematically in HFAD-Detail.  
The analysis through HFAD-Basic on this task has pointed out several concerns related 
to material properties, warehouse & storage, manual handlings, working environment, 
accessibility and the use of additional tools as listed previously in the “HFD-catalogue-
Basic” (Table 8. 4). Since the design team has now taken all of the considerations 
provided by the catalogue into account during design optimization, several possible 
errors recognized in the earlier HAZOPA analysis in Chapter 6 (without HF 
consideration during design) can be prevented. Possible errors during performance of 
this task that are now avoided through the current design are among others: 
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Evaluation Form
HFAD in BASIC Design
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
D
e
s
ig
n
 O
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
No.
Analysis of HF aspects design related to operators’ 
contribution and responsibility
Amount reduction of dangerous materials
Substitution of dangerous materials
Effect moderation
Emergency alarms & fire services
Cooling system
Drying/dehumidification process
Pull under position instead of put up
Lifting height
Lifting frequence
Comfortable positioning to maneuver 
Avoidance of glare, blinding and reflection
Design & configuration of control room
HF Design Considerations
Design simplification
Accessibility (point II.5); reachablility, pathway
Avoidance of contact with hazardous materials
Degree of automation (man-machine allocation)
Contact time minimization
Emergency safety equipment: Eye-wash, 
shower, staging area, evacuation way, etc. 
Feed stroke & route of transport
Monitoring of temperature change
Corrosion avoidance
Identification of possible reactions between 
materials
Warehouse location
Full protection clothing, full face mask
Ventilation
Leakage identification system
Waterproof protection clothing
Operator supporting system in field
Operator supporting system in control room
Consideration on design parameters based 
on guidelines for ergonomics
Avoidance of awkward positioning
Packaging dimensioning
Adequate lighting
Use of ear protection
Noise dampening, sound absorption
Time span reduction at location
Blocking of access to source of noise
Air conditioning
Reduction of excessive energy usage
Re-allocation of work to other shifts
Vibration reduction
Dimensioning of equipment and furnitures
Equipment arrangement, workspace 
adequacy
Access to intercommunication system
Sampling location and equipment
Information readability
Placement of operating elements, reachability
Grouping of elements with similar functions
Illumination of labels and signs displaying 
extra important information
Consistency of information display
Avoidance of confusion and mix-up
Control room location
Control room dimensioning
DCS Design
Data availability for inputting set-points
Display configuration
Control room lighting
Correct selection of operating elements
Dimensioning of operating elements
Positioning & placement of operating elements
Feed-back availability
Covering & containment of process 
equipment
Design of sight-glass
S20
S21
S22
S23
S24
S25
S26
S27
S28
S29
S30
S31
S32
S33
S34
S35
S36
S37
S38
S39
S40
S41
S42
S43
S44
S45
S46
S47
S48
S49
S50
S51
S52
S53
S54
S55
S56
S57
S58
S59
S60
S61
S62
S63
S64
S65
S66
S67
S68
S69
S70
S71
S72
S73
S74
S75
S76
S77
S78
S79
S80
S81
S82
S83
Related to tasks:
Task
Design of warehouse and storage
Adjustment of building construction (to 
cope with geographical condition)
Design of plant layout
Transport of materials (from & to plant location)
Protective clothing and equipment
Water supply sufficiency
Temperature control system
Emergency exit & evacuation way
Design consideration based on applied 
regulations and law
Shifting plans
Production plans
Work scheduling, rotation, assignment of works
Use of the same units on the whole design
Design of labels and signs
Marking, coloring and coding of labels, 
signs, information display 
Use of a unique language
Team formation
Trainings and courses
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
S16
S17
S19
Consideration to outsourceS18
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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Figure 8. 3 HF-Design evaluation in basic engineering 
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1. Mistakes conducted during transfer of the palette with bags of solid materials 
approaching the charging chamber due to insufficient available space. The 
arrangement of neighbouring equipment has been adjusted to provide the 
operator with adequate space for manoeuvring. Through this redesign, possibility 
of bags falling off the pile that can cause material release and injuries is 
minimized. 
2. Mistakes conducted as the operator lifts each bag off the palette onto the 
chamber grid (sieve). Work design has been adjusted to reduce the size of bags or 
sacks to be lifted by one operator, and the accumulated maximum weight one 
operator is allowed to lift within a certain time frame. Consequently, for a mixing 
process that requires bigger amount of solid materials, the work must be split 
between 2 operators rotationally. Additionally, the use of lifting device and 
scissor-lift with rotating table to position the sacks at work height instead of on 
floor level also reduces operator load and hence, reduces the likelihood of the 
occurrence of errors and injuries.  
3. The use of an uncovered sharp tool such as a knife is substituted with other 
cutting device, such as safety cutters for smaller sacks, or by asking the supplier 
to deliver the material in open-mouth sacks. In other case, if a very big amount of 
solid materials is required to be fed daily, a use of an automatic sack opener or 
bag splitter should be considered.  
However, even though many of the possible errors have been avoided through design 
improvement, other errors may still arise through the introduction of the new solution 
offered by the design team. For this reason, the HFAD-Detail must be implemented to 
prove whether other possible errors with significant effects on process state can arise 
under the current working condition. The generation of “HFD-catalogue-Detail” is 
facilitated through the use of modified PITOPA questionnaire for PIFs evaluation, which 
will point out the aspects in need of improvement that must be carried out before the 
design is brought under construction. At this point it is very important to include 
worker’s opinion and experience into the analysis, and as far as practicable to also 
perform a virtual simulation of the work together with worker representatives. The 
feed-back coming from operator’s side is a very crucial additional input for the design 
team in optimizing the plant design, including the job design, the development of 
working procedures as well as the design of training programmes.  
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The questionnaire to be used for an analysis in detail engineering is provided in 
Appendix A. The use of this questionnaire to generate HFD-catalogue-Detail provides at 
the same time a means to conduct the design evaluation. If no considerably important 
changes must be made, the design can continue to construction phase, during which a 
pre-startup safety review (PSSR) should be performed as a final check (CCPS, 2007a).  
This new HF design approach needs to be computerized to better assist the 
consideration of HF in plant design and to cope with the huge amount of data. This 
computer program must be able to automatically summarize all information collected 
during HF design and list every HF aspect to be concerned of, in order to optimize the 
design in achieving a safe operation. The application of this program must be done 
iteratively throughout the design, so that necessary modifications can be comprehended 
as early as possible and eventually, a regularly repeated HF analysis by means of PITOPA 
must be performed during process operation to maintain the HF quality of the plant. 
Moreover, although the HFAD can provide design suggestions related to HF issues for all 
types of human activities in a process plant, for tasks conducted in control room 
(supervisory control tasks) the suggestions out of HFAD are still considered too general 
and refers directly to the utilization of available guidelines for designing control system 
and alarm system. Even though reliable guidelines are available, the utilization of which 
must be made based on operators requirements in a particular process plant. Therefore, 
an analysis of operator actions during the performance of control and monitoring tasks 
is necessary to be conducted separately from the analysis of other manual tasks 
conducted in field. 
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CHAPTER 9 
APPROACH FOR IMPROVING OPERATOR PERFORMANCE  
IN CONTROL ROOM 
 
The introduction of DCSs (Distributed Control Systems) in process industry has led to a 
significant shift of operators work and responsibilities in control room as previously 
discussed in Chapter 2.4.2. The increasing degree of automation and complexity of 
process plants also enhances the requirements on operators in monitoring and 
controlling process flow. The large number of sub-processes interconnected with one 
another has a consequence that disturbances are no longer tend to occur in isolation 
(Stanton, 1994). Unlike during performance of field tasks, control room operators are 
assigned with a kind of workload that requires different levels of concentration and 
decision making ability. Therefore, the presence of sufficient knowledge and a 
comprehensive understanding about the process is required.  
Automation and computer control create a distance between operators and the process. 
As a consequence of one essential reason of automation, there is a reduction of 
operator’s direct involvement in the actual processes. This leads to a decrease of process 
understanding. Thus, they become more unaware of what is actually happening behind 
the displays, which can lead to a hesitation in deciding what to do and how to act during 
critical conditions. The fear of any fault arising during controlling and monitoring, 
dependent on the company safety culture, can increase as the operators know that 
incorrect action may lead to an accident or to an enormous economic value (Ivergard, et 
al., 2009).  
Particularly during abnormal condition, control room operators are required to 
overcome with a huge amount of information while having to consider the accurate 
corrective action simultaneously. A mistake made in taking decision in such situation 
can trigger a series of events subsequently that might lead to a disaster. In providing the 
operators with adequate support, the understanding about how they react to 
disturbances and how different factors can affect their performance is very essential to 
have. Such an understanding can only be achieved through a proactive incorporation of 
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HF into the design of DCS by among others, performing an analysis on control room 
operator actions.  
Unfortunately, the means that provides adequate systematic for incorporating HF 
considerations into the design of DCS is still lacking in process industries. The available 
methods to increase operator’s situational awareness (SA) and to analyse cognitive tasks 
in control room (discussed previously in Chapter 3.5) are not giving much assistance in 
optimizing the design of DCS in process industries and hence, are not widely 
implemented. Several reasons that cause the slow penetration of such methods in 
process industries are: 
• Most of the methods provide retrospective rather than prospective analyses. They 
provide a way to measure and analyse the level of SA or vigilance, yet, not focusing 
on finding solutions to improve the condition in avoiding undesired events. 
• The methods to improve SA cannot specifically clarify how the avoidance of operator 
incorrect actions must address the adequacy of DCS-design. As example, methods 
like SAPAT and GOMS have their focus on the interaction between human and 
computer with little emphasis on the design and prioritization of alarms. 
• The methods do not provide a systematic analysis to identify operator actions 
following an alarm (during upsets), the possible errors, or the consequences thereof. 
Moreover, there is no analysis on how the error occurrence can be interconnected 
one with another in generating a bigger incident. 
• The methods do not enable the recognition of the most underlying problems in the 
system, and therefore are not leading to finding the exact solutions in avoiding 
operator errors in control room. 
Meanwhile, although the method PITOPA-Design developed in this work (see Chapter 7) 
is aimed at the improvement of working condition in both field and control room tasks, 
the analysis by means of the new method can only provide general suggestions in 
relation with DCS design. Analysis of operator actions in control room requires a deeper 
scrutiny and must be conducted separately from the analysis of field tasks. In 
overcoming with various problems with control system, assistance from different 
guidelines is actually available. However, those guidelines for alarm design and 
management basically only provide recommendations to solve alarm problems without 
providing systematic approaches to reveal the underlying problems. Solutions 
recommended by the guidelines can only be properly selected and used if the exact 
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underlying problems have been recognized. Hence, there is a need for a technique that 
provides a way to analyse what the system’s deficiencies really are and what the 
operators are lacking of, to be able to extract the most suitable solutions from guidelines 
(Löwe, et al., 2010).   
 
Figure 9. 1 The need of a technique to incorporate HF into design of DCS and alarm system 
 
In this work, a method is developed to answer the call for a systematic integration of HF 
into DCS design that provides a way to reveal operators’ needs in performing 
supervisory tasks in control rooms, and to exploit this information in designing the DCS, 
configuring control room and designing alarm system based on best practices and 
guidelines (Figure 9. 1). In developing the new method, which will be later referred to as 
the PITOPA-CR, a modification of PITOPA is carried out. The modification starts with a 
re-identification of performance influencing factors (PIFs) for supervisory tasks (work 
in control room), since these factors can differ from those that affect human beings 
during field tasks. Following the identification of control room PIFs, a modification of 
task analysis and operator actions analysis into the so-called Control Room Task 
Analysis (CRTA) technique, and the technique for Control Room Operator Actions 
Analysis (CROAA) will be conducted.  Ultimately, the new method for analysing HF in 
control room will be integrated with the PITOPA-Design. A closer discussion about the 
development of the new approach is delivered in the following sections.     
9.1 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) for Supervisory & Monitoring Tasks 
To guaranty a reliable operator performance in a control room, there are two important 
parameters that must be developed and maintained, these are the vigilance level and 
situational awareness (SA). It is crucial to maintain operator’s alertness during work, 
especially during process monitoring and supervisory tasks, where the work can be very 
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monotonous. A high level of operator SA and vigilance, together with an optimal level of 
workload can lead to a reliable decision-making process and improve the overall 
operator performance (Stubler, et al., 1996; Hallbert, 1997). 
All factors that can influence operator performance during supervisory or control tasks 
were identified in this work (Figure 9. 2) based on literature studies, several guidelines 
for control room configuration (Hallbert, 1997; O'Hara, et al., 2002; Stanton, et al., 2005), 
and most of all based on the previous works on PITOPA and field observation in the 
process industries. All of the identified PIFs have an influence on the vigilance level, 
workload, operators’ SA and hence, on operator’s final decision-making process, either 
directly or indirectly, in different ways and immensities. The relationship between each 
factor and these four parameters is very complex and cannot be easily modelled, since 
personal characteristics also play an important role in this interaction. A simulator-
based study has once attempted to show the relationship between operator SA and 
subjective workload, but then discovered that the explanation of the relationship is more 
complicated, since many other factors including operator experience and team 
interaction can generally affect operator performance (Hallbert, 1997).  
Despite of the difficulty to model the complex relationship between various PIFs and SA, 
vigilance and workload, the PIFs must still be identified at the very least.  All of the 
identified PIFs listed in Figure 9. 2 hold the key to an optimal working condition in 
control room, and must be configured in such a way that eliminates unnecessary 
demand on operators. The factors describe not only the technical facility part of the 
system, but also the crucial aspects affecting human cognitive ability as well as the 
organisational aspects, these are: (a) Human-System/Human-Computer Interface, (b) 
Design of Control Room; (c) Workplace Design; (d) Job Design; (e) Operator 
Competence; (f) Operator Supporting System; (g) Alarm System and (f) Line 
Management. 
An internal survey related to these control room PIFs was conducted at Bayer 
CropScience AG in Germany, in different plants owned by the company at the same 
location. The survey was undertaken by involving two groups, the operators and 
management personnel. The goal of this survey was to collect opinions from control 
room operators and plant managers concerning the relevance/importance of various 
PIFs in affecting supervisory and monitoring tasks. Results of the internal survey are 
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presented in Figure 9. 3, whereas the actual values that represent the relative 
importance of every PIF in comparison with another (expressed also as weight of each 
PIF) is listed in Table 9. 1. The elicitation of weights for the control room PIFs took place 
by means of the AHP algorithm (see Chapter 2.7.1 for a closer explanation). 
 
Figure 9. 2 Performance Influencing Factors in Control Room 
 
Figure 9. 3 below shows the comparison between the attribute weights as rated by the 
operators (showed with green bars) and by the managers (orange bars) after their 
importance in influencing control room work. From this comparison, it is obvious that 
operators see the supervisory and monitoring work in control room as more demanding 
in terms of knowledge, experience and skill. Hence, they put the availability of proper 
and adequate operator supporting systems in form of an integrated operating system 
and emergency safeguard/response procedures at a relative high level of importance. At 
the next level, operators judged that the work in control room requires particular 
reliability in aptitude and physical fitness for duty. Operators can easily lose sight of 
process status just after a slight reduction of concentration level due to tired eyes, 
drowsiness or uncomfortable feel after being in a sitting position for hours. 
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Consequently, they see the availability of supports coming from diverse technical 
components as very important; these are the prioritization of alarms, adequate signs and 
labels of every necessary operating element, the assurance that all components are well 
maintained and the configuration of control room as a whole.  
 
Figure 9. 3 Comparison between operators’ & managers’ judgement on the importance of HF 
attributes 
 
In addition to the workstation and workplace design, the job design is also considered as 
a very important aspect to maintain their performance during supervisory tasks, 
especially staffing and the allocation of work. Many operators think that more often than 
it should, one shift is short of qualified workers for the operation. Such situation often 
occurs if most of the workers in one shift are already close to their retirement, and 
consequently receive more days-offs than the younger ones. On the other hand, the very 
young ones mostly still need to complete their training years and are not capable yet to 
work without direct supervision from a more senior one. The rest of the aspects are 
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given a lower priority in terms of how immense they influence supervisory work, 
compared with other attributes. Nevertheless, once again it is to be noted that all factors 
identified here are important and can affect operator’s work in control room. The fact 
that some of them are rated with lower degree of importance does not eliminate the 
must to consider all factors during design of process control system and control room 
design. The complete weighting system for every factor and its attribute from operator’s 
perspective is listed in Table 9. 1 whereas a complete description about each factor and 
the contributing attributes is delivered in Appendix B.  
Different from the operators’ opinion about the PIFs importance, the result of the 
questionnaires given to the managers demonstrates a quite significant difference. The 
orange bars in Figure 9. 3 show that the managers consider the technical aspects as the 
most important and most influencing attributes during supervisory control. The 
attributes include “System response & feedback”, “Design of operating elements” as well 
as “Display configuration”. Other attributes contributing to alarm system and operator 
supporting system are considered to be slightly less influencing than the previous ones.  
The significant difference between how the operators and the managers view the 
importance of various factors in influencing the work in control room leads to an 
important point of discussion. One possible explanation to this difference is that the 
managers have actually been aware of and have acknowledged the main problems 
control room operators are facing during their work. They must have searched for the 
solutions to these problems and have implemented improvements to the control and 
monitoring system through the introduction of more reliable technology. With the 
optimization of control system by means of increasing its reliability, the engineers and 
managers were sure that operators’ weaknesses are compensated, workload on 
operators is significantly reduced and errors by operator can be optimally avoided. What 
is left now is to making sure that the system and the technology is good maintained so 
that they are always available in a good condition. 
For the operators, although all the technology with higher precision, reliability and 
better user friendliness are introduced to the control and monitoring system, the most 
important thing is still their own competence. With every change introduced to the 
system, some problems are solved; others come along, which can directly have influence 
on operators. Hence, the basic need to be able to cope with any deviance, either in 
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monitoring process flow, or in adapting with new system and technology, they need to 
have the knowledge, the ability to understand how the system works, and also to receive 
adequate training and courses. This leads to the need to always taking operators’ 
opinion into account following every system modification to have the awareness of how 
operators are very easily influenced by the changes made to the system.  
Table 9. 1 Weights elicitation for control room PIFs from operator’s side 
 
PIF Weight Attribute Global weight  
A. 
Human-System 
Interface 
0.093 
A1.  Displays configuration 0.026 
A2.  Design of control/operating 
elements 
0.025 
A3.  Entry of data & instruction  0.022 
A4.  System response & feedback 0.020 
B. 
Control Room Design 
0.104 
B1.  Control room layout & components 
arrangement 
0.030 
B2.  Accessibility 0.024 
B3.  Ambience & comfort 0.023 
B4.  Communicating system 0.027 
C. 
Workplace design 
0.100 
C1.  Workstation configuration 0.030 
C2.  Labelling and signage of operating 
elements 
0.035 
C3.  Layout of panels and displays 0.035 
D. 
Job Design 
0.107 
D1.  Allocation of work 0.022 
D2.  Variation of work 0.017 
D3.  Staffing 0.035 
D4.  Work scheduling & shifting plan 0.016 
D5.  Proportion of manual (field) work 0.017 
E. 
Operator 
Competence 
0.187 
E1.  Skill & knowledge 0.061 
E2.  Working experience 0.051 
E3.  Physical characteristics & fitness 0.036 
E4.  Training & courses  0.039 
F. 
Operator Supporting 
System 
0.130 
F1.  Operating & working procedures 0.035 
F2.  Emergency safeguard & emergency 
response procedure 
0.048 
F3. Integrated/computerized operating 
procedure 
0.048 
G. 
Alarm system 
0.177 
G1.  Number of alarms 0.025 
G2.  Alarms prioritization 0.036 
G3.  Available response time 0.024 
G4.  Signalling & alarm presentation 0.022 
G5.  Failures indication features 0.034 
G6.  Maintenance 0.035 
H. 
Line Management 
0.102 
H1.  Line of responsibility & supervision 0.020 
H2.  Communication 0.028 
H3.  Management of change (MOC) 0.025 
H4.. Organisation and safety culture 0.030 
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9.2 Development of PITOPA-Control Room (PITOPA-CR) 
After the long discussion about differences between the characteristics of field work and 
the work in control room, it came to the understanding that in order to analyse control 
room tasks and to recognize the requirements of control room operators, a technique 
specifically developed for this purpose is needed. Therefore, in this work PITOPA is 
enhanced to comprise not only the field/on-site works but also the supervisory control 
conducted in control rooms. Moreover, the technique will provide additional 
information to be included in the HF analysis in design process by means of the new 
approach PITOPA-Design. 
 
Figure 9. 4 Role of HF analysis in control room in improving alarm management 
 
The new technique for HF analysis in control room developed here will be labelled as 
“PITOPA-Control Room (CR)” and will provide a way to analyse and recognize system’s 
deficiencies, both in terms of technical and HF issues. A HF analysis by means of PITOPA-
CR delivers the correlation between causes-alarms-consequences, as well as the 
understanding about how different parts of the system interconnect one with another, 
and how the system itself interconnects with human beings operating it. These are the 
basic understandings required to finding the exact solutions to problems in control room 
and to comprehensively improve the system, which might include an improvement on 
training programs, the allocation of functions, alarm rationalization, operating 
supporting system, alarm prioritization and so forth (illustrated in Figure 9. 4). 
141 | C h a p t e r  9  
 
In Figure 9. 5 the simplified structure of PITOPA-CR is presented. The structure shows 
the necessary steps in the analysis, which also represents the extent of PITOPA 
enhancement to cover works in control room. Based on the same consideration about 
the importance of integrating HF into safety analyses, the new technique for control 
room must also combine the performance of HAZOPs and HF analysis. The HF part of the 
analysis itself similarly to PITOPA requires the execution of a task analysis, an operator 
actions analysis and an evaluation of various PIFs. However, to be applicable for an 
analysis in control rooms, these 3 techniques need to be modified. Eventually, results 
coming from the analysis will enable the recognition of various HF issues and problems 
in performing supervisory control and based on these problems, the exact solutions 
proposed by different guidelines and industrial best practices can be filtered and 
accurately utilized. 
 
 
Figure 9. 5 Structure of the new technique for PITOPA-CR 
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HF analysis by means of PITOPA-CR will focus on two goals, the reduction of alarms 
triggered by operator’s failures during normal work and the avoidance of operator 
errors during alarm remediation. For this purpose the analysis is divided into two parts; 
an analysis of normal operation that will aim at the avoidance of operator errors with 
potentials to causing process deviations and triggering alarms, and an analysis of 
abnormal operation following an alarm, where operator’s contribution is required for 
remediation. This second part of the analysis holds the key in keeping the process within 
the tolerable operating state and to stay away from the emergency state.  
9.2.1 Analysis of Normal Operation 
The analysis of control room work in normal operation is demonstrated in Figure 9. 6 
below. The analysis can be initiated after a clear definition of the process is attainable. 
Since in monitoring, operators are normally assigned to deal with more than one part of 
the process, it is necessary to define the process (and sub-processes) assigned to one 
operator to be monitored. In the case where more than one operator are assigned with 
the same responsibility, then these operators are considered to be in one ‘team’, and 
correspondingly, the processes and sub-processes monitored by one team of operators 
must be defined.     
Following the assignment of processes to every operator, the next step of the analysis is 
the combination of a task analysis and HAZOPs, which is similar to the previously 
developed HF technique HAZOPA (see chapter 6). On all critical tasks identified through 
CRTA, CROAA and CR-PIFs evaluation must be performed. 
I. Control room task analysis (CRTA) 
In analysing control room tasks, an initial and crucial step would be to identify 
operators’ responsibility during supervisory control and to classify those tasks into 
routine tasks and actions for alarm remediation. Alarm remediation is one of the main 
responsibilities of control room operators, which belongs to an abnormal operation 
state and hence, will be a part of later discussion. The focus of an analysis in normal 
operation will first be the normal/routine tasks, which can include general parameters 
monitoring, inputting set-points, documentation/logging of process data and parameters 
value, etc. 
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Figure 9. 6 HF analysis for normal operation 
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The identification of routine tasks in CRTA continues with the identification of possible 
errors, the consequences of these errors and lastly, the identification of safety critical 
tasks. These are the tasks, during which an executed error is considered to have high 
potential to causing significant process disturbances/parameters deviations or other 
consequences with significant severity that might not directly relate to process 
disturbances, but can cause negative latent condition, can bring harms to operators or 
endanger the surrounding environment. For the identification of safety critical tasks, the 
severity of process deviations and the consequences following errors by operators is 
evaluated by using a score, qualitatively representing the severity level. Table 9. 2 lists 
an example set of scores that can be employed for this purpose. 
Table 9. 2 Scores representing the severity of error consequences other than causing process 
disturbance 
Score Definition 
0 
Error can be immediately corrected, necessary safeguards are available to tolerate 
such errors, and no further dangers or harms can result following this error 
(not safety critical) 
1 
Error can be corrected under supervision; some authorizations are needed for 
correction. If not corrected within the right timing, process will be delayed and 
dangers might occur 
(safety critical) 
2 
Error can lead to an unnoticeable change on process flow, with time can cause 
serious events and system breakdown 
(safety critical) 
 
Simultaneous with the performance of CRTA, HAZOPs analysis must as well be 
conducted. In the case where HAZOPs had been conducted earlier, then the reports to 
this safety analysis must be kept accessible during CRTA. Only by integrating these two 
analyses, it will be possible to see the connection between operators misacting in 
causing process deviations, throughout the whole operation. This means, it will become 
possible not only to see which possible deviations can occur through which technical 
failures, but also to see whether those deviations can happen as a result of operator 
incorrect actions. The worksheet for the simultaneous implementation of CRTA and 
HAZOPs is provided in Figure 9. 7. To better demonstrate the flow of the analysis, the 
worksheet shows an example of two processes under supervision of 2 operators (the 
example is a simple extraction of earlier case-study). 
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Figure 9. 7 Worksheet for HF analysis in normal operation with CRTA and HAZOPs 
II. Control room operator actions analysis (CROAA) – normal operation 
In dealing with supervisory tasks, operators can easily lose sight of how severe the 
condition could become following a minor incorrect action. A deeper analysis on errors 
with significant consequences must be conducted, in order to reveal the underlying 
problems, and to anticipate the negative outcomes resulting from the error occurrence. 
For this reason, CRTA cannot stand alone and has to be continued with an analysis of 
operator actions for control room tasks.  
The CROAA (control room operator actions analysis) will scrutinize further the safety 
critical tasks identified earlier during CRTA and the necessary corrective actions or 
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alarm remediation as summarized in Table 9. 3. During CROAA, the analysis of critical 
tasks and necessary corrective actions by operators will take place through the 
generation of CROAA diagrams. However, the analysis of corrective actions and alarm 
remediation will be a part of CROAA in abnormal operation and will not be discussed 
here. CROAA diagram for normal operation will first demonstrate the sequence of tasks 
performance within all sub-processes supervised by one team of operators.  Figure 9. 8 
demonstrates an example of CROAA-diagram-normal, based on the description of 
operator tasks listed in CRTA worksheet in Figure 9. 7. 
Table 9. 3 Summary of tasks and corrective actions in need of further analysis 
 
Tasks with perceived criticality 
(analysis in normal operation) 
Task Nr. Process Deviation Caused Alarm 
Task 2.1.1 D7, D8, D9 AT4.1, AP4.1 
Task 4.1.1 D7, D8, D9 AT4.1, AP4.1 
Task 4.1.3 D9 - 
Deviations in need of operator actions 
(analysis in abnormal operation) 
Node Deviation Alarm 
N2.1 
D1/D2 AL2.1 
D3/D4 AL2.2 
D5/D6 AL2.3 
N4.1 
D7 AT4.1 
D8 AP4.1 
D9 - 
D10 AL2.3 
 
In reverse to the diagrams of classic OAA, on CROAA diagram (Figure 9. 8) the time 
sequence to perform operator tasks is demonstrated vertically and the different 
locations of task performance are depicted horizontally from left to right (Smieszek, 
2010). Task locations in this case can be the control room, field or other locations such 
as the laboratory, supervisor office, warehouse or the logistic office. The presentation of 
all steps conducted in different locations other than the control room has the purpose to 
provide better illustration about the whole monitoring activity during operation. This 
illustration is important since also errors conducted in other locations, such as in field 
can trigger alarms that might require the operators in control room to cope with the 
problem. Nevertheless, only the sub-tasks to be done in control room will be analysed 
deeper in CROAA, whereas the avoidance of errors than can occur during work in other 
locations are analysed through the classic OAA and/or HAZOPA.  
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Figure 9. 8 CROAA diagram for normal operation 
 
The sequent steps to be conducted are represented with rectangles in the diagram, 
coloured differently for every operator. In this example, the green rectangles represent 
the responsibility of Operator 1 and the purple ones are steps to be conducted by 
Operator 2. Sub-tasks that might require the contribution of both operators will be 
marked with both colours. The rectangles outlined with red lines illustrate the subtasks 
belong to safety critical tasks. In the example Tasks 2.1.1, 4.1.1 and 4.1.3 are identified as 
safety critical tasks, on the CROAA-diagram-normal all subtasks belong to these critical 
tasks are outlined with red lines. Further analysis needs to be conducted on these 
subtasks/steps, since the consequences of any error occurring during these steps can 
lead to a dangerous event. 
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CROAA-diagram-normal can help recognizing operator load due to inadequate task 
sequence and work design, as well as inadequate distance between different locations 
where operators must conduct actions to complete task sequence. From this diagram, it 
will also be possible to recognize the need of communication between operators in field 
and in control room at certain points. Additionally, any work overlapping and 
overloading that might occur can be identified. However, since these factors are not the 
only factors that play a big role in affecting operators’ performance; an evaluation of all 
CR-PIFs must be simultaneously performed for every safety critical control room task. 
III. Control Room PIFs Evaluation in normal operation 
In the beginning of this chapter the importance of an identification of various factors 
affecting operator’s work in control room has already been discussed. Despite the 
difficulty to model the relevance between influencing factors and operator’s working 
performance related to vigilance, situational awareness, workload and decision making 
process, evaluating those factors in term of their relevance with task performance and 
how adequately they are provided to the control room operators can deliver valuable 
findings. Through such evaluation, relative to each critical task, the factors that can 
influence operator’s work the most and are not necessarily provided to meeting their 
requirements can be recognized. This will enable the identification of the need to 
inherently improve the (working) system. 
Table 9. 4 Scores for evaluating Control Room (CR) – PIFs 
Category Score Description 
I 1 
Factor/attribute has low relevance with task performance; is 
not affecting operators significantly, however whenever 
needed is available at sufficient adequacy 
II 3 
Factor/attribute has moderate relevance with task 
performance; is often needed for completing task and is 
available at sufficient adequacy  
III 7 
Factor/attribute has high relevance with task performance; is 
one of the main key factors for task completion and is 
available at sufficient adequacy 
IV 10 
Factor/attribute has high relevance with task performance; is 
one of the main key factors for task completion , but is NOT 
available at sufficient adequacy 
 
For the evaluation of control room PIFs, an evaluation form was developed, which helps 
in making judgement concerning the relevance level and adequacy of each attribute in 
supporting operators during performance of certain tasks. Based on the characteristics 
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of different tasks, control room PIFs must be evaluated differently for each critical task. 
By using the evaluation form in Figure 9. 9 the relevance and adequacy of every attribute 
subjected to one task is categorized into 4 classes, each of which will be assigned with a 
score (Table 9. 4), which will be multiplied with the weight of the corresponding 
attribute as elicited earlier, in order to determine the relative importance of all factors 
and attributes. Attributes which receive the biggest value of relative importance are 
determined to be the most influencing PIF attributes. 
 
Figure 9. 9 Control Room (CR) – PIFs evaluation form for normal operation 
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The result of CR-PIFs evaluation will lead to the recognition of most necessary system 
improvements in order to providing human operators with better support, so that the 
likelihood of errors can be reduced and upset condition due to operator errors during 
supervisory control can be avoided. With less occurrences of errors by operators that 
could have caused deviations, the frequency of alarm activation can be reduced, and 
hence, the likelihood of alarm floods will be reduced. 
IV. Identification of alarm availability 
The performance of CRTA and HAZOPs enables the recognition of parameter deviations 
coming from both operator incorrect actions and technical failures. Following parameter 
deviations, it is important to identify whether alarms are available, to announce the 
operators of the abnormal process condition. If alarms are available, the next question to 
be answered is whether any operator response or remediation by operator is required. 
In the case where operator response is required following an active alarm, the analysis 
must continue to the second part; an analysis of abnormal operation. If no alarm 
remediation by operators is required, and the alarms are only activated in order to 
provide information about the current process status, then an assessment for alarm 
rationalization must be performed to reconsider whether this announcement must 
remain as alarms, or they are rather to be classified as warnings. Additionally, 
availability of necessary safeguards and technical measures to maintain safety of 
operation following the deviation must be assured. 
If in another case, after a parameter deviation occurred no alarm will be activated, it is 
necessary to make sure whether the availability of alarm is essentially required. Only if 
after further consideration, it is concluded that no alarms should be activated following 
the corresponding deviation, then the HF analysis can be terminated at this point and no 
further analysis for abnormal operation is needed.  
9.2.2 Analysis of Abnormal Operation 
At the second level, an analysis of abnormal condition of the process will be performed. 
This analysis will scrutinize deeper the operator actions and responses following an 
alarm or during process upset following an error. Operator action during abnormal 
operation holds the most important role in forcing the process back to its normal 
condition, and if not successfully done, can be a cause of disasters. This is the reason why 
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at this 2nd level analysis the factors influencing operators must be analysed once again in 
term of their immensity in affecting operator work in control room during upset. 
The analysis of abnormal operation is illustrated in Figure 9. 10. Following an active 
alarm, operators are required to acknowledge and remedy the situation within a certain 
available time, in order to avoid dangerous state and to bring back the process to the 
normal operating condition. Any mistake happening during the effort to remedy alarm 
can have severe consequences. Therefore, every step for alarm remediation must be 
analysed, in order to identify possible errors during the performance. For this purpose, a 
control room operator actions analysis (CROAA) for abnormal operation needs to be 
applied. Additionally, an evaluation of PIFs in abnormal operation is also necessary to be 
conducted.  
The identification of alarms remediation can utilize the assistance of the worksheet in 
Table 9. 5 below. With this worksheet, the remediation of alarms summarized previously 
in Table 9. 3 will be identified, as well as other corrective actions required to correct 
deviations. The corrective measures can be pure technical and fully automated, but can 
also require operator’s contribution. All steps to remedy alarms and all human 
contribution needed to recover from process upset are analysed in CROAA-Abnormal as 
discussed in the following section. 
Table 9. 5 Worksheet for an analysis of control room work in abnormal operation 
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Possible errors & 
technical failures
Parameter deviation
Identify corrective 
measures
Alarm 
available?
Assessment for 
alarm 
rationalization
Remediation 
through operator?
Alarm remediation
Identify possible 
errors
Identify 
consequences
CROAA diagram –
abnormal operation
PIFs 
Evaluation
Guidelines, alarm 
management best 
practices
Improvements suggestions 
on control system, control room, job design,
alarm management, etc.
Identification of underlying 
problems
Yes No
Yes
 
Figure 9. 10 HF analysis for abnormal operation 
 
I. Control room operator actions analysis (CROAA) for abnormal operation 
The performance of CROAA-Abnormal is assisted by another worksheet provided in 
Table 9. 6. The information collected in this worksheet helps to systematically see that in 
their attempt to recover from upset condition, mistakes can be executed and as a result, 
the operation can run even farther away from the expected normal condition. 
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Acknowledging certain intolerable errors during alarm remediation will help in finding 
crucial points where adequate operator supporting system must be provided to assist 
operator decision making process. In an extreme case, where the outcome of an error 
can potentially lead to a disastrous incident, the remediation of certain alarms must 
exclude operators’ contribution, or at the least, alarm remediation can only take place 
under supervision of the plant manager. Emergency shutdown must as well be 
accessible as the last system barrier to avoid a disaster from happening.  
Table 9. 6 Worksheet for CROAA-Abnormal 
No.
Steps for alarm remediation/ corrective actions
Description & location
Possible error Consequences
Further
corrective 
actions
Emergency 
shutdown 
required?
ALARM: AT4.1
Cause: 
D8
Error in Subtask 4.1.1.1
R1.AT4.1
R2.AT4.1
R3.AT4.1
R4.AT4.1
CA1ER1
ER2
ER3
ER4
ER5
ER6
CA2
CA3
CA4
CA5
CA6
CA7
 
Using information from the worksheet for CROAA-Abnormal, steps for alarm 
remediation and necessary corrective actions will be demonstrated in CROAA-diagram 
for upset condition, systematically showing the susceptible points where the system 
tends to fail in coping with human errors. Figure 9. 11 presents CROAA-diagram-
abnormal, which provides an analysis of operator action following the activation of 
alarm AT4.1 in previous example. On this diagram, the routine tasks during normal 
operation are illustrated once again. Moving further to the right side of the diagram, the 
abnormal condition is depicted, which now becomes the focus of this analysis. If an error 
happens during the performance of a task or a sub-task, the implication of this error in 
form of a parameter deviation continued with alarm activation, is systematically 
demonstrated. Following the alarm, steps for remediation are sequentially illustrated 
with numbered rectangles. The diagram can be expanded to such an extent, until 
everyone in the analysis team is convinced that all significant possible errors that might 
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have potential to causing disastrous event are anticipated and that adequate support for 
operators in coping with process upsets can be guaranteed. 
Figure 9. 11 provides a clear demonstration about the relationship between alarms, 
causes and consequences thereof. In some cases, one error can trigger more than one 
alarm; this can as well be illustrated in the CROAA-diagram-abnormal. The diagram 
provides also an observation on how operator response following alarms can fully 
distract their attention in performing routine tasks. Such distraction can as well be 
resulting in another parameter deviation that can trigger other alarms. Due to the 
complex nature of the diagram, further errors that are possible to happen during alarm 
remediation are not shown on the same diagram. 
I. Control Room PIFs Evaluation in abnormal operation 
To be able to provide the necessary support for operators, an evaluation of control room 
PIFs must be conducted for abnormal operation. Even though the earlier evaluation for 
normal operation has revealed significant operators’ requirements in performing critical 
tasks, during an upset they might require additional supports so that reliable 
performance can be assured. For this reason, CR-PIFs evaluation must take place to 
analyse every error-prone step of alarm remediation and corrective actions by 
operators, for example the step R2 during remediation of alarm AT4.1 in the example as 
demonstrated in CROAA-diagram-abnormal (Figure 9. 11).  
The basic principles in conducting the CR-PIFs evaluation for abnormal operation are 
similar to the evaluation for the normal one; nevertheless, the evaluation is now made 
related to the characteristics of steps operators have to conduct during alarm 
remediation. Hence, only the heading of the evaluation form needs to be modified, to 
explicate for which alarm remediation the CR-PIFs evaluation is carried out. The slightly 
modified evaluation form is provided in Figure 9. 11.    
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Figure 9. 11 CROAA diagrams of control room work in abnormal operation
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Figure 9. 12 Extraction of CR-PIFs evaluation form for abnormal operation 
 
9.3 Alarm Prioritization 
Several techniques for alarm prioritization were discussed in Chapter 2.6.3, are based on 
best practices and suggested by reliable guidelines in different industrial branches. 
However, in this section a technique for alarm prioritization is proposed as an extension 
of the earlier developed ones, which will take into account the result of the analysis on 
operator actions in control room.  
9.3.1 A survey on Alarm Prioritization 
Alarm is normally prioritized based on the consequences caused by omission and failure 
in responding to it. The consequences will have impact on the most important plant 
criteria that need to be maintained (Rothenberg, 2009), which are:  
a. Safety of personnel 
b. Environmental impact 
c. Product quality, production rate and production plans/schedules 
d. Plant and equipment integrity  
e. Enterprise finances 
f. Company and business reputation 
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In the scope of the internal industrial survey at Bayer CropScience, a survey was 
conducted to collect the opinions of plant managers and engineers in viewing how 
relevant the above criteria are for alarm prioritization. The result of the survey provides 
relative weights for each prioritization criterion, as listed in Table 9. 7. From the table it 
can be viewed that the plant managers consider ‘safety of personnel’ as the most 
important thing to maintain, and alarm must successfully inform the operators of 
disturbances that can have impact to this criteria. Moreover, operators must respond 
correctly to the corresponding alarm, in order to avoid undesired events related to 
personnel safety. 
Table 9. 7 Weights of plant criteria for alarm prioritization  
 
Criteria of alarm impacts Relative Weight 
a. Safety of personnel 0.32584 
b. Environmental impact 0.26828 
c. Product quality, production rate 
and production plans/schedules 
0.10314 
d. Plant and Equipment integrity  0.10314 
e. Enterprise Finances 0.07925 
f. Company and business reputation 0.12035 
 
9.3.2 Incorporation of CROAA into Alarm Prioritization 
Most of the common alarm prioritization techniques suggest combining two 
considerations; the consequence (and its severity) and the urgency of the corresponding 
alarm. An alarm will be given a priority of highest level if noticed that a failure to 
acknowledge this alarm can lead to a severe consequence, and if the operators only have 
little time to correctly respond to it. In this case, the urgency of alarms is represented by 
the available time to respond to an alarm. An alarm that announces information related 
to a severe condition but does not have to be corrected within a narrow time span can be 
assigned with a lower priority. 
However, in viewing the urgency of an alarm, a broader perspective is needed. Urgency 
is basically the call for immediate attention or the need to perform something 
immediately or within the shortest possible timeframe. It is true that urgency relates 
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strongly with the amount of available time to conduct certain action, and with less time 
available, an action is becoming more urgent than usual. But, the need to give immediate 
attention can also result from the awareness that the consequence by not or incorrectly 
performing this action can lead to a serious damage, regardless of when this action must 
be done. Knowing that an undesired outcome can be resulted from an uncompleted 
action will shift the urgency of such action to a higher level, since an immediate attention 
to it is now required. 
In its relation to alarm prioritization CROAA provides valuable information concerning 
the necessary operator actions during alarm remediation, about the errors that might 
occur during these actions and to which consequences those errors can result if not 
corrected in time.  This information relates strongly to the urgency of an alarm, since the 
understanding about how a severe consequence can be caused by a failure during alarm 
remediation must be informed to the operator. The operators must be aware of the 
situation, that in responding to such alarms, higher concentration, discussion among co-
workers and supervision from shift leader or plant manager might be needed. Defining 
urgency from time availability only cannot deliver the most proper priority, since 
sometimes after a critical alarm is activated, operators have quite much time before the 
most extreme outcome could occur. However, the urgency of an action rises by knowing 
that if they wait any longer, the condition will get worse and will become harder to 
handle.  
The necessary operator actions after the activation of alarms are usually not taken into 
consideration in the common alarm prioritization techniques. Therefore, an extension of 
those techniques is made in this work. The new technique starts with an evaluation of 
alarms in terms of their relevance in giving impact or in causing damage to the 6 plant 
criteria listed in Table 9. 7. This evaluation takes place by giving scores to each alarm, 
which represents their strength in affecting those criteria if omitted; e.g. using a scale 
between 0 to 10, where 0 shows no relevance and the score 10 represents the absolute 
relevance of an alarm to jeopardize certain plant criteria if the operators failed to 
remedy it. These scores will then be multiplied with the elicited relative weights of each 
criterion, which will deliver a corrected value of the scores. This will reduce the 
subjectivity in opinions given during the scoring.  
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After evaluating how the alarms related to the consequences caused on the 6 plant 
criteria, it is now important to make a final evaluation by taking the available time as 
well as the critical characteristics of operator actions to remedy those alarms into 
account. The evaluation applies the calculation of distance using k-Nearest-Neighbor 
(kNN) Algorithm (see Chapter 2.7.2). The flow of the performance is provided in Figure 
9. 13.    
 
Figure 9. 13 The flow of alarm prioritization by means of the new technique 
 
I. Determination of alarm priority areas for classification purpose  
The classification of alarms into 3 priorities is performed based on 3 considerations; 
how relevant the omission of an alarm in giving impact on the 6 plant criteria is (Priority 
Factor 1 – PF1), how much time is available (PF2), and how the characteristics of 
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operator actions during alarm remediation are (PF3). Scores as listed previously in 
Figure 9. 13 will be given to each consideration for every alarm to be prioritized. 
However, the score for the first consideration (PF1), which represents the relationship 
between alarm omission and the impact caused on the 6 plant criteria, is calculated 
separately at the beginning. Ultimately for the priorities classification, there will be 3 
scores to be taken into consideration, which are the scores for PF1, PF2 and PF3. 
These 3 final scores are the attributes of the instances and can be assumed as a point 
(x,y,z) in a 3-dimensional coordinate. Since the scales used for judging all three scores 
are different one from another, for further calculation all scores for PF1, PF2 and PF3 
must be normalized to [0,1] so that  all possible combinations of the coordinates 
(PF1,PF2,PF3) will lay between: 
                           Q ≤ S! ≤ ! ∧ Q ≤ SO ≤ ! ∧ Q ≤ SU ≤ !            Equation 6 
To be able to classify the alarms based on their priority within this domain, the 
boundaries must be set. The priority of a query alarm  is to be classified after the rule 
defined as follows: 
            V%' =
WX
Y
XZ
M[M\ !,   0.9≤PF1≤1 ∧ 0.9≤PF2≤1 ∧ 0.9≤PF3≤1
M[M\ O,   0.7≤PF1<0.9 ∧ 0.7≤PF2<0.9 ∧ 0.7≤PF3<0.9
M[M\ U,   0≤PF1<0.7 ∧ 0≤PF2<0.7 ∧ 0≤PF3<0.7
]^ maxV%
' G∑ V%
'_ ! J, `
#
                        
 
                                                                                                                                              Equation 7 
where P(a) is the priority outcome of the query alarm ,,    denotes the code used to 
identify alarms, b ... bc denote the c samples closest to , P(ab),  = 1 …  c is known as 
the priority of a particular c sample (i.e. Priority 1, Priority 2, Priority 3) and  denotes 
the k-value for classification. Figure 9. 14 below demonstrates the definite areas assigned 
with 3 different priorities. 
After determining the boundaries between each priority area, a classification of the 
query alarm  will be enabled. However, a coordinate can sometimes consist of PF1, 
PF2 and PF3 values in different ranges, i.e. PF1 = 0.8 (lays in the area of Priority 1) , PF2 = 
0.5 (area of Priority 2) and PF3 =0.1 (area of Priority 3), that makes the classification of 
this point into a certain priority more difficult. The prioritization of such alarm must 
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then be made based on the distance evaluation between the corresponding query alarm 
and the k-samples whose priorities are known or set.  
0.9 1.0
0.9
1.0
0.9
PF2
PF3
PF1
1.0
0.7
1.00.7
1.0
0
Definite area of Priority 1 Definite area of Priority 2
Definite area of Priority 3
 
Figure 9. 14 Areas assigned with 3 alarm priorities 
 
kNN algorithm is used to help the classification process. By using a step ∆d = 0.05 sample 
points (k-samples denoted with b) that represent the definite domains of Priority 1, 
Priority 2 and Priority 3 within 0 ≤ ae1 ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ ae2 ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ ae3 ≤ 1 can be 
determined. kNN algorithm will measure the distance between the coordinate of the 
query alarm  and these k-samples. Ultimately, the priority of alarm  will be 
classified based on the priority given to the majority of its nearest neighbours (sample 
points with smallest distance from alarm ).  
The minimum number of the nearest neighbours to be compared with the query alarm 
(k-value) is arbitrary, an odd number is however more preferable. This technique 
proposes the k-value of 15 to provide an accurate classification, so that for the Equation 
2 the value of  is settled to  = 1 …  15. 
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II. Evaluation of alarms in their relevance in affecting plant criteria  
The first step to implementing the new prioritization technique is to evaluate the 
relevance of the alarm in affecting the 6 criteria by giving a score 0 - 10 to every alarm-
criteria relationship. Given an example of a prioritization of 2 alarms, alarm 1 and 
alarm 2, the scores that represent the impact of the alarms on the 6 plant criteria is 
shown in Table 9. 8.  
Table 9. 8 Scores showing relevance of a sample alarm (Alarm A) in affecting the 6 plant safety 
criteria 
 
Criteria 
Relative 
weight 
Fixed score 
Alarm ! Fixed score Alarm O Corrected score ! Corrected score O 
a. Safety of personnel 0.326 3 9 0.978 2.934 
b. Environmental 
impact 
0.268 7 9 1.876 2.412 
c. Product quality, 
production rate and 
production plans 
0.103 
 
7 10 0.721 1.03 
d. Plant and equipment 
integrity  
0.103 5 9 0.515 0.927 
e. Enterprise finances 0.079 3 10 0.237 0.79 
f. Company and 
business reputation 
0.120 8 8 0.96 0.96 
Total score = PF1  5.287 9.053 
The omission of alarm 1 is considered to give only small impact on personnel safety, 
the equipment integrity and enterprise finances. However, if this alarm was ignored or 
not successfully corrected, a relative severe impact on the environment and will quality 
can be caused. Due to these reasons, the company business reputation will be put in 
danger. Whereby, alarm 2 is very crucial in terms of all 6 plant criteria.  
III. Inclusion of both available response time and the characteristics of operator 
actions during remediation into alarm prioritization 
After the impact of omission on the 6 important criteria is evaluated, the inclusion of 
available time and the characteristics of operator actions into the prioritization must 
now take place. Table 9. 9 gives the summary of all considerations (represented by PF1, 
PF2 and PF3) to prioritize alarm 1 and 2. Since the scoring scales used to evaluate 
each consideration are different, the scores must be normalised first before going to 
further calculation. The normalisation takes place by means of the following equation: 
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                                                               H = Mff                                                Equation 8                                         
where x denotes the normalized score and r = the score given in the evaluation with the 
corresponding scale [n,nR]. 
Table 9. 9 Coordinates of Alarm !and O 
 
Considerations to 
prioritize alarms 
Scores fo] 
alarm ! Scores fo] alarm O Normalized scores  alarm ! Normalized scores  alarm O 
1. PF1 
Relevance to 
plant criteria  
5.287 
(PF1 in 
Table 9.8) 
9.053 
(PF1 in 
Table 9.8) 
0.5287 0.9053 
2. PF2 
Available 
response time 
4 5 0.75 1 
3. PF3 
Characteristics 
of actions 
during 
remediation 
1 3 0.33 1 
 
 
Figure 9. 15 Plot of alarm AB1 and AB2 on the prioritization domain in 3-dimensional coordinates 
By using Equation 8, the normalized scores for alarm 1 and 2 can be calculated, 
giving the coordinates of both alarms: (0.5287,0.75,0.33) and (0.9053,1,1) respectively 
as demonstrated in Figure 9. 15 above. For alarm 2 the priority can be easily classified 
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into Priority 1 (high) according to Equation 6. However, alarm 1 must be prioritised 
through a classification by means of kNN algorithm. 
IV. Alarm prioritization with kNN algorithm 
The kNN algorithm will now calculate the distance between alarm 1 and the 
previously determined k-samples that represent Priority1, 2 and 3. The calculation of 
distance takes place using Euclidean distance. Afterwards, the 15 k-samples that are 
located nearest to Alarm 1 will be identified, these are namely the nearest neighbours 
of alarm 1. The priorities applied to these nearest 15 neighbouring points will be 
identified, and the priority that is assigned to the majority of those 15 neighbours will be 
given to alarm 1 correspondingly.  
Table 9. 10 kNN result showing the 15 nearest neighbours of alarm ! 
 
Rank 
Distance to alarm !  
(0.5287,0.75,0.33) 
Priority of  
k-sample P%ab',  = 1 … 15 
1 0.104181 3 
2 0.105942 3 
3 0.106554 3 
4 0.108276 3 
5 0.12391 3 
6 0.124433 3 
7 0.125394 3 
8 0.126427 3 
9 0.128816 3 
10 0.129822 3 
11 0.130743 3 
12 0.131239 3 
13 0.141364 3 
14 0.145237 3 
15 0.146573 3 
Table 9. 10 provides the nearest 15 neighbours of alarm 1 and the priorities they are 
representing. From the result of this calculation, all 15 points nearest to alarm 1 lay in 
the area of Priority 3. A strong assumption that alarm 1 lays in the same area can be 
taken and hence, this alarm will be assigned with Priority 3 correspondingly. 
Mathematically it can be expressed as: 
 
                               V%!' = ]^ maxV%
' G∑ V%
'!g ! J = M[M\ U               Equation 9 
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9.4 Intermediate Summary 
The new method PITOPA-Control Room (CR) provides a way to analyse operators’ 
responsibility in performing supervisory control and process monitoring. The analysis 
by means of the new method will lead to the recognition of various HF issues both 
during normal and upsets condition, which will enable the identification of the most 
influencing factors that can negatively affect operators’ performance in both operating 
conditions. Identifying these factors can give direction in improving the system and 
control room configuration to meet operators’ requirement and to understand their 
limitation. The analysis for abnormal condition will deliver specific information about 
the available alarm system in terms of their adequacy in announcing upsets to the 
operators and its prioritization concept. By means of this analysis, the common alarm 
problems such as alarm flooding and false alarms can be avoided and their occurrences 
will be reduced consequently.  
The implementation of PITOPA-CR is summarized in a simplified diagram in Figure 9. 16, 
which addresses the need to incorporate results coming from the analysis into alarm 
management programs. In the next chapter, the role of PITOPA-CR in optimizing the life-
cycle of an alarm management is delivered in brief.  
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Figure 9. 16 Implementation of PITOPA-CR
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CHAPTER 10 
INCORPORATION OF OPERATOR ACTIONS ANALYSIS INTO ALARM 
MANAGEMENT 
 
The new technique for HF analysis in control room described in the previous chapter is a 
way to incorporate the analysis of operator actions into the whole alarm management 
activity and lifecycle. The performance of CRTA (control room task analysis), CROAA 
(control room operator actions analysis) and the evaluation of control room PIFs in both 
normal and abnormal plant conditions will provide a systematic identification of “causes 
– alarms – consequences” relationships. Through the understanding about what causes 
an alarm to go off and to what consequences the omission of the alarm can lead to, an 
alarm system can be optimally managed. Trough CROAA, operators’ contribution in 
causing deviations that activate alarms can be identified, whereas the evaluation of 
control room PIFs subsequently will lead to the revelation of the most influencing 
factors that can force people to perform incorrect actions.  
The inclusion of operator actions analysis during process upsets into alarm 
prioritization was also explained and discussed in detail. However, alarm prioritization 
is not the only stage of alarm management lifecycle (Figure 2. 9), where operator actions 
must be taken into consideration. The identified “causes – alarms – consequences” 
relationships can help a company’s alarm management systems in a wider continuum as 
illustrated previously in Figure 9. 4. The incorporation of the new technique for HF 
analysis in control room into the lifecycle of alarm management is illustrated in the 
following Figure 10. 1.  
1. Identification of necessary alarms 
Performance of CRTA and CROAA-normal leads to the identification of process 
deviations in need of alarms. From this result, it will be possible to re-check, whether 
those necessary alarms are available and acknowledgeable by operators. 
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2. Alarm rationalization 
On the other hand, the results of CRTA and CROAA-normal also lead to the identification 
of unnecessary alarms, or warnings that are to be treated differently from alarms. With 
this information, (re-)rationalizing of alarms will be assisted, and the number of 
irrelevant alarms or unnecessary warnings can be reduced. 
3. Prioritization 
In addition to alarm rationalization, results coming from CROAA, particularly from 
CROOA-abnormal can add valuable information to prioritize alarms. The understanding 
about the characteristics of operator actions needs to be performed during upsets is 
necessary to classify the priority of an alarm.   
4. Training plans and programs 
The results delivered by CROAA in form of normal and abnormal diagrams will help 
identifying unnecessary alarms so that alarm rationalization is provided with better 
assistance.  Additionally, from the CROAA diagrams, necessary operator actions to 
remedy alarms and the most probable errors during the corresponding alarm 
remediation will be identified and anticipated. This information is very essential to be 
taken into consideration in planning and optimizing operator training programs in 
working with the alarm system.  
5. Design of operator supporting systems and other relevant aspects  
Additionally, the evaluation of control room PIFs will provide valuable information to 
designing an alarm system. The recognition of the most influencing factors during 
normal tasks and during alarm remediation will provide the design team with the 
knowledge concerning operator’s needs and requirements in performing their work. 
Consequently, the most necessary design requirements can be correspondingly realized, 
as to understand operator’s limitation and to avoid them from performing incorrect 
actions that have the potential to causing disastrous events.   
 
 
169 | C h a p t e r  1 0  
 
6. Optimizing operation 
With all information obtained from PITOPA-CR alarm system and alarm management 
can be improved and optimized, as well as the control system, with which the operators 
have to work. This will of course lead to an optimization of process operation generally. 
Moreover, since disturbances and necessary operator actions are anticipated, working 
procedures can be refined.  
 
 
Figure 10. 1 Incorporation of operator actions analysis into alarm management 
 
The performance of both CROAA and control room PIFs evaluation for normal and 
abnormal operations will on one hand enable the avoidance of operator error that can 
trigger alarms, which will reduce the potential of alarm floods. On the other hand, these 
techniques enable the anticipation and prevention of further possible errors during 
alarm remediation, which will consequently prevent the severe consequences as an 
outcome of those errors. Incorporating the performance of these new HF techniques into 
alarm management and into the implementation of the new HF method for design phase 
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developed in this work will provide a way to optimizing plant and process design both 
from the technical and Human Factors requirements. As a result, an inherently safer 
plant design that grants operator safety and optimizes production efficiency will be 
achievable. 
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CHAPTER 11 
RESULTS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
11. 1 Results  
Due to several limitations, the earlier developed method, Process Industry Tool for 
Operator Actions Analysis (PITOPA) is unsuitable for HF analysis of a plant under 
design. Hence, PITOPA was enhanced into PITOPA-Design to comprise an analysis of HF 
condition during the whole phase of process plant design, beginning with the conceptual 
design until detail engineering in relation with safety analyses conducted during these 
stages, e.g. HAZOPs. This way, the process plant can be designed not only to meeting 
engineering and technical requirements, but to as well take into consideration human 
operators’ requirements in term of their safety and working efficiency. Combined with 
the application of classic PITOPA during commissioning phase and plant operation, both 
methods PITOPA-Design and the classic PITOPA will provide a systematic way to 
consider, analyse and recognize problems in plant design that can significantly affect 
operators’ performance, so that safeguards, safety equipment, working procedures or 
trainings for operators can be anticipated and planned correspondingly.  
The new method PITOPA-Design does not address in particular the design of control 
room and control system, or any other aspects that specifically relate with operators 
work during supervisory control. However, PITOPA-Design directs the users to 
separately analyse operators’ requirements in performing supervisory tasks and 
afterwards, to make improvements or design suggestions corresponding to the analysis 
results. For this purpose, once again a modification was made on the classic PITOPA, in 
order to provide a way for HF analysis in control room work, which has led to the 
development of PITOPA-Control Room (PITOPA-CR). With similar logic, PITOPA-CR 
scrutinizes every condition related with operator performance in working with the 
control system, to acknowledge active alarms and to cope with upsets. PITOPA-CR 
delivers results that can be exploited to improve alarm management system, among 
others through a better alarm rationalization and prioritization. For these reasons, a 
new technique for alarm prioritization was additionally developed to enable the proper 
utilization of PITOPA-CR result in the prioritization of alarms. This new technique 
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PITOPA-CR can be implemented in existing plants, and can as well be interconnected 
with PITOPA-Design, in particular during late basic until detail engineering, where 
control system and control rooms are being configured.   
The whole work described in this report provides a systematic way to incorporate 
Human Factors (HF) into design and operation of process plants, for operators’ work 
both in field and in control room as demonstrated in Figure 11. 1. A proper 
implementation of PITOPA-Design and a frequent HF audits by means of the classic 
PITOPA, both in a combination with PITOPA-CR will extensively optimize process and 
occupational safety, increase process efficiency and productivity and less but never the 
least, will radically reduce unplanned costs.  
 
Figure 11. 1 Area of application of the new approach for HF analysis during plant lifecycle 
 
The work has achieved the desired results; however, several recommendations for 
future works are suggested in the following section. 
11. 2 Future Works  
The method and techniques developed in this work attempt to provide a clear 
systematic in performing HF analysis; either it is conducted during design, 
commissioning, or operation of a process plant. This systematic can however be very 
confusing, and the amount of information collected and resulted from the analysis can 
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become enormous with the increasing complexity of the plant. Performing a paper-
based analysis is for that reason not recommended. Therefore, there is an inevitable 
need to computerize the techniques in order to ease the implementation, and most 
importantly, to maintain a reliable analysis since the correct flow of the analysis is 
assured.  
Further recommendations will be made more in the area of PITOPA-CR. For the 
development of this technique, factors influencing human operators during supervisory 
control were re-identified and broken down into smaller attributes to one extent where 
a hierarchy was obtained. The author still senses the need to explore the factors that can 
influence human beings during control room work, and to afterwards form the proper 
hierarchy correspondingly. Additionally, the author recommends the identification of 
PIFs that are most relevant to operators’ action during abnormal operations or upsets. 
Several factors can have bigger impact on operators during plant upsets than in normal 
operation generally. Hence, the PIFs for works during normal and abnormal conditions 
need to be differently identified.  
Moreover, the need to explore other techniques for evaluating these influencing factors 
rather than using AHP is considered to be of great importance. AHP used in this 
development relies too much on operators’ subjective opinions and feelings. Such 
subjective feelings can vary more widely if used in judging work load in term of stress 
level, information processing and vigilance rather than when used to evaluate physical 
load. 
Related to the whole development, further validations of PITOPA-Design, HAZOPA, 
PITOPA-CR and the technique for alarm prioritization in process industries are 
necessary to be conducted. Focusing to alarm prioritization, validations and more 
industrial observations are needed to refine the determination of areas/domains for 
alarm prioritization that is used for classifying alarm priorities. Either a change of 
boundaries need to be performed can only be answered after thorough field analysis and 
deeper discussion with practitioners.  
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APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire for HF-Design Evaluation in Detail Engineering 
 
 
 
 
Technical Facilities
1 Equipment General Condition Total score / 2
1.1 Technical system
Is sufficient time available for task performance? Yes 2
No 1
Technical system condition: Normal 1
Abnormal 1
Emergency 4
Operability: Easy to operate 1
Difficult/confusing 4
1.2 Process safety condition
Is the part to be operated safety relevant? Yes 5
No 1
Is necessary safety equipment available? Yes 1
No 5
Not safety relevant 0
2 Human-System Interface Total score / 3
2.1 Display
Is display provided to the operators? Yes 1
No 5
If yes:
Appearance adequacy:
Adequate colorings: Yes 1
No 2
Suitable amount of information displayed: Yes 1
No 2
Readible information: Yes 1
No 2
If no:
Is it necessary for process monitoring? Yes 5
No 1
Is up-dating  for displays included in the MOC? Yes 1
No 3
2.2 Communication System
Adequate communication system to support communication between field an control room:
Available 1
Not available 5
Not necessary 0
Adequate system to support communication between different locations in field:
Available 1
Not available 5
Not necessary 0
2.3 Feedback and alarms
Feedback to operators to confirm task completion? Available 1
Not available 4
Not necessary 0
Emergency alarms adeuqately located? Yes 1
No 3
Simultaneous and false alarms excluded? Yes 1
No 3
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3 Environmental Factors Total score / 5
For tasks conducted outdoor:
3.1 Illumination
Adequate lighting available? Yes 1
No 5
Not necessary 0
Glare and reflections excluded? Yes 1
No 5
3.2 Temperature, humidity and wind
Suitbale working apparel & clothing for the corresponding temperature available?
Yes 2
No 10
Not necessary 0
3.3 Noise
Noise reduction system / ear protection available for operators?
Yes 2
No 10
Not necessary 0
3.4 Vibration
Vibration reduction system available? Yes 2
No 10
Not necessary 0
3.5 Air quality and toxicity
Toxic atmosphere avoided? Yes 2
No 10
Not relevant 0
For tasks conducted indoor:
3.1 Illumination
Adequate lighting available? Yes 1
No 5
Not necessary 0
Glare and reflections excluded? Yes 1
No 5
3.2 Temperature, humidity and wind
The temperature of working area:
Cool (< 21ᵒC) 3
Normal (21 - 33ᵒC) 1
Hot ( > 33ᵒC) 5
Operators are to work near heated process equipment?
Yes 5
No 1
3.3 Noise
Noise reduction system / ear protection available for operators?
Yes 2
No 10
Not necessary 0
3.4 Vibration
Vibration reduction system available? Yes 2
No 10
Not necessary 0
3.5 Air quality and toxicity
Toxic atmosphere avoided? Yes 1
No 4
Not relevant 0
Adequate ventilation: Available 1
Not available 3
Not relevant 0
Air conditioning/purifying system: Available 1
Not available 3
Not relevant 0
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4 Workplace Design Total score / 2
4.1 Layout
Adequate space available for task performance? Yes 1
No 3
Consistent arrangement of equipment to avoid confusion:
Yes 1
No 2
Not relevant 0
Equipment arrangement allows movement? Yes 1
No 2
Not relevant 0
Arrangement allows avoidance of direct contact with heated equipments?
Yes 1
No 3
Not relevant 0
4.2 Accessibility
Necessary equipment/tools/parts are physically reachable during task performance:
Yes 1
No 2
Not relevant 0
Stairs, ladders and ramps are adequately placed: Yes 1
No 2
Adequate pathways to connect different process parts available for task performance:
Yes 1
No 4
Not relevant 0
Pathways lead the shortest way to reach a different task location:
Yes 1
No 2
Not relevant 0
Human
1 Skill & Knowledge Total score / 2
1.1 Type of task
Task type Skill-based 2
Rule-based 4
Knowledge-based 6
Individual task? Yes 2
No 4
1.2 Qualification and Experience
Operator has the required skill and knowledge? Yes 1
No 2
Operator has the required experience? Yes 1
No 2
Has operator completed manadatoty trainings related to task perforamance?
Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
Restrictions for people with certain age or behaviour considered?
Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
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2 Manual & Physical Handling Total score / 2
2.1 Physical Load
Any manual handlings of materials or equipment necessary?
Yes 3
No 1
Reduction of pullling, pushing, carrying, lifting and lowering possible?
Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
Physical hard task? Yes 4
No 1
2.2 Additional Tools & Safety Equipment
Necessary additional tools available? Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
Are additional tools easy to operate? Yes 1
No 2
Not necessary 0
Is necessary protective clothing provided? Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
Performance reduction caused by the wear of protective clothing avoided?
Yes 2
No 1
Not necessary 0
3 Stress Level Total score / 3
Adequate support for tasks requiring high concentration available?
Yes 1
No 3
Not relevant 0
Adequate support for tasks with high monotony level and causing boredom available?
Yes 1
No 3
Not relevant 0
Adequate support to ease task performance with high potential of hazardous risk available?
Yes 1
No 4
Not relevant 0
Management & Organisational System
1 Job Design Total score / 2
1.1 Task Frequency
Shifting plans completed? Yes 1
No 4
Is the goal of task completion clearly determined and explained to operators?
Yes 1
No 6
1.2 Job Description
Are tasks broken down into definite steps and clearly described? 
Yes 2
No 10
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2 Line Management and Procedures Total score / 3
2.1 Line of Responsibilities
Clear hierarchy of responsibility in performing the task?
Yes 1
No 2
Person responsible in planning and sharing the task assigned?
Yes 1
No 2
Person responsible in giving instructions during task performance assigned?
Yes 1
No 2
Person responsible in giving supervision assigned?
Yes 1
No 2
Person to be informed of task completion clearly assigned?
Yes 1
No 2
2.2 Procedures
Means to explain the task to operators available? Yes 1
No 2
Procedural manual/instructions for task performance available?
Yes 1
No 4
Up-dating plans of manuals and working procedures prepared?
Yes 1
No 4
2.3 Supervision
Adequate supervision for task performance available?
Yes 1
No 4
Supervision from contractors or third party required?
Yes 6
No 1
3 Task Information Total score / 3
3.1 Labels & Signs
Equipment and process components related to task performance are adequately labelled:
Yes 1
No 4
Instructions and warnings are readible and noticeable:
Yes 1
No 3
Up-dating plans for labels and signs are prepared: Yes 1
No 3
3.2 Communication
Adequate communication between field operators available?
Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
Adequate communication between field and control room available?
Yes 1
No 4
Not necessary 0
Adequate communication between shifts available?
Yes 1
No 3
Not necessary 0
3.3 Documentation
Adequate system for documenting task completion available?
Yes 2
No 10
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTION OF CONTROL ROOM PIFS AND  
THE CONTRIBUTING ATTRIBUTES 
 
A. Human System/Machine Interface (HSI/HMI) 
HSI holds the role in assuring a reliable information exchange between the process and the 
operators, since this interface is the boundary across which process information is transduced 
by sensors and displayed to the operators (CCPS, 1994). Design of HSI must support the 
recognition, tolerance and recovery from any possible human errors during process monitoring 
(O'Hara, et al., 2002). The attributed associated with HSI are configuration of displays, design of 
control, system response and feedback, and the entry of data and instruction. 
A1. Displays configuration 
The term ‚displays configuration‘ in an analysis by means of PITOPA-CR represents the way 
in which process information is presented to control room operators by a display system. 
The evaluation of this attribute will comprise necessary design requirements for reliable 
process monitoring by operators, including:  
- Presentation of only necessary and relevant information for operators 
- Appropriate display format for particular tasks: suitable use of text, graphs, charts or 
tables  
- Design of displays elements including colouring, use of icons and symbols, 
abbreviations, scales, arrows and the size of presented information  
- Display networks/structure: the use of hierarchical, sequential or relational 
structure 
A2. Design of control 
Controls are devices that interconnect human with HSI and consequently with the process. In 
the context of control room work can include: 
- General conventional control devices i.e. pushbutton or rotary control for instance at 
panels and consoles 
- Computer-based input devices i.e. function keys and keyboard, mice, trackballs, 
joystick, touch-screen, light-pen, graphic tablets or speech input devices.  
The evaluation of the attribute ‚design of control should observe whether the appropriate 
control devices have been selected to providing support for operators in performing the 
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tasks they are assigned with. Additionally, the location of those devices, accuracy, speed and 
human suitability must be taken into consideration during the evaluation.  
A3. Entry of data and instruction 
The entry of data and instruction relates with the selected input control device described in 
point A2. However, this attribute represents more the way in which the operators conduct 
the whole activity and how the system is designed to prevent accidental input or actuation. 
Several examples of observation that should be taken in evaluating this attribute are: 
- If operators are required to entry process data that will significantly affect the flow of 
the process, then the system needs to ask for confirmation and must be sensitive 
enough to any unfeasible inputs.  
- If certain parameters must be kept unchanged, then any possible manipulation by 
operators must be assured to prevent accidental interference. 
- If for data entry or for giving instructions the operators need to input long line of 
numbers or text, then it can be considered to provide them with several options from 
possible ranges of data. The operators will then have to only choose the desired 
instruction by for instance clicking on one of those options. 
A4. System response and feedback 
In relation to the attribute A3, system response and feedback describes the computer’s 
behaviour after receiving information inputted by the operators and its ability to inform the 
operators that their input has been received or is being processed. Additionally, the time 
between the submission of the instruction and the presentation of feedback from the 
computer is essential, since delay in giving confirmation after an entry of data, can mislead 
operators to a wrong decision, especially if they are required to subsequently input next 
instructions correspond to the result of the previously conducted step. 
B. Control Room Design 
Control room is frequently expressed as the workplace where operators conduct all activities at 
different workstations. Such workplaces or control rooms are hence the facilities that house the 
workstations and additional equipment that provide the environment where operators conduct 
their tasks. Attributes contributing to the design of control room that need to be evaluated in 
PITOPA-CR are control room layout and equipment arrangement, accessibility, ambience and 
comfort, and communicating system. 
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B1. Control room layout and equipment arrangement 
Since as previously mentioned, control room is consisted of several workstations and 
equipment, a good arrangement and positioning of those elements need to be maintained in 
providing support for operators. The evaluation comprises: 
- Arrangement/layout of furniture, instruments and other equipment to consistently 
meet the staffing and task assignments 
- Document organisation and storage 
- Storage of tools, protective clothing and equipment i.e. helmet, safety gloves, masks, 
etc. 
- Positioning of emergency equipment and exit 
B2. Accessibility 
Related to point B1, the access to all necessary elements in the control room must be kept 
available. The layout of control room and the arrangement of different equipment must 
provide the operators with adequate accessibility in reaching for instance working 
procedures and emergency exit, within a relative narrow time frame. Additionally, the access 
to displays and controls required for continuous monitoring needs to be assured in any 
process condition, for all operators working at that time regardless to the specific tasks 
assignments. This is to enable any operators working at that moment to gain awareness of 
process abnormality, even if they were not assigned with the monitoring of the particular 
part of the process.  
Another point evaluation regarding the “accessibility” is the sufficient access between the 
control room with other necessary locations, such as the plant manager or the supervisor 
office, room for personal storage (including restrooms, room for eating and lounge facilities), 
and  laboratories. At plants where direct operators involvement in field is required, the 
shortest and safest access to reach the plant needs to be available.  
B3. Environment, ambience & comfort 
Working environment in a control room needs to be maintained within the operator’s 
comfort range. Besides the availability of the above mentioned facilities; resting and eating 
area, restrooms and lounge facility, operator’s comfort during working in the control room 
must be assured by maintaining the thermal comfort, illumination and the auditory 
environment.  
- Thermal comfort includes room temperature, air humidity and adequate ventilation 
- Illumination; level of illumination for different activities must be ensured, for instance 
lighting at workstations and individual controls, for reading and writing area or 
additional emergency lighting for special condition  
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- Auditory environment includes the background noise level in the workplace. Noise 
can come from the busy line of communication between field and control room 
operators or due to a number of stale alarms that are constantly active.  
B4. Communicating system 
Communicating system plays an essential role in assuring operation reliability especially at 
the plants where manual intervention of operators is still required. Such intervention 
requires certain operators to conduct tasks directly at process equipment, in connection 
with decisions made by control room operators. Hence, good communication between the 
two must be maintained at an adequate level through the availability of a good and proper 
communicating system. A good communicating system must also related to point B3 reduce 
the noise level in the control room.  
C. Workstation Design 
Workstation is where the operators perform their tasks and is consisted of different HSI 
elements, such as displays and input devices. Types of workstation are i.e. sit-stand workstation, 
stand-up and sit-down consoles, vertical panels and desks. The design characteristics of 
workstation can affect reach, vision and comfort. Considerations correspond to the design of 
workstations must comprise the general configuration, labelling and signage of operating 
elements, and layout of panels and displays.   
C1. Workstation configuration 
The evaluation of workstation configuration comprises the unique consideration of the 
followings: 
- Dimensioning, including workstation height, slope, angle and depth. 
- Positioning, including placement of controls and distance from front edge of 
workstation 
- Display location, positioning of displays on desks if not integrated mounted, location 
of displays to  avoid glare and blinding 
- Lateral spread of controls and displays 
- Clearance for legs and feet 
- Sitting and standing positioning relative to types of workstation 
C2. Labelling and signage of controls & demarcation 
Permanent labels are generally used to identify group of panels, controls and displays, 
individual items, instructions and control directions, whereas signs can be used to 
emphasize necessary instructions, warnings or forbiddance to perform certain actions. 
Demarcation lines are additionally used to identify workstation sections. The characteristics 
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that need to be taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of labels, signs and 
demarcation lines are: 
- Content 
- Size 
- Location 
- Colourings and contrast 
- Lettering  
- Consistency and permanence  
C3. Layout of panels and displays 
In relation with point C1, the layout of panels and displays need to be extra evaluated in term 
of the placement of displays (vertical or horizontal placement of multiple displays), 
orientation relative to line of sight, viewing distance and the position of frequently and 
infrequently monitored display device. 
D. Job Design 
In maintaining the situational awareness during process monitoring, it is essential to design and 
allocate operators’ responsibilities in such a way that guarantees a good proportion between 
performing process orientation, monitoring and evaluation, taking action and assessment of 
current situation. A proper job design must prevent and boredom to control room operators, and 
must on the other hand prevent work overloading and fatigue, both of which can lead to the 
reduction of situation awareness.  
D1. Allocation of work 
Works must be allocated to operators who meet necessary requirements demanded by the 
tasks to be completed. Several people may have limitations in performing certain works, so 
that they might require assistance from other co-workers. Hence, a consideration to always 
pair the operators must be taken into account in allocating the work, by combining 
necessary characteristics and limitations featured by each of them. Several points to be 
evaluated in term of work allocation may include: 
- Whether the tasks assigned to the operator puts irrational demand that is beyond 
his/her capabilities. 
- If the operators are assigned with task that is either too hard or too easy for him/her, 
whether the operator is provided with assistance from other co-workers or is 
responsible to assistance to other workers. 
- Is the job assigned to the operators suitable for their qualifications, by not asking 
more than the operators may have been acknowledged with based on their working 
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experience, yet giving them the opportunity and space for learning more about the 
process and the work.   
D2. Variation of work 
Since the work in control room often deals with routines and monotonous activities that can 
cause boredom and reduce situational awareness, it is favourable to make the job a little 
more complex by putting more variation to it. This can include introducing more variety of 
tasks and to a certain possible extent, giving operators with more responsibilities in 
planning and execution of the work.  
D3. Staffing 
The attribute ‘staffing’ describes the availability of the minimum necessary number of 
experienced and apt operators present on a shift in order to complete the work successfully 
without putting too high load on each operator. By staffing, it is to be evaluated whether the 
distribution of age, level of experience, health condition or other physical and/or 
psychological limitations among the workers in one shift is in a good proportion that 
guarantees the availability of capable and fit operators to be present on each working shift.  
Some of the problems related to staffing would be: 
- Qualified staff being too few on a shift or a particular job that requires skilled workers. 
- Insufficient personnel leading to overloading and therefore stress. 
- Excessive personnel leading to poor co-ordination and communication. 
D4. Work scheduling & shifting plans 
Work schedule and shifting plans are commonly a problem that occurs on every shift. There 
are many patterns of shift work rotation recognized these days, some of which are easier 
than others. However, the pros and cons between the patterns are still disputable and no 
conclusion can be made about which one suits best.  
Hence, the evaluation can only first look at the satisfaction level among the workforce about 
the selected and implemented shift pattern, and whether the decision to enforce this certain 
pattern has taken their opinions into account. Additionally, the duration and frequency of 
rest breaks and how these are organised must also be taken into consideration in the 
evaluation.  
D5. Proportion of manual/field work 
Since in most of chemical process plants, there is still a considerably number of semi-
automatic systems, the proportion between manual/field work and control room work 
needs to be maintained practical and realistic. During process monitoring operators are 
often required to perform direct manipulation at the process equipment while other 
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operators monitor and manipulate the process from the control room. The amount of 
activities to be conducted directly on-site can have effect on many other aspects, such as the 
allocation of work, staffing and also communication system.   
E. Operator Competence 
Operator competence and cognitive ability is by far considered as one of the most important PIFs 
from operator’s perspective. For many of them, regardless of all positive changes to the system, 
it is their own capability to comprehend the process condition and the system that counts in 
achieving the operation’s goal. Attributes that contribute to operator competence are skill & 
knowledge, working experience, physical characteristics & fitness for duty, and adequate 
training and courses. 
E1. Skill and knowledge 
Skill describes the human ability to interpret information, for example to recall and carry out 
steps to perform tasks, technical reading and drawing skills. It also includes visual and 
hearing abilities. Since they are not inherent personal qualities, they can be obtained through 
training and experiences. Knowledge is all a person knows and understands in order to 
perform the task successfully. Knowledge is for example; understanding hazards, processes 
and operation procedures, equipment, and rules. Requirement of certain skill and knowledge 
depends on the kind of task to be performed by the operators. Many of the control room 
works require more understanding concerning the process and working experiences, 
without eliminating the need of good motoric and physical ability.   
E2. Working experience 
Experiences give the operator familiarity about the task, and in many cases play bigger role 
than trainings, especially in overcoming with abnormal situations. Due to the intensiveness 
of process knowledge required in performing process monitoring, tasks allocation needs to 
take into account the time an operator has spent at the corresponding plant. Lack of 
experiences can be compensated by good supervision and adequate communication with 
other co-workers. 
E3. Operator physical characteristics and fitness 
The work in control room requires particular reliability in aptitude and physical fitness for 
duty. Operators can easily lose sight of process status just after a slight reduction of 
concentration level due to tired eyes, drowsiness or uncomfortable feel after being in a 
sitting position for hours. In relation with the allocation of work in point D1, tasks must be 
allocated to operators by taking into account their physical limitations. In some cases it is 
B-8 | A p p e n d i x  B  
 
desirable to issue some restrictions to performing particular tasks related to age or health 
condition. 
E4. Training and courses 
In analysing on-site tasks by means of the conventional PITOPA, the evaluation of training 
and courses is conducted implicitly through the evaluation of the level of skill and knowledge 
demanded by the task. Here, in analysing control room works, it is considered necessary to 
put training and courses and an extra point of evaluation and hence is separated from point 
E1. The evaluation comprises the actualization of training plans that include basic 
understandings about the operating system, including control and alarm system. Since 
computer and automation technology moves very rapidly, trainings to upgrade operators’ 
skill and knowledge to be able to operate the more sophisticated operating elements need to 
be guaranteed, especially for the older ones.  
F. Operator Supporting System 
Operating supporting system in this analysis relates with all aspects that provide the operators 
with necessary information in evaluating and analysing process condition, and to 
correspondingly make decisions to overcoming with abnormalities. In other words, operator 
supporting system has the goal to provide the operators with necessary assistance during fault 
detection and diagnosis, and to direct them to finding proper solutions. The contributing 
attributes are the operating and working procedures, emergency safeguards and ERPs, and 
computerized operating procedure system.  
F1. Operating and working procedures 
Procedures refer to document system such as standard operating instructions, maintenance 
and emergency procedures. Operating procedures that are consisted of cautions, warnings 
and notes, and explain step-by-step instructions, should support the operator to perform 
their job safely. A good procedure is an important key to safe operation, quality assurance 
and environmental impact reduction. Many accidents happened because instructions were 
not followed, were missing or even incorrect. Since procedure is present to improve safety 
and reduce human error, it should be evaluated and improved in order to make sure that it is 
accurate and up-dated.  
Procedures are aimed to support the operators with its user-friendliness, accurateness and 
conformation to appropriate standards, as well as its consistency in format and lay-out. 
Additionally, operating procedures must be maintained attainable for control room 
operators, by providing an adequate storage for such documents in the control room as 
discussed in point B1. 
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F2. Emergency safeguards and emergency response procedures (ERP) 
In addition to the working procedures, operators also need to be provided with guidance 
concerning what they must do in facing emergency situations. There is a point where 
operators must terminate their effort to overcoming with upsets and for instance shut down 
the plant and walk away from the dangerous zone to protect their own life. This limit is 
however can be very vague, since operators’ mind is generally set with the idea to always try 
to keep the process safe and continue running. It is difficult for them under such a stress to 
recognize whether an emergency has occurred. Hence, it is necessary that the system assists 
the operators in such situation to recognize the dangerousness of the condition by for 
instance automatically terminating all incoming instructions from operators. The system 
should in opposite give operators an instruction to perform emergency shut-down. To 
prepare the operators in facing such emergency situation, an emergency response 
procedures (ERP) needs to be made available and attainable in the control room.  
F3. Computer-based operating procedure system (CBP) 
Procedures are normally available in written form as commonly known as paper-based 
procedures (PBP). With the increasing implementation of computerized control systems and 
DCSs, and also the increasing requirement to promote operation safety, operating 
procedures are nowadays computerized, and widely known as the computer-based 
operating procedure (CBP), which is integrated into the control and monitoring system. CBP 
provides the operators with guidance in selecting proper actions during tasks completion. 
The purpose is to increase the likelihood that the goal of the tasks can be safely achieved by 
correctly presenting unambiguous and desired course/sequence of actions. However, CBP 
must always be good maintained and kept updated to achieving the purpose of its 
implementation. 
The evaluation of CBP in this analysis must observe the relevance of the implementation for 
the completion of operators work and whether an updating plan is available to checking the 
actuality of the CBP. 
Operator supporting systems are sometimes computerized (known as COSSs - computerized 
operator supporting systems). However, such system is not widely accepted yet, since an extra 
reliable configuration of COSS is essentially required. Every possible error and the remedial 
actions to it need to be identified, so that COSS can suggest proper and reliable 
recommendations to the operators during the remediation of abnormal condition. Operators’ 
mind will be blocked with the suggestions offered by the system, and they will be no longer 
capable to automatically search for alternatives in solving the problems. Hence, if COSS is to be 
B-10 | A p p e n d i x  B  
 
implemented at a plant, it must be made sure that the system is able to comprise every problem 
that might arise during any operating state.   
G. Alarm System 
An evaluation of alarm systems can be made in term of their physical and functional 
characteristics. The physical characteristics describe the relationship between alarm system and 
the other parts of the plant, including how alarm systems interact with operators. The functional 
characterization describes how the alarm system is used in plant operation.  
G1. Number of alarms 
The extreme large number of alarms is a common problem for control room operators. In a 
complex system, especially those that have been operating for many years, modifications, 
audits and reviews can add up the number of sensors and alarms from time to time. Without 
a good management of alarms, this increasing number can lead to over-alarming, flood, 
nuisance, and other typical alarm problems. An analysis of alarm logs often shows that the 
most frequent incoming or activated alarms are those that are in the reality irrelevant to 
operators’ work. Hence, it is essential to limit the number of alarms, by re-identifying the 
real alarms and differentiate them from warnings and other annunciations. Moreover, it is 
also reasonable to group the alarms so that the presentation can be made based on this 
grouping to whom the alarms may concern. More about alarm presentation will be evaluated 
in point G4. 
G2. Alarm prioritization 
A good and proper prioritization of alarms holds one of the keys to a reliable process 
monitoring and controlling. Operators often feel overloaded by too many incoming alarms 
that are irrelevant, require no further actions from them or indicate non-dangerous 
situations. Improper alarm prioritization and their presentation to the operators can distract 
operators from the real important action at that particular moment. Such situation can force 
the operators to conduct erroneous actions that can ultimately result in a disaster. For this 
reason, the adequacy of alarm prioritization system implemented in the plant needs to be 
evaluated, starting with the basic rules how alarms are prioritised to how alarms with 
different priority are presented. The letter relate with point G4 discussed below. 
G3. Available response time 
In performing remedial actions, especially following a high-priority alarms, operators will 
require adequate time to process the information and make a proper decision 
correspondingly. The unavailability of sufficient time to respond will put more loads on them 
and hence cause stress that will disturb their information processing. Severe consequences 
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may result from any incorrect decision taken during remedial actions and therefore this is to 
be strictly avoided. Hence, there must be an anticipation of the time a high-priority alarm 
should be presented to the operators, so that they can have adequate time to conduct 
corrective actions. The result coming from CROAA can help the identification of necessary 
time-span that must be made available for control room operators after acknowledging an 
alarm.    
G4. Signalling and presentation 
The presentation of alarms to the operators determines how fast and correctly they 
acknowledge and respond to incoming alarms. Alarms can be presented using visual or 
auditory components. The auditory components are designed to capture the operator's 
attention to a change in the plant, while the use of visual components guide attention to the 
appropriate alarm (by i.e. flashing) and provide detailed alarm information (i.e. alarm 
message). In some cases it can be desirable to combine visual and auditory components to 
display alarms. 
Generally alarm display approaches can be characterized into three basic types; spatially 
dedicated, continuously visible (SCDV) alarm displays (e.g., tiles), alarm message lists (e.g., 
for temporary alarm displays) and integrated alarms into process displays. The presentation 
of alarms has to ensure that operators acknowledge especially the high-priority alarms in 
time, and to not letting the operators get distracted by the presentation of less important 
alarms.  Several important characteristics of alarm presentation to be evaluated are:  
- General characteristics (e.g., alarm graphics, selection of visual or auditory 
components, consistency of alarm coding) 
- Display of high-priority alarms 
- Display of alarm status (unacknowledged, acknowledged or cleared) 
- Display of shared alarms (alarms that can result from more than one causes) 
- Alarm messages/list 
G5. Failures indication features 
The failures indication features should let the operators know about any malfunction 
occurring in the alarm system. Whether a sensor is being repaired or software maintenance 
is being undertaken, operators need to be informed that certain functions of the system they 
are currently working with are not usable. Such indication will avoid misinterpretation and 
failures in taking further decisions.  
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G6. Maintenance 
Maintenance of alarm systems must be well planned and frequently implemented to 
maintain the system reliability. Maintenance needs to take into account feed-backs from 
operators related to the user-friendliness of the system in operators; opinion. Related to 
point G5, undertaken maintenance and repairs must be informed to all operators to avoid 
them from gaining too much trust in a malfunctioning system.  
 
H. Line Management 
Line management is the implementation of organisational policies in the daily life of process 
operation. Hence, line management has a major impact on the conditions that influence error, 
since even if appropriate policies are enforced by the higher managerial level, these policies may 
be ineffective without the support of line management. There are several aspects correspond to 
the line management in maintaining effective operation and maintenance, such as a clear line of 
responsibility and supervision, communication and documentation, management of change, and 
the quality of the organisational and safety cultures themselves.  
H1. Line of responsibility & supervision 
It is needed to have a clear hierarchy of responsibilities in performing tasks. Lack of 
knowledge or experience concerning the task, or the need of any quick decision in 
emergency situations, can be compromised by the availability of adequate supervision. 
Supervision has the responsibility to allocate the activities for the whole team in order to 
achieve compliance using rules and procedures, monitoring the team performance, making 
decision whenever required, leading the team, facilitating workforce and maintaining good 
communication within the team, and ensuring and developing team work. Therefore, it is 
essential to have a clear path of responsibility and to have the right people with adequate 
knowledge and outstanding decision making ability placed on the supervising positions. 
H2. Communication & documentation 
Communication is the exchange of information between elements within the organisation. 
The management system is responsible for addressing the communication between the line 
personnel, staff personnel, supervisors and upper management. Maintaining good 
communication among co-workers and between different hierarchies is very essential in 
forming a good atmosphere at work. If this is achievable, workes’s motivation and trust to 
the company can be increased, which will certainly lead to an improvement in their 
performance.  
Documentation as one type of communication can refer to several meanings (ISO 14100): 
1. Policy, objectives and targets set by management. 
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2. Description of scope of each management systems in the organisation. 
3. Description of the main elements of management systems and their interaction and 
reference to related documents.  
4. Documents and records required by regulations and by other subscribed requirements. 
5. Documents including records determined by the organisation to be necessary to ensure 
the effecting planning, operation and control of processes, such as pipe and 
instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), flow diagrams, incident reports, procedures and other 
documents that can be found at the workplace. 
Documentation should be considered as an essential activity since a good documentation can 
be used as learning material of failure or incorrect actions which were performed in the past 
and can help avoiding the same mistake from occurring again in the future. A record of how 
the recent process is performed should also be made, so that it can be used later as a 
consideration in taking a decision, anytime an improvement or enhancement of the plant is 
needed. 
H3. Management of Change (MoC) 
Changes made on any part of the plant or in the working procedure need to be analysed, 
planned, implemented, controlled and documented to avoid major hazards. The implications 
of restructuring the plant must be assessed to ensure that the plant personnel receive 
adequate resource to discharge their responsibilities. In dealing with control room works, 
the management of change plays a very big role, since any changes that are not well analysed 
and not adequately informed to the operators can result in disastrous events. Organisational 
changes include changes in role and responsibilities, organizational structure, staffing levels, 
staff disposition and others that might directly or indirectly affect the control hazards, such 
as changes in reporting relationships, objectives, resources, management system, available 
expertise for design, engineering support, procurement, etc. 
H4. Organisational and safety culture 
Organisational culture is the major component in determining safety performance and 
behaviour. It can be described as “a pattern of basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or 
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration- that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those 
problems” (Schein, 1985). Since line management is responsible for the implementation of 
organisational cultures and policies during plant operation, it is necessary to also evaluate 
how sufficient the organisational culture values process safety and human factors.  
 
